ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF A EUROPEAN UNION

By GOTTFRIED HABERLER

THE idea of a European political and economic union is more popular and is being taken more seriously in the United States than in Europe. The American attitude has been well expressed in the "Declaration of Policy" of "The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948" by which Congress enacted the European Recovery Program. One section of that act reads:

> Mindful of the advantages which the U.S. has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal trade barriers, and believing that similar advantages can accrue to the countries of Europe, it is declared to be the policy of the people of the U.S. to encourage these countries [receiving Marshall aid] through a joint organization to exert common efforts . . . which will speedily achieve that economic cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and recovery.[1]

The European countries are being continually admonished by many well-meaning Americans to hurry with their unification; they are scolded for moving too slowly and are told that this is their last chance; unite or perish! Recently there has been much talk about regional unions. France and Italy have been discussing a customs union for some time. The Scandinavian countries have ventilated the possibility of a Nordic union. And there is, of course, the Benelux economic union between Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg.

It is important that American public opinon should not be misled by so much talk into believing that a Western European union is likely to be formed within a few years and that such a union is a necessary condition for European economic recovery and the maintenance of peace. It can be conclusively shown, I believe, that a real political or economic union in Western Europe is utterly impossible and that economic recovery and peace can be achieved without it.

[1] Section 102 (a).

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In the following pages I shall deal primarily with the economic aspects of the problem. For a penetrating historical and psychological treatment, see Crane Brinton's brilliant essay, *From Many One: The Process of Political Integration; The Problem of World Government.*[2]

I

The term "union" in the political as well as in the economic sense is often employed very loosely. People sometimes mean by "forming a union" not more than that the European countries should get along, compose their differences, cooperate militarily in defense against aggression from the East, eliminate the worst impediments to trade and travel, that is, restore freedom of trade and travel to the limited extent that existed in, say, the 1920's or at least in the middle 1930's. Compared with the present situation such a state of affairs could indeed be called a "union" and a union in that modest sense is, indeed, not only desirable but essential, and I should say capable of at least approximate realization.

But most people who insist that unification is necessary mean by union something much more ambitious. Similarly, in the present paper I shall be concerned with union in a stricter sense.

Let us discuss the economic side of such a union. What is usually demanded is a *customs union.* This is an arrangement by which two or more countries agree on a common customs tariff against the outside world. If the customs union is complete, customs duties for the trade between the members of the union are completely abolished, thus creating a free trade area inside the common tariff wall. (If the customs union is incomplete, duties on trade between the members are not completely abolished, but only reduced. An incomplete customs union shades off into preferential tariff arrangements.)

It has always been recognized by economists and political scientists that a customs union is the first step towards a complete economic and political union. If we disregard a few unimportant cases, where tiny countries with no political ambitions attach themselves economically to larger neighbors (like

[2] Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948.

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Luxemburg to Belgium, or Liechtenstein to Switzerland), there is no case of a customs union on record which was not accompanied or quickly followed by complete political unification. This was true during the comparatively liberal nineteenth century and it would be doubly true of real economic union today.

However, under present-day circumstances a mere customs union would mean precious little. What would be the use of abolishing customs duties, say, between France and Great Britain, if all the other measures by which governments influence and direct the production and flow of commodities were maintained, such as import quotas, special taxes, maximum or minimum prices, consumer rationing, allocation of raw material and labor, regulation of investment, exchange control, credit policies, outright government trade monopolies ("state trading" and "bulk purchases") and so forth and so on? The present state of the Benelux union offers an excellent example. Belgium and Holland have agreed on a common tariff against the outside world and have abolished duties on trade between themselves. But since they have not yet been able to reach an agreement on the other phases of economic policy trade between them is still tightly regulated and their economic unification is still entirely in the future. Whether they will be able to achieve a real economic union remains in doubt, although the chances of a success are better in this case than almost anywhere else in view of the political and cultural affinity of the two countries.

Let me repeat and emphasize: In our age of economic planning or, at least, of drastic government interference in the economic process, if a group of countries wishes to enjoy the benefits of economic unification, if they really want to create a free trade area such as exists within the boundaries of the United States, they must agree not only on a common tariff but also on all major phases of economic policy such as price policy and rationing, credit and investment policies, monetary and fiscal policies, and several others. In the nineteenth century an agreement on tariffs would have been sufficient to create a free trade area and to enable the participating countries to enjoy the benefits of large markets and international

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division of labor.[3] Today a mere tariff agreement would be only one of several prerequisites of economic unification and not the most important one at that.

II

Two conclusions follow from this fact. The first will hardly be disputed. It is that economic unification is impossible without political unification. There is no chance whatsoever that sovereign states will ever agree and stay agreed on the major phases of economic policy. My second conclusion is this: Economic unification in the real sense as indicated above is politically impossible except (a) if it were imposed by force by a dictator, a Stalin or a Hitler, or (b) after a return, *not* to complete *laissez faire* (if that ever existed), but to a condition of comparatively little state interference in economic matters as it existed before 1914.

It is practically impossible that countries like Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium should agree on a common economic policy. Today Britain, Norway, and the Netherlands pursue a policy of rigid control or planning, while in France and Italy the system of controls has largely broken down and Belgium has decontrolled her economy in an orderly fashion. It is hard to see how these two groups would be able to agree on a common economic policy. Moreover, it would be a dangerous illusion to assume, as many supporters of economic planning do, that a solution could be found if only the liberal bloc ("liberal" in a comparative sense)—France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland—could be persuaded to reintroduce a policy of controls. It is an illusion to believe that if only Léon Blum had a dependable majority in France, France and Britain could work out a joint plan which would bring about an effective unification of the two economies. I cannot and need not here go into the broad question of the precise meaning and scope of economic planning and the arguments for and against it. This much, however, seems to me undeniable: that such planning requires a high degree of political stability, a strong government, an iron discipline on the part of the whole people, a

[3] It is hardly necessary to demonstrate that universal free trade or, at least, all-round reduction in tariffs would be a still better and more promising method for furthering the benefits of international division of labor.

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superbly efficient administration served by an experienced and incorruptible civil service. And it is equally clear that even granted (although it is by no means certain yet) that these conditions are sufficiently fulfilled in a few countries like Great Britain, Norway, and the Netherlands, it is hopelessly utopian and unrealistic to expect anything like that in our times on an international scale.

The inescapable conclusion, then, is this: In a democratic Europe there will be either planning and no economic and political unification, or, if there is to be unification, there can be no comprehensive economic planning. Since I do not believe that there will be a sufficiently widespread and far-reaching return to economic *laissez faire*, I do not expect economic or political unification. There will be no European union now or in our time.

III

This conclusion should not be regarded as the expression of pessimism and despair. Western Europe has staged an economic and political recovery since the end of the war which is quite remarkable. She is, however, not yet out of the woods. It is by no means certain that mistakes will not be made which may slow down or halt the further expansion of output that is essential for making Western Europe self-supporting by the time American aid is scheduled to come to an end (1952). It would be very easy, for example, to put recovery in jeopardy by permitting, with the help of Marshall aid, the standard of living to rise to levels which cannot be supported when American aid tapers off. There may still be serious political disturbances and social revulsions, for example in France, which seems to be one of the weakest links in the Western chain. But the point is that such mistakes and mishaps can be avoided without unification.

True inter-European trade must be intensified. Several of the international economic organizations, notably the Economic Commission for Europe in their remarkable report, *A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe*,[4] have shown that the volume of inter-European trade has lagged

[4] Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948.

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far behind the volume of output. Economic nationalism is as strong and destructive as ever. Each country wants to produce its own automobiles, radios, refrigerators, railway equipment, ships, steel, and so forth. The consequence is that no country can produce these things on a sufficiently large scale to benefit from mass production methods. The amount of wasteful duplication of capacity in many lines which will be gradually revealed when the investment programs now in progress in the various countries are completed, may be uncomfortably large, leading to glutting of markets and severe unemployment.

It is, of course, easy to imagine and to postulate an omniscient and omnipotent international planning board which would adjust the various national plans and eliminate inconsistencies between them. But, for the reasons indicated above, we cannot expect anything like that to come into existence in our time. There is much talk of international coordination. There is even the paradoxical phenomenon of the United States, which stands for free enterprise, compelling Western Europe through the E.R.P. to draw up four-year plans on the ground that this procedure forces the participating countries to compare their respective plans and iron out inconsistencies. But whether, under the internationally uncoordinated type of planning which we have generally today, it will be possible to avoid major inconsistencies is very doubtful.[5]

The only effective method of coordinating the various national economies, to foster international division of labor and raise the volume of international trade and especially of inter-European trade, is a return to more liberal trading methods and a gradual elimination of the worst impediments to trade. An indispensable prerequisite for such a program is discontinuance of inflation, alignment of currencies, gradual but rapid substitution of the price mechanism for the methods of direct controls. To bring about this change in policy, is, of course, a difficult task. But it is not impossible. Great progress has been made in all Western European countries in that direc-

[5] It should be observed that some of the countries where price control, rationing, allocation of material and labor have broken down or have been abandoned, such as France, practice planning in the sense relevant here, viz., in the sense that they push, by all sorts of methods, the creation and expansion of industry in general and certain branches of industry in particular.

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tion during the last three years. A striking example of what can be achieved along these lines is offered by Belgium. Inflation was stopped soon after liberation by drastic monetary and fiscal measures, and liberal policies quickly put the country on the road to recovery. It has been pointed out *ad nauseam* that in Belgium favorable factors were present which did not exist in neighboring Holland or in Great Britain: comparatively little war destruction, high dollar income from the Congo, a legacy of dollars left behind by the U. S. Army. Nobody can deny that for these reasons Belgium was in a comparatively favorable position. But how easy it would have been to squander these favorable opportunities—by lax financial policies, by continuing inflation, upsetting the balance of payments and necessitating the continuation or re-imposition of stifling controls—is shown by the example of Sweden, a neutral country which emerged from the war under much more favorable conditions than Belgium.

Another even more striking, indeed a truly spectacular example of what can be achieved by liberal economic policies, is the amazing improvement that has taken place in Germany since June, 1948. At that time and at one stroke repressed inflation was removed by a drastic currency reform and the suffocating system of controls inherited from the Nazis, which had held the economy in a deadly grip, was swept away. The country is not yet out of danger; open inflation is still a threat. But open inflation (as well as deflation) can be avoided and if it were allowed to happen, it would be the consequence of new mistakes. The fact remains at any rate that the potency of liberal policies, of what Lord Keynes has called "the classical medicine," has once again been dramatically demonstrated by the recent German events. This is the more important because this test was made under most difficult circumstances.

Let me guard against a possible misunderstanding. The Belgian and German cases were not mentioned in order to suggest that the record and achievements of other Western European countries are less impressive. No doubt Great Britain's record of economic recovery is excellent and it compares very favorably with that of France, Italy or perhaps even Belgium.

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But that is really not surprising. If one keeps in mind that Great Britain had not to suffer from invasion or occupation, that no war of liberation was waged on her soil, that she received a huge American loan and enjoys certain national advantages (political stability, discipline, absence of a large group of communist saboteurs), one would expect the British economy to display a superior performance even with an economic policy which falls short of the optimum. The question is whether the performance of the British economy would not be still better if disinflation and restoration of the price mechanism had been started earlier and had been pushed more energetically.

It must not be forgotten, however, that Great Britain too (and the same seems to hold for Norway and the Netherlands) has moved in the direction of decontrol though more slowly and gradually than continental countries. Since she has a strong government, an efficient administration, and a disciplined people, she was able to reduce inflationary pressure by fiscal measures (budget surplus) and did not have to rely on sharp price rises to absorb excess purchasing power (up until now at least). Thus the inflationary gap has been diminished gradually and equilibrium between demand and supply reached or approached in many sectors. This has made it possible to abolish rationing for a number of commodities and to reinstate the price mechanism as a substitute for cumbersome and wasteful controls in these sectors. Britain has certainly still a long way to go, but she is going in the direction of decontrol, although at a rather slow pace. This movement could easily be speeded up and it should be speeded up in the interest not only of British recovery but also in the interest of European economic unification or, let us say more modestly, of European economic cooperation and reintegration.

This brings us back to our main theme: A higher and increasing degree of economic integration, a greater division of labor and a rising volume of trade, can be achieved quickly and effectively only by liberalizing economic policies. There is no easy short cut. To clamor for economic and political union means starting at the wrong end. Such a union is a chimera and no efforts should be wasted on it and thereby withdrawn

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from the arduous but necessary and not hopeless task of relaxing controls, reducing tariffs, and creating the necessary prerequisites thereof, to wit, elimination of open and repressed inflation, and restoration of the price mechanism and of monetary equilibrium. If this program is carried forward successfully, an increasing degree of economic unification will follow automatically.

IV

I would go one step further and would assert that under present circumstances an economic and political union is not only impossible, but if by a miracle it could be achieved, it would not even be desirable. The only condition under which I could imagine the formation of a union of Western Europe is in an extreme emergency. For example, after a devastation of Europe following another war or during a common war of survival against the onslaught of Eastern barbarism, something analogous to the British offer of June, 1940, to France of a complete union with common citizenship may conceivably succeed.

But is it not as certain as anything can be in such matters that as soon as the emergency is past and the reconstruction of the shattered economies begins (if we may again be allowed to stress the economic aspects of the problem), the union would be subjected to terrific stresses and disagreements? What kind of over-all policies should be pursued? The planning type as now practiced in Great Britain, Norway, and the Netherlands? Or the more liberal policies followed by other countries on the Continent? Even assuming that agreement on the general type of policy could be reached—which I for one would find in itself undesirable, if it meant the subjection of the whole group to rigid planning and control—there would still remain many vital questions to decide and to quarrel about. What should be the comparative standard of living? Is it not very natural that the poorer countries will demand the same standard of living as the richer members of the union, or that they would at least press for a rapid reduction of inequality? Will the countries who traditionally enjoyed a high real income be willing to grant equality to their poorer brothers, although that concession would necessarily be at the expense of their own living

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standard? Where should particular industries be located? In which temporal order should reconstruction proceed? It would be easy to multiply examples and to indicate in greater detail the gravity of the frictions which unavoidably must arise. Not only would the union break asunder—unless it were kept together by the iron fist of a dictator—but much hatred and antagonism would be generated in the process of disintegration which would poison the atmosphere for a long time to come and might well result in less international cooperation than would have been possible, if no attempt at forming a real union had been made.

What is true of individuals is often true of nations: Nowhere is there so much hatred as can often be found between members of the same family. Nations like people should, therefore, not be forced to live together and to decide jointly matters on which they cannot agree. In the interest of communal peace, it is often better that people live separately and that decision-making be decentralized as far as possible. It is the thesis of the present paper that this holds true of most of the major decisions concerning economic matters which in the Western world devolve upon the state and which the advocates of world government and similar movements wish to confer upon continental or regional unions.

It seems to be entirely inappropriate to apply to Western Europe the analogy of the thirteen colonies which formed the United States of America. The colonies were young countries with a very short history; their area and economies were still in flux and growing rapidly; the colonists spoke the same language and, above all, the unification came in the eighteenth century during the era of comparative economic liberalism. Suppose New England, the Middle Atlantic States, the South, Middle West, and the Pacific West had had a hundred years to harden into independent states with well protected economies supported by powerful vested interests, with different wage levels and living standards, currency, and banking systems. Is it not more than doubtful that there would be today a United States of America?

As Professor Brinton has recently remarked, it would be more appropriate to use as an analogy the Eighteenth Amend-

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ment to the Constitution rather than the Constitution itself. Even if abstinence from alcohol were affirmed as a good thing in itself, it can hardly be doubted that this aim was not well served by prematurely imposing complete prohibition. Similarly, even if unification of Western Europe or of all of Europe is desirable as such (which is by no means self-evident from every point of view, although this issue will not be argued here), it should come slowly and gradually. Its premature realization by force or under duress of an acute emergency would in the long run disunite rather than unite and so defeat its own purpose.

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THE COLLAPSE OF THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, 1914-45

By HAJO HOLBORN

ANY attempt at the formulation or critical review of American policies in Europe is conditioned by our historical conceptions. Whether we try to define American policy with regard to Germany, the economic recovery of Europe, or the protection of western Europe against further Russian inroads, we are consciously or unconsciously influenced by what we consider to be the "normal" organization of Europe, and are thereby led to direct our political actions as much as possible toward the restoration of the traditional order. There exists, on the other hand, a general awareness of radical changes in world politics and especially European affairs, and our practical political experiences demonstrate that we are constantly driven to adopt unprecedented measures which run counter to what we still envisage as the historical pattern of Europe.

During the last ten years, in which the United States was suddenly forced to assume a leading role in Europe, American policy-makers have committed some serious mistakes owing to the belief that a return was possible to a Europe in many respects similar to that of the nineteenth century. We have also stumbled in inferring from the novelty of the European situation that we could dispose of an analysis of historical factors altogether. A constructive treatment of European problems calls, indeed, for historical thinking. But historical knowledge, and even more the mere memory of a past age, are quite different from historical thinking. The foremost task of historical analysis is to establish a clear distinction between the forces and ideas of past ages which continue to have a bearing on our present-day problems, and those which have ceased to be live issues for our times or, perhaps, forever.

Historians seem to be habitually inclined to overrate the lasting quality of historical factors and to underestimate the ruptures in the process of history. But every page of history records

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not only survival but also death. Therefore, it should be stated clearly and emphatically that what is commonly called the "historic" Europe is dead and beyond resurrection. What we still have to gain is a critical insight into the events which destroyed the props of the old European system and the causes which made it an illusion to hope for the reconstruction of an autonomous Europe. The European political system collapsed during World War I, and since the statesmen at the Peace Conference of Paris and in the interwar period failed to revive it on a stable foundation it was swept away by World War II. Without an understanding of the general character of this revolutionary event in twentieth century history we cannot hope to make intelligent decisions with regard to our future course of action.

I

For practically a thousand years Europe meant the community of western peoples who lived, broadly speaking, between Scandinavia and Sicily, the British Isles and the Pripet marshes. These European nations were not politically unified, even in the middle ages, but were bound together chiefly by religious and cultural ties. In early modern times the balance of power system was the expression of whatever political integration they had achieved. But even in this period, the balance of power system was not an exclusively European system. Individual members of the European family have always been tempted to increase their weight by alliances with non-European powers. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Franco-Turkish alliance was the classic example of this tendency, while in the eighteenth century Russian influence began to be felt. By the end of the century Russia had acquired the Baltic provinces and large parts of Poland, countries which had formed the eastern outposts of the western world. In 1760 a Russian army occupied Berlin, and in 1799 Russian troops fought in Holland and Italy. It is interesting that Suvorov, who led Russian troops to victory in North Italy, has been built up in the Russia of Stalin as one of the great heroes of the Soviet Union.

Napoleon's conquest of Europe to the Vistula in the years 1805-1809 left England and Russia as the only powers capable of resistance. Though both England and Russia proved uncon-

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querable, the two powers were not strong enough in 1813 to dislodge Napoleon from Central Europe without the assistance of the nations and states of Central Europe itself. A Russian army could never have reached Paris in 1814 if Prussia and Austria had not joined forces with Czar Alexander I. As a result, Europe during the nineteenth century was not dominated by two super-powers, but by five great powers. Metternich took great care to avoid any action that would have made Alexander I the virtual ruler of the Continent, and in cooperation with England and even France he limited the expansion of Russia into Europe. As a result, though Metternich was not strong enough to keep Russia from taking central Poland, Russia's westward march was halted there for more than a century. Only in the Balkans did the disintegration of the Turkish empire allow further Russian advances in this period. British counteraction succeeded in thwarting Russian attempts at the full control of the Near East.

Czar Alexander's decision to carry on the war of 1812 beyond the frontiers of Russia and Poland to the complete defeat of Napoleon was sharply criticized by the Soviet historian Eugene Tarlé in his notable book on the war of 1812, written during the heyday of Soviet isolationism.[1] Tarlé expressed the opinion that Russian blood and strength were spent gratuitously, and that the policy of Alexander I only paved the way for the British hegemony of the nineteenth century. Unquestionably Britain was the chief winner in 1815, but Tarlé failed to discuss the great advantages which Russia gained from her participation in the European wars of 1813-15. Metternich, in spite of his anxious search for the establishment of a European system that would prevent a Russian invasion of Central Europe, realized at the same time that Central Europe had to be organized in such a way as to offer Russia the assurance of peace along her major frontier. He also wanted to use Czarist Russia to bolster the autocratic regimes of Central Europe. But the objective of the Holy Alliance, and of subsequent agreements between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, though grounded in common ideological partisanship, was largely found in the desire to assure Russia of the friendship of the powers along her western borders.

[1] Eugene Tarlé, *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1942 (first Russian edition, Moscow, 1938).

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Metternich's policy satisfied Russia's demand for national security and for influence in the affairs of her western neighbors. When the revolutions of 1848-49 threatened to wreck the system of Metternich, Czar Nicolai I actively intervened to restore the old Central European regimes and did not demand any *quid pro quo* for dispatching Russian troops into Hungary. Russia contributed substantially to the defeat of liberalism in Central Europe—a defeat from which Central European liberalism never fully recovered.

The shift of power from Vienna to Berlin in the 1860's did not seriously affect Russia's position or attitude. Bismarck was as much concerned as Metternich had been with impressing upon the Czar the harmony of Russian and German political interests as well as their common faith in monarchy. The Germany of William II, by turning from continental to world policy, antagonized not only Russia but also Britain, and these two powers, which had been farthest apart in every respect during the nineteenth century, united together with France in order to contain Central Europe.

II

The political system of Europe as created in 1815 broke down in World War I. German military victories drove Russia out of the provinces and states which the Czars had acquired since the early eighteenth century. If Russia had survived the German blows and had still been an Allied power in the fall of 1918, she probably could not have been denied control of the Turkish Straits, which the western powers promised her in 1915. In addition she would, of course, have retained her Baltic provinces and, in all likelihood, have annexed East Prussia. Poland would probably have been restored, though only as an autonomous state under the Russian crown. In this position Russia would have exercised great power in Europe, particularly in the succession states and in Germany.

The Bolshevist revolution, made possible by the chaos engendered by Germany's military triumphs in the East, induced the western powers not only to withhold all these potential gains from their wartime ally, but also to confirm the territorial losses which Russia had suffered by the treaty of Brest-Litowsk. If

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German policies during World War I had not been marred by unnecessary brutality and outright stupidity, Germany might have earned considerable gratitude in some of the new states which she had first brought to life. As it was, the states along the northeastern fringe of Europe as well as the succession states in the Danubian area looked toward the West for protection both against Russia and Germany.

For the first time since the early eighteenth century, all the peoples of the western Christian creed were free from Russian domination. Moreover, even some Russian territories, like parts of Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine, together with the strategic approaches to Russia, remained in western hands. But there was another side to the picture. To be sure, during the nineteenth century Russia held important non-Russian territories and wielded great influence in general European affairs. Yet at the same time Europe was not lacking in some power over Russia. As has been seen, Russian outward expansion was kept within certain bounds, and she was compelled to respect international treaties. Her internal development was heavily dependent upon foreign capital and technological advice. European ideas had a deeply stirring effect upon Russian intellectual life. Even a doctrine with the special overtones of the slavophile movement cannot be fully understood without some consideration of the impact of western thought.

Russia was being "westernized" in many respects and in this process displayed an unusual capacity for blending her own cultural heritage with modern western ideas. In the second half of the nineteenth century the great Russian novel and music became in their turn a leaven in western European thinking. This political and cultural *rapprochement* between Europe and Russia came to an end with World War I. It should be remembered, however, that Marxism is not a native Russian doctrine, though in the hands of Lenin, and even more so of Stalin, it has been adapted to the circumstances and needs of a Russia plunged into chaos and misery by military defeat. The philosophy of Karl Marx is an arsenal from which many political schools can draw arms. Bolshevist theory itself has undergone considerable change since 1917 in response to new political developments. In the early years after the October revolution, the

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western powers might well have moulded the circumstances which conditioned the evolution of that theory. In addition, the western powers could have overthrown the Bolshevist government itself.

In his recent speech in Boston, Winston Churchill characterized the "failure to strangle Bolshevism at its birth and to bring Russia . . . by one means or another into the general democratic system" as one of the major mistakes of the peacemakers of 1919.[2] This seems historically correct, and Mr. Churchill also deserves credit for having seen in 1919 the loss and danger to Europe involved in the separation and hostility of a Bolshevist Russia. It still remains doubtful, however, whether the policies in support of the white Russian interventionists, whom Mr. Churchill, as the British secretary of war, backed in the years after 1918, were wisely chosen. To give assistance to groups which were largely dominated by reactionary elements was not likely to win the confidence of the Russian masses. Russian interventionists, who enjoyed the support of the western powers, were also suspected of being collaborators in the despoilment of Russia, who had just been deprived of many of her western provinces with the approval of the western powers.

The attempt at intervention in Russia after World War I gave the Communist rulers in Moscow the chance to pose as the true defenders of the national interests of the country. They have derived great strength from this role ever since. It is revealing that the Soviet government appealed again mainly to Russian national sentiment when it officially named the Russo-German war of 1941-45 the "great patriotic war." The Allied interventions in Russia after World War I, undertaken without realistic plan and clear determination, greatly helped such an identification of the Bolshevist program with the historic Russian state.

The policy of half-hearted intervention was followed by the lukewarm policy of the *cordon sanitaire*. It represented the open admission of the inability of the western powers to influence the course of Russian domestic affairs except by increasing the difficulties, first of the stabilization, and then of the forced expansion of the Russian economy. It must be admitted, however,

[2] The *New York Times*, April 1, 1949.

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that the policy of the *cordon sanitaire* contributed to the defeat of early Soviet attempts to turn the Russian revolution into a world revolution, although events like the German recovery in the mid-twenties and the anti-Communist turn of the Chinese revolution were undoubtedly more important than the negative policy of abstention.

III

It was dubious from the beginning whether the new eastern states would be able to live between Russia and Germany, if Russia was not integrated in some fashion into a European system. Yet many people tended to forget Russia altogether. To them Poland seemed to have taken the place that Russia occupied in Europe before 1914, and the Little Entente that of the former Austro-Hungarian empire. But neither one could fill the role of the former Romanov and Habsburg empires. It must suffice here to mention only a few of the major weaknesses of the new eastern states. Since they looked in many different directions, toward the Baltic, the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas, they had not much unity among themselves. While the Habsburg empire, in spite of its pernicious internal controversies, had formed a viable economic entity, the new states were confronted with unsolvable economic problems in addition to their formidable political difficulties.

Among all these states Czechoslovakia was the most democratic and prosperous one. Practically none of the other states ever acquired an economic or political equilibrium. They were driven to adopt governmental methods which had only a superficial resemblance to democracy, while their living standards remained far below the European average. The ensuing social crises, brought to a head by the depression of the late twenties, inflamed again the conflict of nationalities. Not only did states like Poland and Czechoslovakia continue to be at loggerheads, but issues of nationality also undermined the internal cohesion of such states as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Hungary, smarting under her defeat, kept revisionist forces alive with the support of Italy.

It was an illusion to conceive of the Little Entente and Poland as substitutes for the empires of the Romanovs and Habsburgs.

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Between 1887 and 1917 France had spent about sixteen billions of francs in loans and investments in order to build up her Russian ally.[3] If she could have employed similar amounts of money to set the new eastern states on the road toward prosperity, the system of French eastern alliances might have become a strong underpinning of the European status quo. But the French depositor, having lost more than a quarter of all his foreign investments as a result of the World War, was not inclined to permit his government to conduct a bold foreign economic policy. Since the new states remained economically weak, the foremost potential customer, Germany, continued to hold considerable power in the southeastern European states.

Naturally, the military agreements between France and the eastern states were practical only as long as France was physically capable of cooperating with her eastern allies and making a substantial contribution to their defense both against Germany and the Soviet Union. This required the disarmament of Germany, at least to the extent that French troops could force a junction with the Czechoslovak army along a line from Metz-Diedenhofen to Eger-Pilsen. It also called for a French army capable of strategic maneuver and not one almost exclusively designed for defensive operations along the frontiers of France.

The responsibility for maintaining the Paris settlement, however, lay as much with Britain as with France. From the outset there was a great deal of skepticism in Britain regarding all the new eastern states. During World War I the champions of the partition of the Habsburg empire had gained only a slight superiority over the forces which insisted on the preservation of a reorganized Habsburg empire, or at least the establishment of some Danubian federation.[4] In any event, after 1919 British diplomacy tried to keep the Polish state within certain bounds, in order to mollify Russian and German animosity against the revived Poland. The Curzon line on the one side, and the acceptance of plebiscites in Upper Silesia, East- and West-Prussia

[3] Cf., Herbert Feis, *Europe the World's Banker, 1870-1914*, New Haven, Yale, 1930, p. 51; and Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, *War Debts and World Prosperity*, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1932, p. 426.

[4] Cf., for example, David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*, 2 vols., New Haven, Yale, 1939, vol. I, pp. 17ff.

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and the drafting of the Danzig statute on the other, were illustrations of this British policy.

No doubt, it would have been possible and perhaps even wise to correct the Versailles treaty in Germany's favor as long as such changes could be achieved by procedures of international law and multilateral agreement, and not by unilateral *faits accomplis*. But British diplomacy failed conspicuously to discourage the latter methods. The most important event in this connection was the decision by the Conservative British cabinet in 1924 to reject the Geneva Protocol and to negotiate instead the Locarno Treaty. Britain thereby drew a definite distinction between the western and eastern parts of the Paris settlement. She declared her reluctance to participate in the active support of the new order in eastern Europe, and her determination to limit her commitments to the protection of the Rhine.

The historical adviser to the British Foreign Office, Sir James Headlam-Morley, in a remarkable and prophetic memorandum, warned the British cabinet in February, 1925, that "the danger point in Europe" was not the Rhine, but the Vistula, and he went on to inquire:

> Has anyone attempted to realize what would happen if there were to be a new partition of Poland, or if the Czechoslovak state were to be so curtailed and dismembered that in fact it disappeared from the map of Europe? The whole of Europe would at once be in chaos. There would no longer be any principle, meaning, or sense in the territorial arrangements of the continent. Imagine, for instance, that under some improbable condition, Austria rejoined Germany; that Germany using the discontented minority in Bohemia, demanded a new frontier far over the mountains, including Carlsbad and Pilsen, and that at the same time, in alliance with Germany, the Hungarians recovered the southern slope of the Carpathians. This would be catastrophic, and, even if we neglected to interfere in time to prevent it, we should afterwards be driven to interfere, probably too late.[5]

Headlam-Morley argued that Great Britain could only be defended on the European continent, irrespective of the fact that she formed at the same time the center of a world-wide empire. England had always been a part of the European political system, and most certainly so in the days of Elizabeth, Cromwell, Marlborough, Chatham, Pitt, Castlereagh, Canning, Palmer-

[5] Sir James Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History*, New York, A. H. King, 1930, pp. 182-84.

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ston, Salisbury, Lansdowne, and Grey.[6] The British historian was also right when he called it the supreme achievement of statesmanship in the first half of the nineteenth century that France was brought back to the councils of the great European powers without ever being allowed to upset the order of Europe which the Congress of Vienna had established. He recommended analogous concessions to Germany, particularly by a revision of reparations, but warned British statesmen not to give Germany the chance to wreck the basic arrangements of the Paris Conference. This would be possible, he correctly predicted, if the new eastern European states were left without general protection, and if Germany were permitted to cooperate with Russia against them.

But British diplomacy, in line with the prevailing public opinion in England, chose a different course. Sir Austen Chamberlain, in spite of his strong personal sympathies for France and his suspicions of Germany, was swayed by the general sentiment that Britain could avoid continental entanglements except for limited commitments made for the immediate security of the English Channel. By confining the British guarantee to western Europe, Britain gave the impression that she was willing to tolerate changes in eastern Europe, in contrast to the declared French policy.

If Stresemann found a majority in support of his Locarno policy among the Germans, it was largely due to the hope that the treaty seemed to open the gates for a revision of Versailles in the East. To be sure, Germany had to sign arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and France strengthened her ties with the two states simultaneously with the signing of the Locarno treaty. But the eastern peace settlement was not reinforced by a British guarantee. Moreover, Germany, in a special protocol, was assured by the other Locarno powers that her cooperation in the defense the League Covenant against a Russian infraction would take into account her "military situation" as well as "geographical situation."[7] This actually meant

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[7] Arthur Berriedale Keith, ed., *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs, 1918-1937*, 2 vols., London, Oxford University Press, 1938, vol. I, p. 124.

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that Germany was given great latitude to determine her relations with Russia without much reference to her League obligations. When in April, 1926, Germany concluded the Treaty of Berlin with the U.S.S.R., Stresemann could tell the Soviet government that the question of whether or not the U.S.S.R. would be judged an aggressor by the League in the event of a conflict with a third state "could only be determined with binding force for Germany with her own consent."[8]

The Locarno treaties and Germany's entrance into the League of Nations have often been described as the apogee of the international system of 1919. In reality Locarno failed to create a European peace. It covered up certain cracks, which had appeared in the building, but allowed others to continue unchecked. It would have been unobjectionable to make concessions to Germany between 1924 and 1930 in such matters as the occupation of the Rhineland and reparations. Probably much more should have been done to enable German democracy to develop under normal conditions. But it was a tragic fallacy to believe that eastern Europe could be neglected economically and politically without courting the gravest dangers.

We have seen already that the new eastern states did not possess sufficient unity among themselves. Nor was this lack of unity among them surprising, since they had developed in different directions as borderlands of the historic European community. For a time the Habsburg monarchy had tied the nationalities of the Danubian basin together, and Austria in turn had been a major force in the maintenance of the European continent. But once the Turkish pressure subsided and democratic national movements raised their heads, the Habsburg empire was lost. No doubt, the establishment of some sort of Danubian federation after 1919 would have been desirable for a good many reasons, but it would not have solved the major problems of security of the new eastern states. They could have found a solution only within a closely integrated European system, which the League of Nations and the European diplomacy of the interwar period failed to provide.

[8] Note by the German Foreign Minister Stresemann, to the Soviet Ambassador, Krestinski, April 24, 1926; *Ibid.*, pp. 128ff.

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IV

Winston Churchill has called World War II the "unnecessary war."[9] Of course, Mr. Churchill probably would not deny that there is an overriding necessity in the course of history, grounded not so much in political events, as in the moral and intellectual fiber of nations and men. But in the more narrowly defined "political" sense, in which this article is conceived, we must assume with Mr. Churchill that statesmen have a choice not only of objectives but of methods to achieve them. It is doubtful whether after World War I the victorious European powers had it in their hands to restore the continent to full prosperity without active American cooperation, but it is much less doubtful that Britain and France together could have built and upheld a European political system in spite of the withdrawal of the United States from Europe after 1920. The opportunity for rebuilding an integrated political system in Europe had already been missed by the time Hitler came to power.

The reaction of the western states to the rise of National Socialism was only another manifestation of their lack of awareness of the general problems of Europe. In 1935 Hitler succeeded in restoring the German *Wehrmacht* (which included imposing air forces), and thereby became an immediate threat to Britain as well as France. By the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 he made effective military cooperation between France and her eastern allies impossible. Two years later Hitler could force England and France to collaborate in undoing the European order of 1919 by becoming accomplices in the dissection of Czechoslovakia, the most strategically placed and strongest of the new European states.

The Munich treaty gave Germany undisputed control over southeastern Europe on the condition that Hitler would not go to war against the East and that he would respect certain rules of international law. If Hitler had been satisfied with the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland, he could have gained ever increasing control over southeastern Europe through economic penetration. It was unlikely that the western powers would have had either the minds or the means to chal-

[9] Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1948, p. iv.

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lenge such a German policy, which could have led to a German-dominated federation of *Mitteleuropa*. On the other side, Russia would have grown uneasy over an eastward expansion of Germany, but could hardly have interfered without the active support of the western powers. As a matter of fact, Britain and France, in excluding the Soviet Union from the Munich settlement, had seemed to turn the pressure of German power deliberately away from the West and toward Russia.

Yet it is idle to speculate on the course that history might have taken if Hitler had concentrated on the peaceful exploitation of his vast gains after 1938. He had geared the German economy to war and had prepared the German people for tribal conquest. Indeed, he had been pouting already when Chamberlain, at Munich, deprived him of "his" war.[10] Thus the march into Prague, and, shortly thereafter, the struggle for Poland followed. British diplomats suddenly realized that the Vistula was as important as the Rhine, but their attempt in 1939 at building up an eastern "cordon" against Germany with Rumania, Hungary, and Poland, was more an act of faith than a political performance. In any event, the decisive question was the future attitude of the Soviet Union, and this diplomatic problem was tackled last.

In the summer of 1939 it had become clear that effective military cooperation between Russia and the new Anglo-French entente would be even more difficult than it had been during World War I. The Russians undoubtedly knew that the western powers had decided, at least for the initial phase of the imminent war, upon a defensive strategy in the West, which meant that the Russians would have to carry the burden of the fight. Possibly the western armies would not go beyond what came to be known as a *Sitzkrieg*, and Chamberlain might conclude a new compromise at the expense of Russia. It is at least understandable that the Soviet government entertained grave suspicions in view of both the events prior to 1939 and of the realities of the moment.

It cannot be denied that the Soviet rulers were asked to as-

[10] The best historical treatment so far of the events leading up to Munich and the Polish crisis is to be found in two English books: John Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy*, New York, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1948; and Lewis B. Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-39*, London, Macmillan, 1948.

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sume awful risks when they were invited to join in the resistance against Hitler. In these circumstances it was natural that they requested permission to occupy the natural ramparts in the Baltic that had protected Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and that they inquired what forms Russian-Polish military cooperation could take. The answers were disconcerting. Poland refused to admit Russian troops, and the western powers maintained that the integrity of the Baltic states was protected by the Covenant. It is difficult to see how the western powers could have acted differently, though in the Czechoslovak crisis they had hardly even paid lip-service to their League obligations. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 23, 1939, was the result of this unexampled breakdown of every concerted action. Under the terms of the treaty the Soviets could occupy most of the Baltic states, Bessarabia, and one third of Poland. Their western defenses were greatly improved and, for the time being at least, Russia was relieved of the threat of a German attack. Germany was turned against the West.

It would be difficult to find in international history a comparable moment of general confusion. Every major actor in the events of 1939 was sooner or later to discover his lack of foresight. The final result of the war should, one may hope, convince the Germans of the criminal folly which Hitler committed not only in unleashing a general war, but also in removing the buffers between Russia and Germany which had largely been created by German military efforts in World War I. The blind contempt which the Germans had always felt for the Poles played an important part in these events.

Stalin himself soon had reason to rethink the practicability of the Soviet-German pact. The consequences of this eastern "Munich" were as catastrophic as those of the Munich treaty of 1938 had been. The pact was concluded in the hope that a struggle between Germany and the West would ensue, and that it would last some time and weaken Germany as well. Stalin's general judgment—that France and Britain were weak, despite Germany's inclination to underrate British skill and determination[11]— proved correct, but the Nazi conquest of the continent

[11] Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, eds., *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, Washington, Department of State, 1948, p. 74.

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was faster and more thorough than the Russian leaders had expected. There is a bitter note in all subsequent reported statements by Stalin on France, which "opened the gates to the fascist enemy," contributed less to the final victory than the Poles, and should not be readmitted to the councils of the great powers.[12] Once Russia was attacked by Hitler's armies, the Soviet Union realized the need for cooperation with the West and began to clamor for the "second front," which she herself had helped to undermine by her assistance to Hitler and the propaganda of the Comintern, which had been particularly effective in France.

But it should not be overlooked that Russia, even at the height of German power in the fall and winter of 1940, did not give up certain interests, even beyond the line of demarcation which the pact of 1939 seemed to have drawn between Germany and Russia. In his talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop in November, 1940, Molotov firmly insisted upon Russia's rights with regard to the Straits and adjacent Balkan areas.[13] He was not cajoled by Ribbentrop into accepting an outlet to the Persian Gulf instead. It should also be noted that Molotov was not impressed by Ribbentrop's glib sales talk about the defeat of England, which the German minister asserted had actually already been accomplished. Molotov's shrewd and cagey statements in Berlin were an indication that the Russians derived some comfort and courage from Britain's continued resistance after the battle of France and western Europe had been lost. On the basis of the available documents no one can say whether Molotov and other Russian leaders considered in this connection the interest that the United States took in the independence of the British Isles and of the British Commonwealth. But we may surmise that the expressions of American sentiment and official policy were carefully analyzed in the Kremlin.

V

With the conquest of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, soon to be rounded off by the occupation of southeastern Europe and the Balkans, the continent was vir-

[12] James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper, 1947, pp. 25, 28.
[13] *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-54.

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tually in Hitler's hands. The defeated nations were deeply shaken in their traditional beliefs, and if Hitler had offered them a dignified role in a reorganized Europe he might have been able to consolidate his conquests, and might even have received considerable support for his war against Russia. But his "new order" of Europe was only a device for the rule of a master race over subjugated peoples, and Hitler's "crusade" to protect European civilization against the Russian menace was an equally false label. Inevitably resistance to German military government grew, particularly after the German war machine stalled in Russia and the Allies could begin to extend active support to the national undergrounds.

Nevertheless, the nations of the European continent ceased after 1940-41 to be a major element in deciding the fate of Europe, and the circumstances of their defeat and their subsequent Nazi bondage made it extremely doubtful that they could easily recover something approximating their former political stature after liberation. As in the years after 1809, only Russia and Britain seemed to count, but the differences in the historical ages were great. Napoleon's European regime did not have the methods of the twentieth century police state at its disposal nor the planned war economy, in which millions of vanquished people could be exploited for the industrial production of the victorious state. Early nineteenth century warfare and resistance depended on arms which could be supplied with relatively small effort, while in the modern age highly technical weapons were required. The speedy rearming of Prussia after 1812, largely accomplished with British assistance, could not be repeated with France or Belgium in 1944.

There were other differences between 1810 and 1940. Britain fought her continental wars with small armies augmented by allied and auxiliary forces. During World War I Britain was compelled to mobilize a large national service army. But even then she had achieved only a stabilization of the western front in France, and without American assistance the western powers could not have turned the balance against Germany in 1918, particularly in view of the breakdown of Czarist Russia. The battle of France in 1940 left Britain without any continental allies, and an invasion of the continent by the British and

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British Commonwealth forces after 1940 could not have broken Hitler's iron grip on the continent. Even the mere defense of the British Isles and the empire required at least the financial and industrial support of the United States.

Hitler's invasion of Russia in June, 1941 and his declaration of war on the United States after Pearl Harbor made it possible to plan realistically the full destruction of the Nazi domination of Europe. Without the gallant and prodigious war effort of Britain, American power could never have been brought to bear upon Germany, as Americans well know. Incidentally, even the Russians should ponder what might have happened to them if the British had not fought on after Dunkirk. But it is true that from 1941 until 1944 the Russians had to carry the main burden of the German war, with losses of life and devastation of land such as no people has suffered in modern history. They cannot claim that they won the war by themselves, but it is correct to say that they broke the *offensive* power of the German army, particularly in the gigantic struggle in the plains of southern Russia during the winter of 1942-43. The isolation of the Sixth German army around Stalingrad took place at the same time that Anglo-American forces landed in North Africa. After the fall of Stalingrad the Russians began their advances to the West, tying down the bulk of the German armies in the process, and deflecting to the East most of Germany's war production, which continued to rise until early 1944.

Undoubtedly, American and British lend-lease deliveries contributed to the Russian successes, but how much it is impossible to say. The official Russian contention today is that they constituted six percent of the Russian war production, which is probably too low a figure. Moreover, at the critical turning point of the war, before the transplanted Russian factories were fully operating, even a smaller percentage of the overall production, if delivered in time, could have been decisive. On the other hand, could the western powers have afforded to see the Soviet Union knocked out? The Russians, on their part, did not complain so much about western niggardliness with regard to lend-lease as they did about the lack of a second front, which seemed to indicate a hesitation on the part of the western powers to commit their major military forces to an invasion of the Con-

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tinent. The United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, pledged all signatories to support each other by employing their "full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war."[14] But until June, 1944, the western Allies could not use their full military resources.

A good case can be made out to prove that a cross-channel operation in 1942 or early 1943 would have brought little relief to the Russians. General Marshall, however, urged such an operation in the event that the Russian front should be seriously disrupted by the Germans.[15] But he was overruled in the combined Anglo-American councils, and Churchill's strategy of limited investments and peripheral approaches prevailed for the time being. The Anglo-American armies invaded North Africa and Sicily, but proceeded, even after the Mediterranean had been made safe and their numerical strength had grown, to divert some of their power to the Italian peninsula. Only thereafter did General Marshall's conception of a massed invasion of northwestern Europe become the central theme of western strategy.

There has been a great deal of idle talk in the American press about Mr. Churchill's superior strategic judgment. It has been argued that his idea of defeating Hitler by attacking the "soft underbelly" of Europe would have left the West in control of the major part of southeastern Europe. To such a thesis the answer can only be that such an attack might have brought western armies to Salonika, Sofia, Valona, possibly even Budapest, but also Russian armies to Hamburg, Bremen, and the Ruhr. It is hard to think of a worse misnomer for the southern part of Europe than the one coined by Mr. Churchill. Indeed, nowhere is Europe protected by harder shells than along the Alps and the Balkan mountains, and no soldier who fought in

[14] Leland M. Goodrich, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1942, vol. IV, p. 203.

[15] Cf., Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, Harper, 1948, pp. 413ff.; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History*, New York, Harper, 1948, pp. 560ff. Cf., also, General Marshall's report, *The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific*, Washington, Simon and Shuster, 1945, pp. 8ff.; Dwight David Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1948, pp. 44ff., 66ff., 138f., 167.

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southern and central Italy will be inclined to agree with Mr. Churchill.

The major objection to Mr. Churchill's plan of pressing the Italian campaign and following it up with an invasion of the Balkans is found in the limitations which terrain and lines of communications would have placed on any such operation. The Balkan peninsula would not have permitted the deployment of more than a part of the Anglo-American forces, partly on account of the nature of the country involved, partly because the supply lines were far longer than those of a cross-channel operation. Consequently, only relatively small German forces could have been brought to bay in the Mediterranean.

The strategy proposed by the American chiefs-of-staff under General Marshall's leadership was based on the consideration that, according to Clausewitz's dictum, the supreme strategic objective is the annihilation of the enemy's army, and that such an end can be attained only by the use of the maximum of one's available forces. In World War II this could be achieved only in the northwestern European theater. Nowhere else could the western powers have deployed all their divisions, and deployed them so effectively, in a war of maneuver likely to lead finally to the capture of the main arsenal of the enemy, the Ruhr. But even this campaign depended heavily on Russian military cooperation, since it could succeed in achieving its major objectives only if the Red Army continued to hold down the bulk of the German forces.

VI

This was the setting in which American statesmen, in the years from 1942 to 1945, had to formulate a program for the reconstitution of Europe after the War. Would the intervention of the United States in Europe again be as temporary as it had been after 1917? Very grave doubts existed about the willingness of the American people to assume long-range commitments in Europe. It was assumed that America would not withdraw from a new League of Nations, and the response which the idea of a permanent United Nations organization found in both American parties gave an early assurance that the United States would not become as isolationist a power as she had been in the interwar period. But special commitments in Europe beyond a par-

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ticipation in the Allied occupation of Germany and possibly Austria seemed not within the realm of possibility. Furthermore, with another war in the Far East still to be fought and won, once the war in Europe had come to an end, there was an imperative need for the speedy transfer of American divisions to the Pacific and a natural tendency not to be involved too deeply in European matters. Finally, there was the desire to win Russian cooperation in the war against Japan.

Moreover, the thinking of American policy-makers was still dominated by the vague notion that somehow the old Europe would ultimately reemerge. It was a foregone conclusion that Russia would extend her influence beyond her pre-World War II frontiers and, perhaps, even beyond her 1914 frontiers in certain cases. Prussia-Germany would be wiped out as a great power, and an equivalent to the Habsburg empire in the form of a Danubian federation was not likely to be restored. At the end of the war only Britain would be able to counterbalance Russian power to some extent. She was expected to rule the Mediterranean. United States military government of Italy was, at least in its early phase, run with the idea that the British should be given every opportunity to reestablish their old economic and political ties with Italy. In the case of Greece the American military chiefs refused to have U. S. troops participate in the landings. After a great deal of argument a small group of American officers was allowed to direct the administration of civilian relief goods.

The Italian and Greek as well as other cases made it clear that for the time being, and probably for some time to come, the United States would have to provide Britain with the means to implement her policies.[16] It was realized, too, that the British economy itself would have to be bolstered after the War. But the prevailing opinion was that Britain would get back on her feet and be capable of exercising a powerful influence in western and southern Europe. There was also the hope that France, after a more prolonged period of recuperation, would ultimately regain her prewar position, as would the Benelux and the three Scandinavian countries. The finality of the breakdown of

[16] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, prints on pp. 748f. a document, presumably representing the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and expressing very succinctly the prevalent opinion of the future roles of Russia and Britain in Europe.

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Europe as a political system, balanced within itself, was at best sensed, but hardly recognized.

In the economic field the total impact of the interwar period and of World War II was not fully grasped either. No doubt the American government, backed by a substantial body of enlightened public opinion, had taken certain lessons of recent history to heart. The disastrous consequences of the treatment of reparations and war debts in the international affairs of the interwar period were not forgotten. Lend-lease avoided the pitfalls of inter-Allied financial relations which had been experienced after World War I, and in the discussion of future reparations large money payments were excluded. It was also understood that recovery had to be approached on a worldwide scale and organization. There was general agreement, too, that it was undesirable to have a repetition of the sudden discontinuation of the inter-Allied economic agencies at the time of the armistice, as had occurred in 1918 with the result that certain *ad hoc* councils had had to be improvised after a short, but costly interval. During World War II the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were set up to act as central international agencies in the rebuilding of world economy in the postwar era.

Nevertheless, the size of the problem involved in the reconstruction of Europe was grievously underestimated. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was confined to relief operations in liberated areas during the immediate post-hostilities period. The second "R" in UNRRA was never pronounced. Lend-lease came to an end as soon as hostilities ceased, while the Monetary Fund and the International Bank were given very limited means and functions. Today, when in the Marshall Plan we have a big civilian lend-lease program operating, together with military lend-lease going to Turkey and Greece, and new projects for the North Atlantic states under debate, one may well wonder whether American policy could not have achieved a much higher degree of political stability, if it could have begun to employ the financial and economic resources of the United States in a systematic plan for the rehabilitation of Europe three years earlier.

But even if the United States Government in the years be-

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tween 1943 and 1945 had diagnosed the weakness of western Europe correctly and had been in a position to assume as onerous a role as it has taken today, it could not have revived a European political system standing on its own feet, as the concert of European powers had done during the nineteenth century. With the great powers in Central Europe destroyed, and with western Europe weakened, there was no power in Europe which by its own strength or in alliance with all the other western European states could have blocked Russian progress into Europe. For that matter, even the United States would have been hardly strong enough to oppose the immediate demands of the Soviet Union. The decisions of the Moscow, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences were on the whole the logical and inevitable outcome of this situation. If one wants to criticize them, one should direct criticism not so much against the actual results of the wartime conferences, which after all laid the foundations for the military defeat of the enemy countries and for the building of the United Nations, as against the expectations entertained at the time by western statesmen with regard to the future of Western-Russian relations. The whole wartime policy of the Soviet Union, not to mention her prewar policy, demonstrated that the Soviet leaders never were ready to abandon the sovereignty of Russian policy and were determined to push Russian interests wherever they did not meet with opposition, though they were ready to keep the weapons of the Communist International in reserve.

It remains a problem whether or not it would have been more practical to negotiate with Russia a clear division of spheres of interest, as the British proposed and proceeded to do in the case of Greece against the warning of the American government, which considered such spheres as incompatible with the contemplated United Nations organization.[17] But the practice of United States foreign policy turned out to be less rigid. The United States never considered associating Russia with Britain and herself on equal terms in the military government of Sicily and Italy, though this meant that the western powers would be represented only weakly in the Soviet military government

[17] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 vols., New York, Macmillan, 1948, vol. II, pp. 1451ff.

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of southeastern Europe. Czechoslovakia was informed that she was not on the list of European states to be liberated by western armies. Thus Beneš had no other choice but to conclude, on May 8, 1944, a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union regarding the administration of civil affairs in Czechoslovakia after the arrival of the Russian armies.[18]

In such actions the Soviet Union could find her view confirmed that the West would ultimately be willing to tolerate the creation of a Russian orbit along the western frontiers of the Soviet Union. And there would have been relatively little resentment in the West to such a policy, if the Soviet Union had shown and maintained a minimum respect for the democratic rights and processes of the liberated eastern states. But one of the major factors that was bound to make the years between 1945 and 1947 barren years in the progress of a European peace settlement was probably the expectation of the Kremlin that, in the absence of a constructive program of stabilization for western Europe, time was on the Russian side, and that social disintegration would open new opportunities for Russian influence, and perhaps full control over the rest of the continent.

The Marshall Plan has speeded the recovery of western Europe and has made possible a much higher degree of self-help and mutual assistance among the western European nations. In the political field the Western Union has made a beginning toward overcoming national divisions and pooling the military resources for the common defense of western Europe. But even a closely allied western Europe, if it could be created in the near future, would not be a match for the power of the Soviet Union. Western Europe can survive only if the United States is ready to defend the integrity of the western European states, as she has promised in the North Atlantic Pact. The Pact merely proves that no European political system is left—that it has been superseded by a Russian and Atlantic system.

[18] See text in Louise W. Holborn, ed., *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations,* 2 vols., Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1943-48, vol. II (1943-45), pp. 767ff. The Department of State released for publication an exchange of correspondence between SHAEF and the Soviet High Command concerning Allied military operations in Czechoslovakia during April and May, 1945, which does not affect the statement in the text. The Department of State confirms that "no prior political agreements or commitments had been made with respect to Czechoslovakia," and apparently does not believe that this correspondence constituted a step in this direction. The *New York Times,* May 10, 1949.

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This conclusion, of course, does not mean that Europe has ceased to exist and that her general history has become nothing but the memory of a dead past. The historic bonds which traditionally linked the Czech, Polish, and Hungarian nations with the West seem completely broken at this moment. But even if we are unable at present to see how these historic links can be used to narrow the gulf that separates East and West, we should not lose sight of such possibilities. We would also be ill-advised if we were to forget the strong economic ties which existed between eastern and western Europe and were to underrate their importance in the future.

It would be equally grave if we underestimated the dangers inherent in a partition of Germany between East and West. The partition of Poland, maintained after 1815, proved all through the nineteenth century a continuous threat to a peaceful order of Europe. Then, however, the powers responsible for the dissection of Poland were political friends and, at least until 1914, were determined to stand together in the suppression of the Polish nation. In our divided world a Germany broken up into an eastern and western state would constitute a most serious source of friction. But a united Germany not integrated into an international system would in due course be capable of playing off East and West in an even more dangerous fashion. Both the Soviet Union and the Atlantic states therefore retain a common interest in German disarmament, and on this basis it may still be possible at some future date to reach an East-West agreement under which Germany would be neutralized.

It is obvious that a communist Germany could not be "neutral," and we are in agreement with the Soviet Union that a fascist Germany would be a peril to world peace. Therefore, firm guarantees of a democratic organization of the future German state must be given. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to define the exact nature of these guarantees for a peaceful and democratic Germany. Such a study would require a detailed examination of Allied policies and military government since 1941. But as our position in western Europe becomes less assailable as a result of the Marshall Plan, the Western Union of Europe, the improvement of the western German economy, and finally the North Atlantic Pact, we can start to probe with

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greater determination into the intentions of the Soviet Union with respect to Europe. We cannot afford to have western Europe, including western Germany, annexed to the Russian orbit, but we could give Russia assurances that western Europe will never attack her. Under these conditions it would be advantageous to have a "neutralized" Germany together with a neutral Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria, in between the eastern and Atlantic systems. Europe would still remain politically divided, but might slowly cease to be a battleground and become a meeting place between the competing world systems. It would be a great achievement of present-day statesmanship if it succeeded in utilizing the elements of former European unity which survive to mitigate the East-West conflict.

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STRATEGY AS A SCIENCE

By BERNARD BRODIE

THE recent resignations from posts of high civil authority or ceremonial rank of former military officers will no doubt allay somewhat the suspicions current a year or more ago that the military were "moving in" where they did not belong. Although the original appointment to civil posts of such men as Generals George C. Marshall and Walter B. Smith was hardly due to design on the part of the armed services, being quite easily and plausibly explained on other and quite innocuous grounds, the military departments unquestionably do have a greater influence upon high policy decisions than was true before the recent war. It is therefore time to express concern not so much that that military will move in where they do not belong, but rather that in the process of moving in where in part, at least, they do belong, their advice will reflect their imperfections not as diplomatists but as soldiers.

That concern, besides receiving its immortal expression in the famous apothegm of Clemenceau that war was too important to be left to the generals, has often been expressed by soldiers themselves.[1] It is not simply that the waging of war or the preparation for it requires many skills to which the soldier makes no pretentions. It is that the skill which is peculiarly his own is in all but the rarest instances incomplete with respect to one of its fundamentals—a genuine understanding of military strategy.

That is hardly surprising, since the understanding would have to follow the development of a theoretical framework which as yet can scarcely be said to exist. Creating the mere foundations of such a framework would require a huge enterprise of scholarship, and the military profession is not a scholarly call-

[1] One of the more recent instances is contained in the illuminating book *Operation Victory* (New York, Scribner's, 1947), by Major General Sir Francis de Guingand, former Chief of Staff to Marshal Montgomery. This author points out again and again that the World War II experiences of the British Army reflected a lack of training in high strategy on the part of the British armed services, which have in fact devoted at least as much attention to the subject as their American counterparts.

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ing—as its members would be the first to insist. Nor, for various reasons, including good ones, does it wish to become so. The scholar who on rare occasions appears within its ranks can expect but scant reward for the special talents he demonstrates. It is for quite different accomplishments that the silver stars which are the final accolade of success are bestowed.

The soldier's rejection of the contemplative life would be of no concern to him or to us if the universally enduring maxims of war—the so-called "classical principles of strategy"—which are quite simply elucidated and easily understood, really did provide an adequate foundation upon which to erect precise strategic plans. The soldier has been trained to believe that they do. I shall try to demonstrate that on the contrary the theory contained in those maxims is far too insubstantial to enable one even to begin organizing the pressing problems in the field, that the bare core of theory which they do embody is capable of and demands meaningful elaboration, and that that elaboration and the mastery of it by military practitioners must require intensive, rigorous, and therefore prolonged intellectual application. If I succeed in doing that, there will be no difficulty in demonstrating that strategy is not receiving the scientific treatment it deserves either in the armed services or, certainly, outside of them. And it will also be quite easy to show that our failure to train our military leaders in the scientific study of strategy has been costly in war, and is therefore presumptively—perhaps even demonstrably—being costly also in our present security efforts.

There are, to be sure, certain basic ideas about fighting a war which over the centuries have been proved valid. These ideas have been exalted by various writers to the status of "principles," and have been distinguished from other elements in the art of generalship chiefly by their presumptive character of being unchanging. "Methods change, but principles are unchanging" is the often-quoted dictum of Jomini. These principles, while not often apparent to the uninitiated, are certainly not esoteric. They have the characteristic of being obvious at least when pointed out, and many generals, from Napoleon to Eisenhower, have stressed their essential simplicity.

However, it is also true that as generally presented, these

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"principles" are skeletal in the extreme. They not only contain within themselves no hints on how they may be implemented in practice, but their very expression is usually in terms which are either ambiguous or question-begging in their implications—a trait which has grown more marked since Jomini's day under the effort to preserve for them the characteristic of being unchanging. For example, in a recent list of ten "Principles of War" adopted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee for the use and guidance of the Canadian Armed Forces, we find "Economy of Effort" (traditionally called "Economy of Force") listed as No. 7, with the following explanation:

> 7. ECONOMY OF EFFORT
>
> Economy of effort implies a *balanced* employment of forces, and a *judicious* expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an *effective* concentration at the *decisive* time and place.[2]

The four words I have italicized are obviously the points at issue. To give them genuine meaning in a way that would convert them to tools useful in the planning process would clearly require in each case a large amount of analytical elaboration. One must note, of course, that even as stated the principle is not without meaning. It argues that military resources should not be wasted either through failing to use them at all or through dispersing them among ill-chosen or ill-coordinated objectives.[3] Although the idea is thus reduced to a truism, the fact remains that its violation has often been advocated during war and sometimes practiced, and is also clear historically that in the main (though with conspicuous exceptions) the military leader

[2] Reprinted from an article in the *Canadian Army Journal* for December 1947 by *Military Review*, vol. 28, no. 7 (October, 1948), pp. 88f. The Canadian list of principles, which I am selecting only because it happens to be one of the most recent official pronouncements on the subject, appears to be a somewhat revised version of an article published under the title "Principles of Modern Warfare" in the *Royal Air Force Quarterly* (Great Britain), January, 1948.

[3] To the purist it must be acknowledged that this interpretation and indeed the original Canadian statement quoted somewhat scramble at least two of the traditional principles. As usually stated, the principle of "Economy of Force" confines itself to the dictum that all forces available should be effectively utilized. The rest of the statement belongs to the doctrine usually called the "Principle of Concentration." There is also more than a redolence of that fine old thought called the "Principle of the Aim." In that connection it is noteworthy that the Canadian list cited does give place to the latter two principles, as Nos. 6 and 1 respectively, and the authors seem to be unaware that in No. 7 they were largely repeating themselves. All of which may conceivably reflect the barrenness of the concepts.

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has been somewhat less prone to reject or ignore the principle than the civilian leader who sometimes urges strategic views upon him. The soldier's indoctrination is thus not without value, since it tends to fix in the front of his mind a rule which might otherwise slip out of that place, but it amounts to little more than a pointed injunction to use common sense.

There have been a number of books—extraordinarily few in any one generation—which have attempted to add flesh to the bare bones of the orthodox principles by presenting historical examples both of their conspicuous violation and of their ideal observance.[4] These have been exceedingly useful contributions, and it would be a good thing if more professional soldiers read them. In a day when the techniques of war changed but little from one generation to the next, they were more than adequate. Napoleon, who often mentioned the simplicity of the principles by which he was guided, nevertheless admonished those who would emulate him: "Read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Make them your models. This is the only way to become a great general and to master the secrets of war." It is still a good rule. It tempts one to indulge the fantasy that if Admiral Halsey had read over and over again the campaigns of Nelson and his colleagues in the wars of 1793-1815 (quite accessible in Mahan and elsewhere), he might have been a good deal more skeptical of the "Don't divide the fleet" doctrine that betrayed him at Leyte Gulf.

In the present day, with the techniques of war changing radically not only from generation to generation but from decade to decade, a list of theorems inherited almost intact from the early nineteenth century, however much embroidered by examples even from recent military history, can hardly serve the function generally reposed upon it. The modern officer accountable for strategic planning and decisions has a burden of which his counterpart of a century or more ago was quite free. Nelson

[4] One of the best modern examples is Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice's *Principles of Strategy*, New York, R. R. Smith, 1930. On the naval side we have, besides the works of Mahan, the excellent volume by Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, London, 1911. Corbett, incidentally, was a civilian and a professional historian, and the chief works of Mahan likewise are essentially and predominantly histories with only occasional analytical interjections.

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could spend his lifetime learning and perfecting the art of the admiral without any need to fear that the fundamental postulates of that art would change under his feet. His flagship at Trafalgar was then forty years old, but in no wise inferior in fighting potentialities to the majority of the ships engaged. The modern admiral or general has no such assurance. Changes, even marginal ones, in the inherent potentialities or limitations of the machines with which war is waged may affect not merely the handling of those machines but a whole strategic concept. Principles may still survive those changes intact, but if they do it will be because they have little applicability or meaning for the questions that really matter. The rules fathered by Jomini and Clausewitz may still be fundamental, but they will not tell one how to prepare for or fight a war.

That the "enduring principles" have endured so long as a substitution for a body of live and flexible theory is due mainly to their exceptional convenience. Because they lend themselves so readily to "indoctrination," they are peculiarly well adapted to the traditional patterns of military education. They can be quickly learned as part of a brief course in a war college. And since the graduates of that college may then be presumed to have a common denominator of strategic knowledge, that knowledge can be disregarded in considering candidates for promotion to top rank. Moreover, the common denominator permits the assumption that in the crisis of battle the subordinate commander will readily understand and perhaps on occasion anticipate the intentions of his supreme commander. That it is desirable to achieve such rapport is beyond doubt; the only question is the price paid for it.

Closely related to the "principle" in inherent character, and often derived from it, is the aphorism or slogan which provides the premises for policy decisions. The military profession is by no means alone in its frequent recourse to the slogan as a substitute for analysis—certain scholarly disciplines, not excluding political science, have been more than a little untidy in this regard—but among the military we find some extreme examples of its ultimate development. The slogan may originate in fact or in fancy, it may have but a brief vogue or it may endure apparently forever, it may enthrall a particular

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service or the entire profession of arms, but in any case it provides in the area and in the moment of its ascendancy the key to the basic decisions. "The ram is the most formidable of all the weapons of the ship" was a dictum never genuinely substantiated in battle and basically untrue, but it dominated naval architecture for almost half a century.[5] "He will win who has the resolution to advance" was the maxim of du Picq which inspired the pre-World War I French school of the *offensive à outrance*. It might have better survived the battles of 1914 had not those battles inspired a slogan even more terse and homely: "Fire kills." Those latter two words, trenchant enough but scarcely incisive, had more to do with determining Allied strategy in World War I than any number of volumes could possibly have had.

The maxim may indeed be the supreme distillate of profound thought, but only at its first use—that is, when it is still an apt expression and not yet a slogan. No sooner does it become currency than it is counterfeit. The function of a slogan is to induce rigidity of thought and behavior in a particular direction, which in art may mean the development of a school having its own distinctive value. If the conduct of war is an art rather than a science, as is often alleged, at least it is not art for art's sake. The progress of strategy as a science will be roughly measurable by the degree to which it frees itself from addiction to the slogan.

Of late the armed services have, to be sure, devoted some care to analyzing the "lessons" of their campaigns. General Eisenhower, for example, shortly after V-E Day set up a commission under General L. T. Gerow to study the lessons of the European theatre in World War II. Despite the pre-occupation of such studies with tactics and especially administration, their value for stimulating strategic insights is potentially great. But unless the analysts are properly equipped intellectually to exploit such values, the net result of the studies is likely to be that of intensifying the military propensity to "prepare for the last war." With their traditional reverence for what they term the "practical," the military are inclined to dignify by the name of "battle experience" what is in fact an excessively narrow pragmatism.

[5] See my *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2nd ed., 1943, pp. 85-8, 237. This idea and its origin provide an interesting case study in the deriving of tactical "lessons" from the experience of battle.

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There is of course no substitute for the test of battle or experience in war, but there are at least three reasons why such experience is of limited usefulness and may even be positively misleading.

First, since great changes occur from one war to the next, military planners are obliged to make far-reaching decisions on issues concerning which there is little or no directly applicable experience. We certainly have no experience today with the mass use of atomic bombs. There is a good deal of experience which is in some manner relevant, but it must be sought out and applied with subtlety and discrimination and with constant concern for the qualifications enjoined by the elements of dissimilarity.[6] The incredible and sometimes disastrous lag of tactical and strategic conceptions behind developments in materiel, which Mahan regretfully regarded as inevitable in view of the ancient "conservatism" of the military profession, is due less to conservatism than to the absence of the habit of scientific thinking.

Secondly, the larger decisions of any war, or of the preparation for that war, cast the mold for the experience which ensues, so that the results often fail to provide a basis for judgment upon those decisions. The experience may be fortunate or unfortunate; but since the enemy's responses have a good deal to do with its being one or the other, and since his capacity for error may be no less than one's own, one cannot rely upon success or failure to provide the whole answer. Was a decision which turned out well rather than ill a good decision? From the pragmatic point of view, clearly yes! But the analyst who wishes to derive general lessons applicable to the future, who is anxious to find the solution which will minimize the appalling human

[6] Professor P. M. S. Blackett has demonstrated that even a person trained as a scientist may conspicuously fail to demonstrate proper discrimination in applying analogous experience to the military problem of the atomic bomb. See his *Fear, War, and the Bomb*. New York, Whittlesey, 1949. The only safeguard against such error, as in any field of scientific endeavor, lies in expanding the number of persons with similar competence. In this instance, Dean Louis Ridenour, among others, was able promptly to expose some of the fallacies in Blackett's analysis. See his review article in *Scientific American*, vol. 180, no. 3 (March, 1949), pp. 16-19 (reprinted in *World Politics*, vol. I, no. 3, under the title of "The Bomb and Blackett"). In the military profession the problem of criticism is greatly compounded by the institution of rank, with its extravagant rigidities not only of obedience but also deference. Through the process of promotion the individual is accorded, by fiat, wisdom as well as authority, the stage of infallibility being attained at approximately the fourth star.

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costs of war, may not be so easily persuaded. He will be obliged to go beyond history—*i.e.*, beyond experience—to explore the feebly lit realm of "what might have been."

Thirdly, even within the scope of what our experience does illuminate, the lessons it affords are rarely obvious in the sense of being self-evident. Too many "analyses" of World War II experience remind one of the seven blind men who touched different parts of the elephant. The evidence which relates to a question is generally massive and many sided. Its examination requires not only thoroughness but also imagination. The examiner must be on the alert for rigidities of thought and action in the actors which vitiated the results of even repeated experiment.[7] He must look for the hidden jokers in a situation, the vagaries of circumstance which profoundly affected the outcome, and must clearly distinguish between the unique and the representative. In short, he must engage in a refined analytical operation involving a large element of disciplined speculation. The task requires a mind trained for analysis and for the rigorous scrutiny of evidence.

The strategist of the American armed forces has often in the past stressed the difficulty of his problems as compared with his opposite number of European military establishments. The latter has always been much less in doubt concerning the identity of the probable adversary and the probable theaters of operations. Although the Soviet Union has very conveniently narrowed the problem for us, the sets of circumstances which might govern a conflict with that country still cover an extraordinarily broad range. It is all the more necessary, therefore, that we

[7] The Battle for Leyte Gulf furnishes some interesting illustrations of the rigidities to which I refer, of which I shall here mention only one. Because it had been so in every previous major action in the Pacific War, Admiral Halsey erroneously assumed that in this instance too the enemy's principal force had to be where his carriers were. His conviction that battleships could only play a supporting role caused him to confine his own battleships to such a role. By keeping them with the fleet which he threw against a decoy force he deprived them of any chance of affecting the outcome. If his six modern battleships had been left off the mouth of San Bernardino Strait they would almost certainly have sunk the major force of the Japanese Fleet. An interesting question poses itself: had that happened, what would have been the popular (and professional) attitude today on the value of the battleship type? It might not have been a wiser attitude than the presently prevailing one—Leyte Gulf was after all a special case—but it would surely have been different. Since I am making several references to Leyte Gulf, I might refer the reader to my review article on the subject, "The Battle for Leyte Gulf," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer, 1947), pp. 455-60.

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develop a conceptual framework adequate not only as a base of departure for specific strategic plans but also as a means of weighing one plan against another. The planning operation goes on apace. There are divisions of the Military Establishment set up for that purpose which manage to keep themselves earnestly employed. All sorts of new paraphernalia, including electronic computer machines for solving logistics and mobilization problems, are brought into use. All that is lacking is a conceptual basis for determining whether the plan in hand is a good one—whether it is better than some conceivable alternative. It is an old military dogma that any decision is better than none; the same apparently holds true for strategic plans.

That strategic theory is reducible to a few common-sense propositions does not distinguish it from other social sciences, including the science of economics, which has undoubtedly enjoyed the most systematic and intensive development among the social sciences and which, as I shall shortly point out, bears other and more significant parallels to strategy. One of our leading economists, Professor Frank Knight, has characterized his discipline as follows: "Economic thought runs almost entirely in terms of the obvious and the commonplace . . . The most interesting feature of economic theory is that its larger and more important questions are generally self-answering when explicitly and correctly stated—in so far as they can be answered at all. Indeed, the problem of social action, from the economic standpoint, is chiefly that of getting people . . . to act in accord with principles which when stated in simple and set terms are trite even to the man on the street."[8]

Whether or not other economists would entirely agree—and any process of reducing a large body of knowledge to a few simple propositions necessarily involves arbitrariness—the fact remains that one distinguished economist was able to see his field in that light and could presumably have produced the phrases necessary to implement his assertion. That he did not feel especially obligated to do so is itself revealing. Save for the purpose of persuading busy or simple people to a desired course of action, there is no profit in such an enterprise. The profit is all in the opposite direction, in refinement and retesting of

[8] Frank H. Knight, *Freedom and Reform*, New York, Harper, 1947, p. 130.

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one's conceptual tools in order that analysis of a particular problem may be more precise, that is, more correct. At any rate, in the effort to explore the ramifications or specific application of those questions which "are generally self-answering when explicitly and correctly stated," the economics profession has produced a tremendous body of literature of impressive quality. The far older profession of arms, content with mere reiteration of its wholly elementary postulates, which change not with the changing years, has yet to round out a five-foot bookshelf of significant works on strategy. The purpose of soldiers is obviously not to produce books, but one must assume that any real ferment of thought could not have so completely avoided breaking into print.[9]

The comparison drawn above between economics and strategy is especially telling in view of the similarity of objectives between the two fields. Although the economist sometimes disclaims responsibility for those community values which determine economic objectives, it is quite clear that historically he has been devoted mainly to discovering how the resources of a nation, material and human, can be developed and utilized for the end of maximizing the total real wealth of the nation. Even where somewhat different objectives are stressed, such as the maintenance of full employment, the character of his task is affected only marginally, because that task is fundamentally a study in efficiency. It is the study of the efficient allocation of the national (or other community) resources for the economic ends set down by the community, and the lists of ends presented will differ from one community to another and from one generation to the next more in the nominal priorities accorded specific items than in general content or basic structure.

Strategy, by comparison, is devoted to discovering how the resources of the nation, material and human, can be developed and utilized for the end of maximizing the total effectiveness of the nation in war. The end thus stated is of course also subject to various qualifications. During peacetime we are more interested in avoiding war than in winning one when it comes, and

[9] I am trying desperately here to restrain the bias of the academician that the effort of writing is an almost indispensable catalyst to the production of original thoughts. On the other hand, too many people have found that it is so to enable us quite to reject the idea.

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our military preparations will be affected thereby not only quantitatively but qualitatively as well. Also, we wish to minimize, both in peace and in war, the burden which our security efforts impose upon our pursuit of other values and objectives. Security is, after all, a derivative value, being meaningful only in so far as it promotes and maintains other values which have been or are being realized and are thought worth securing, though in proportion to the magnitude of the threat it may displace all others in primacy. For that reason there is a vast difference between peace and war in the proportion of the national resources made available for security purposes. But in any case we are dealing primarily with problems of efficiency in the allocation of limited resources and with measuring means against policies and vice versa.

In the narrower military sense, strategy deals only with mobilized resources and is concentrated upon achieving victory over a specific enemy under a specific set of political and geographic circumstances. But strategy must also anticipate the trials of war, and by anticipation to seek where possible to increase one's advantage without unduly jeopardizing the maintenance of peace or the pursuit of other values. This broader enterprise, which might be called "security policy,"[10] can be construed to cover the total preparation for war as well as the waging of it. It would thus deal—though with clearly defined and limited objectives—with political, social, and economic as well as military matters in both domestic and foreign contexts.

Security policy so defined can hardly be the province primarily of the soldier, though he should be able to offer pertinent advice concerning it based on his mastery of the military problem. A large number of other skills are more directly related. In matters concerning industrial mobilization, for example, the function of the military specialist is or should be confined to specifying the items needed and their respective orders of priority. The handling of the business must devolve upon the politician, the industrialist or the factory manager, and the

[10] The temptation to use the finer-sounding phrase "grand strategy" must be suppressed in deference to historic usage, though that term has sometimes been used to cover what I mean by "security policy." In traditional usage, "grand strategy" refers to the basic but all-embracing features of a plan of war, as distinct from either the details of a war plan or the strategy of a particular campaign.

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social scientist. Similarly, in problems involving political relations with other states, the soldier's function is confined to pointing out the military advantage or disadvantage which might be expected to follow from a specific course of action. The question of offsetting costs, political and otherwise, and the consequent determination of net profit or loss in a proposed policy is not only a question of civilian responsibility but actually involves skills with which the soldier is normally not equipped, though it is desirable that he appreciate the limitations in freedom of maneuver which beset the politician and the diplomatist. Even in the matter of determining the overall size of the defense budget, the soldier has relatively little to contribute. He should be able to provide us with a rational plan for the allocation of whatever sums are accorded him, but the determination of how large those sums should be must depend upon consideration of a wide range of factors, many of which lie entirely outside his usual realm of discourse.[11] One can go still closer to the heart of the military problem—and point out that the strategy of strategic bombing is very largely a matter of target selection, where the economist (possibly also the psychologist) has at least as much to offer as the military specialist.

In any case, whether we are discussing security policy in the broad sense or more specifically military strategy—or even tactics—we are discussing problems involving economy of means, *i.e.*, the most efficient utilization of potential and available resources to the end of enhancing our security. One might expect to find, therefore, that a substantial part of classical economic theory is directly applicable to the analysis of problems in military strategy. One might further expect that if the highly developed conceptual framework which lies ready at hand in the field of economics were in fact so applied, or at least examined for the suggestive analogies which it offers, some very positive results would follow.

A good example is to be found in the military concept of the "balanced force," in the name of which all sorts of aggressions

[11] All will agree that concerning military appropriations the soldier is not well situated to tell us what we can afford. But what is equally important, he lacks any objective criteria for telling us what he needs. Under pressure from Congress, he is accustomed to presenting his "minimum essential requirements" in quite precise terms; but if he were under equal pressure to be honest, he would admit the wholly illusory character of that precision. I am developing this point in another paper to be published shortly.

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against good sense have been perpetrated. The concept has been applied to all levels of military organization, tactical and strategic, and has long been familiar in its distinctively naval form of the "balanced fleet." Almost too obvious to be worth recording, but nevertheless basic and all-too-often forgotten, is the point that "balance" can mean little or nothing except in relation to predictions or expectations concerning circumstances of future combat, including those circumstances created by one's own strategic plans. A force which is well "balanced" with respect to one set of circumstances is likely to be wholly unbalanced with respect to another, except in so far as the balance sought represents a compromise between different sets of possible or probable circumstances.[12]

Once this point were firmly grasped, and the effort made to establish orders of probability and of risk[13] for various sets of circumstances—in strategy we are always dealing with multiple-contingency analysis—we would have a context for resolving the issues of balance according to the well-known concept of *marginal utility*. That is, a balanced force could be defined

[12] In a penetrating essay written during his imprisonment, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz has analyzed Germany's failure on the seas in World War II. He argues convincingly that if Germany had concentrated her pre-war naval expenditures mainly or exclusively on the submarine arm—instead of dispersing her naval resources on a "symmetrically balanced" fleet—she would have been able to defeat Great Britain within a few months of the opening of hostilities. The error in judgment stemmed from Hitler's conviction that they would not have to fight the British and that a surface fleet would be useful for dominating the Baltic against the Soviet Union. Through Doenitz does not make the point, what he is in effect arguing is that a balanced fleet for a war against the Soviet Union alone was a wholly unbalanced one for a war against Britain, and that proper balance for the latter task would have entailed almost exclusive reliance on the submarine.

[13] Clearly applicable in this connection is an idea which an economist in a high policy-making post in the government has called "the principle of the least harm," and which might be expressed as follows: Other things being equal, that policy should be selected which will do the least damage in case the prediction upon which it is based turns out to be wrong. Or, in other words, different sets of circumstances envisaged as possible for the future must be weighted for policy purposes not alone according to their presumed orders of probability but also according to the degree of risk inherent in the policy which each suggests. One can of course point to numerous instances in the military field where this principle has been more or less consciously followed. The only admonition necessary is that the "order of probability," while it must be qualified by considerations of risk, should not be lost sight of. Otherwise, the "principle of the least harm" will no doubt serve to incur the most harm. For those interested in mathematical systematization of this and related problems, the work of Professors John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern on the theory of games would be illuminating. See their *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947. However, for various reasons I do not share their conviction that their theory could be directly and profitably applied to problems of military strategy.

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as one in which the marginal utilities, tactically and strategically considered, of the last increments to each of the existing components were approximately equalized. To gauge marginal utilities among those components would be anything but easy, but at least the conceptual basis of balance would be clarified in a way that helped to indicate the scope and the direction of the analysis necessary to provide the answers. In that respect the situation would be immeasurably superior to reliance upon such tradition-charged abstractions as "homogeneous" and "symmetrical," to mention two adjectives frequently found in consort with "balanced force." In short, what we are discussing is the difference between thought and dogma.

It might of course be aesthetically abhorrent to discover gallant admirals and airmen discussing their common problems, or the occasional amiable debates between them, in terms like "marginal utility," "diminishing returns," or "opportunity costs." It happens, incidentally, to be quite abhorrent to this writer to find himself inadvertently pleading for a jargon in any discipline, though in this instance there is no danger of corrupting the pure; the military already have a quite substantial jargon of their own. But the advantage of using symbols which are tied to well-thought-out formulations has at least two advantages besides the obvious one of providing a short-hand for intra-discipline communication: first, it may help to assure that the fundamentals of a problem will not be overlooked, and secondly, it may offer economies in the process of thinking the problem through.

To persuade oneself that the fundamentals *can* be overlooked in a strategic problem dealing with the composition or balancing of forces, one need only study the arguments propounded by both sides in the recent inter-service controversy over the super-aircraft-carrier, the *United States*. Secretary Louis Johnson's decision of April 23, 1949 to abandon construction of the vessel seems to have been based on considerations of dubious relevancy, to say the least. It could scarcely have been otherwise, inasmuch as the issue was quite openly a jurisdictional dispute. The Air Force was exercised over an attempted invasion by another service of what it regarded as its exclusive domain, strategic bombing. Such a consideration is of course a

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basic irrelevancy, out of which all the others were bound to proceed.

For example, the Air Force argument that aircraft carriers were "vulnerable" and the Navy reply that "not a single large aircraft carrier was lost in the last three years of World War II" had in common the characteristic of conveying little illumination. We all know that any ship afloat can be sunk and any aircraft can be downed. We also know that both types of craft have had great utility in war in the past. The real issue is utility, and since every military unit or weapon is expendable in war, the question of relative vulnerability is significant only because it affects utility. This is another of those truistic assertions which somehow need to be repeated. What we need to know is the circumstances under which aircraft carriers have succeeded in their missions in the past and those under which they have failed, either through their own destruction or otherwise. We also need to know how current trends, technological and otherwise, are affecting those circumstances. And in so far as we are considering a carrier capable of launching large bombers as well as the types of planes traditionally carried by such vessels, we should have to investigate thoroughly the distinctive ways in which the performance of the ship-plane team would compare with or differ from the performance of long-range land-based bombers. In such a comparison the question of relative cost for the two types of operation would obviously be important,[14] but costs can be compared only where functions are comparable. To the extent that the carrier was discovered to have distinctive functions and performance characteristics—the Navy insists it would need the large carrier even for strictly naval use—the real issue would be the importance of those distinctive functions and characteristics as weighed against their cost. In all this we would obviously be obliged to tie our analysis to a specific enemy and to sets of conditions which have at least the quality of being conceivable.

We can already see the extent of the research and analysis involved, but the marginal utility concept warns us also against static comparisons. The value of the proposed carrier in com-

[14] And exceedingly difficult to work out. The issue is confused by all sorts of differentials in related fixed and sunk capital, in rates of obsolescence, in multiple-use characteristics, and in operating as distinct from initial costs.

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parison with its rough equivalent (performance-wise) of long-range, land-based aircraft must vary with the number of such aircraft and of such carriers already in hand or planned for procurement. As numbers were added to either type (*e.g.*, B-36s), the onset of diminishing returns in further additions to that type would involve an increase in the relative value of the favorable qualities distinctive to the other type (carrier-aircraft team). At what point, if ever, that increase would be sufficient to cause us to shift production resources from the former type to the latter would be a question for which our research would seek answers. But to ask such questions is to put the issues of balanced force generally, and of B-36s *versus* large carriers in particular, on a rational and meaningful plane —which is to say an entirely different plane from the one on which such issues have thus far been fought out.

One thing is certain—that the cost of conducting such a research would amount to considerably less than the cost of one B-36, let alone one carrier. Whether the armed services have within their own ranks personnel who are equipped to ask the proper questions and to direct the relevant research is another matter. Of two things this writer is convinced: that they can have persons so equipped if they want to, and that they should want to.

We do, to be sure, find the services under the pressure of events acting as though they intuitively perceived the considerations involved in the principle of marginal utility. That is to be expected, since the principle reflects only a relatively modest refinement of common sense. For example, during 1944 the Navy severely cut back its production of submarines not because those in service in the Pacific had failed but because they had been too successful. They had sunk so many Japanese ships that they were having difficulties finding new targets. The situation for submarines was described as one of "saturation." But the trouble with intuitive perception *in lieu of* conceptual understanding is that it is likely to be tardy and incomplete. Prior to our entry into World War II, the rough rule of thumb method of thinking implied by the word "saturation" was applied quite disastrously to another problem: how much antiaircraft armament should be installed on our combatant

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ships? The reasoning was entirely in terms of the minimum number of guns necessary to "cover" with defensive fire each of the ship's quadrants. The governing dogma was that offensive strength should not be sacrificed for greater defensive strength. The result was that our battleships on the day of Pearl Harbor were virtually naked with respect to antiaircraft defenses.[15] And it was not until more than a year after that attack that the principle was finally adopted that the amount of antiaircraft armament to be installed on an existing ship was to be limited only by the amount it was physically capable of carrying and servicing, and in order to raise that level a good deal of top hamper was removed. What was belatedly discovered, in other words, was that long after the four quadrants of the ship were "covered," the marginal utility of another antiaircraft gun remained much higher than the marginal utility of many other items of comparable weight or space consumption (including empty space itself) to be found on the decks of our warships.

There is of course a great hurdle between clear understanding of the principles applicable to a problem and the practical resolution of that problem. The antiaircraft problem just discussed might not have been solved any better on the basis of marginal utility theory—if the valuation applied to each antiaircraft gun had remained inordinately low—than it actually was in the absence of such theory. And we do frequently encounter that intuitive perception which effectively replaces conceptual understanding. But so frequently we do not. Besides, there is a great practical difference between that rule of thumb which is recognized to be the optimum feasible realization of correct theory and that much more common species of rule of thumb which simply replaces the effort of theorizing.

Moreover, one cannot forbear to add that some of the more glaring errors of our recent military history could not have been perpetrated by intelligent men who were equipped with even a

[15] The explanation frequently offered by Navy spokesmen during and since the war, that our gross deficiencies in naval antiaircraft armament at the time in question was due chiefly to the unwillingness of Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to the purpose, seems not to withstand the test of the record. I can find little evidence that the Navy as a whole—and particularly the Bureau of Ships—came anywhere near predicting the needs of the war in that category of weapons, or that any concerted effort was made to persuade Congress of the urgency of the problem. Certainly one can find little to indicate that the Navy was eager to sacrifice other, less necessary things accorded it by Congress in order to remedy this glaring deficiency.

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modicum of theory. To tarry a moment longer with our "marginal utility" concept but to shift now to an operational example already alluded to above: could Admiral Halsey possibly have followed the "Don't divide the fleet doctrine" to the preposterous length of hurling ninety ships against sixteen at Leyte Gulf (the Japanese sixteen also being greatly inferior individually to their American counterparts) if he had had any inkling at all of marginal utility thinking? He had other and pressing tasks in hand besides the pursuit of the northernmost Japanese force, and surely many of those ninety ships, especially the new battleships, would have had a far greater utility on those other tasks—which were in fact completely ignored—than they could possibly have on that pursuit. We know that Halsey applied the doctrines he had been taught. It was not that he had failed his teachers but that they had failed to teach him much that could genuinely assist him.

But examples could be piled on indefinitely. Nor can one permit the inference that a single concept borrowed from economics could magically resolve the strategic problems which confront us. It does happen to be the conviction of this writer that a substantial part of economic theory could be very profitably adapted to strategic analysis, including analysis of operational plans, and that those responsible for such analysis would do well to acquaint themselves with that theory—but even that is not the essential issue. Whether this or that concept can be applied with profit is something which interests us only in passing. It is in the field of methodology that a science like economics has most to contribute, and the point which it is the whole purpose of this article to bring home is that what is needed in the approach to strategic problems is *genuine analytical method*. Formerly the need for it was not great, but, apart from the rapidly increasing complexity of the problem, the magnitude of disaster which might result from military error today bears no relation to situations of the past.

For evidence of the primitive development of strategic theory, it is not necessary to compose an ideal model of what can be as a contrast to what is. Historically, we have the case of Mahan as Exhibit A. The tremendous impact (furthered, it should be noticed, by the active interest of various highly placed civilians)

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of Mahan's writings upon the naval branch of the calling can be explained only, as the French strategist Admiral Castex explained it, by the fact that those writings filled "a vacuum." And since Mahan's theories were almost without exception gleaned from studious observation of the practice (and to some extent the writings) of the great naval leaders of a hundred years and more before his time, there is a rather persistent vacuum to account for. Mahan was, as a matter of fact, in some essential respects behind his own times.[16] Certainly he could not be called systematic. But he stood before his colleagues as one who seemed to know the purpose for which warships were built, and he carried all before him. Nor is it altogether irrelevant to point out that Mahan in his maturity felt obliged to regard himself as a misfit in the naval profession, and that the service in which he found himself put itself to few pains to encourage the development of his exceptional and indeed anomalous talents.[17]

Moreover, Mahan has remained, for the United States Navy at least, an isolated phenomenon. The groundwork which he laid for what might have become a science of naval strategy was never systematically developed by the profession. In the thirty-five years since his death—years of overwhelming technological and political change—the service from which he sprang has not produced his successor. Mahan's endowment was a high and rare one, to be sure, but his genius was hardly so resplendent as to paralyze any incipient will to emulate. There can be no doubt that the failure to develop what was so auspiciously begun

[16] For example, his dogmatic insistence that the *guerre de course* (commerce raiding) could not be "by itself alone decisive of great issues" clearly contributed to the almost universal failure prior to World War I to anticipate the strategic significance of the submarine as a commerce destroyer. The submarine had become before Mahan's death in all essential respects the instrument it is today, but in any case his assertion was illogical on the face of it. Whether commerce destruction against a nation like Great Britain could be "decisive of great issues" depended entirely on the scale on which it could be carried out. The submarine and later the airplane made it possible to carry it out on a large scale even under conditions of gross surface inferiority. See my *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, pp. 302-4, 328–32; also my *Guide to Naval Strategy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 3rd ed., 1944, pp. 137-40. The point remains interesting today because comparable considerations apply to the current controversy on the decisiveness of strategic bombing, especially with the atomic bomb.

[17] See William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1947, chap. 1. Mahan's elevation after retirement to Rear-Admiral had, it should be noticed, nothing to do with his services to his country and his profession as a thinker and writer. He was promoted along with every other captain on the retired list who had lived long enough to be a veteran of the Civil War.

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has had its effects in the realm of strategic and policy decision on naval matters.

Nor is the Navy alone in this regard. Air power is still young, but it is certainly not new. Yet it is not possible to find in any language a treatise which explores in discerning and relatively objective fashion the role of air power in war, the factors governing its potentialities and limitations, its relation to other arms, and the chief considerations affecting its mode of operation. Sea power has at least had its Mahan; the literature of air power is all fragments and polemics. That the fact is reflected in the decision-making process can no doubt be demonstrated. It would indeed be amazing if it were not so reflected.

Having said thus much, I am now obliged to point to available remedies. The term "available" must perhaps be stretched a bit, because we are dealing fundamentally with a conflict in value systems. The profession of arms requires inevitably a subordination of rational to romantic values. Loyalty and devotion to heroism are necessarily the hallmark of the calling. Action, decisiveness, and boldness are idealized, though few professions have succeeded so well in building up bureaucratic inhibitions to their realization. The qualities bred into the senior military officer by his institutional environment thus include real and relatively rare virtues, but they also include an anti-theoretical bias which is in fact anti-intellectual. His talents, often real and pronounced, are undeveloped on the side of dialectics. The emphasis is on the so-called "practical," and on command, which is to say administration. "One learns by doing" is one of his favorite axioms; whatever requires a different approach to the learning process—reflection, for example—is suspect.[18] And in his eagerness to be doing, he does throughout his career a fantastically large amount of work of a sort which contributes nothing to his greater understanding of his art even on the technical level.

His training at one of the various war colleges—which he reaches at about the age of thirty-five to forty—is looked upon as an interlude in the more active phases of his career. The courses there are of survey type and of relatively short duration.

[18] Shakespeare, in introducing the dramatic contrast to Hamlet, uses the soldier, Fortinbras.

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The pressure upon the student is intense, but, partly for that reason, there is little encouragement to what one might call rumination, certainly not of a type which might carry over into the subsequent phases of his active duty.

At present the Military Establishment operates three war colleges: the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, the Air War College at Maxwell Field, Alabama, and the National War College at Washington, D. C. The Army has no war college today (the National War College having taken over the plant formerly used for that purpose), but some attention is given to strategic problems at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. At none of these institutions is the course which incorporates strategy of longer than eight to ten months duration, and the portion of the course actually devoted to strategy may be relatively small. It must be observed that the National War College provides a type of training which is somewhat different from that of the other two colleges. It devotes more attention to politics and international relations, and the half of the course given over to military studies surveys the problems of all three services rather than of only one.

These facts in themselves suggest an avenue of approach if reform is seriously to be furthered. We need to make of our war colleges genuine graduate schools in method and duration of training. The military staffs should be chosen for the special attainments of their members in the several fields of strategic analysis (a process which must await development of a corps of officers possessing the requisite competences), and at least for the more advanced courses (*i.e.*, the second and third years of a system which does not yet exist), the students should be selected according to standards which give due weight to the intellectual purpose of the institution. It would also be desirable to reach down into younger age levels than are presently to be found at the war colleges. Such reform in itself would really not be enough—some consideration would have to be given the whole basis of promotion, the system of duty assignments, and perhaps also methods of training at the military and naval academies—but it would be an important start.

The military will object that it is not their purpose to train

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scholars, that there are other besides intellectual qualities necessary in a military leader, and that their needs in strategic planners are after all very limited. They are of course right. The successful military leader must have something besides a good mind and a good education in strategy. But that is only to say that the military calling is more exacting than others. In what other profession does the individual affect or control directly not only the lives of thousands of his fellow citizens but also the destiny of the national community and perhaps also of western civilization as we know it? Analytical acumen need not be emphasized to the exclusion of those other qualities (*i.e.*, "leadership," *et al.*), but it has a long way to go to gain consideration even comparable to the latter.

So far as concerns the limited needs of the Military Establishment for strategic planners, those needs may not be as limited as appears on the surface. If some of those problems were seriously thought through which are now handled by a process often called "mature judgment," there might quickly develop a marked shortage of thinkers. In any case, we probably have here as in other branches of the military art a field for specialists who are selected and trained for the specialty. Thus far we have had specialization in everything else. And regardless of how limited was the actual need in such special skills as strategic analysis, we should have to have a respectably broad base for selecting those called to the task and an adequate means of training them.

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THE SOVIET THEORY OF "PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY"[1]

By RUTH AMENDE ROSA

I

THE concept of "people's democracy"[2] has posed a real ideological dilemma for the U.S.S.R. Prior to the spring of 1948 Soviet theory was confronted with the fact that—partly because of Soviet policy itself—eastern Europe was not developing toward socialism by exactly the same pattern of violent revolutionary change which the U.S.S.R. had experienced, but in a manner more closely approximating gradual "reform." To a very considerable extent it was in the interest of the Soviet Union to emphasize the differences between its own development and that of the "new democracies" in order to quiet national and non-Communist fears in those countries. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. apparently felt obliged to establish its own position of ideological "leadership" in eastern Europe and, simultaneously, to fit the concept of "people's democracy" into the body of orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Prior to June, 1948, the Soviet party "line," as revealed in published sources, provided no single, consistent answer to this problem of doctrine. Although firm as to the ultimate objectives sought in eastern Europe, the "line" had apparently not been rigidly fixed with respect either to the theoretical details of the concept of "people's democracy" or to the methods by which the objective of socialism was to be pursued. This was indicated not only in the extent to which Soviet spokesmen resorted to arbitrary rationalization in describing the theoretical bases of "people's democracy," but also in the frequency with which

[1] This article was completed while the author was holding the New Jersey State Fellowship under appointment by the American Association of University Women.

[2] "People's democracy"—or "the new democracy," as it is sometimes called—refers, in Soviet terminology, to the political, economic and social system which has been established since the end of World War II in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.

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conflicting views on the subject were expressed with apparent impunity by Soviet theorists.[3]

This lack of an integral theory of "people's democracy" seems, in retrospect, to have been a direct reflection of the policy of expediency which governed Soviet relations with eastern Europe during the immediate postwar years. Prior to the spring of 1948 the apparent aim of Soviet policy toward the dependent states of eastern Europe was to persuade those countries, by a policy of moderation, to accept Soviet hegemony and to cooperate in carrying out the Soviet-sponsored program of "laying the foundations" for the later construction of socialism.[4] Needless to say, the Soviet Union was able and willing to use direct force, should it be necessary for the attainment of Soviet ends in eastern Europe. On numerous occasions force was openly used. More frequently, the implicit threat of force was sufficient to assure conformity with Soviet views. But Soviet writing on the theoretical aspects of "people's democracy" consciously sought to conciliate national and non-Communist feeling in eastern Europe, while avoiding or deliberately misrepresenting such obviously unpopular subjects as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the collectivization of agriculture.

The publication on June 29, 1948 of the Cominform "Resolution on the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia"[5] marked the end of this policy. In effect, it announced the crystallization of the Soviet party "line" on the "new democracy" and the "resolution," by a reversion to the principles of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, of the doctrinal dilemma which had faced Soviet theory. The new Soviet approach—which, of course, has not been openly acknowledged as such—is based on the theory that progress toward socialism has led the "people's democra-

[3] Varga, the well-known economist, is of course, a most note-worthy exception to this statement. The views on "people's democracy" which he expressed in his book, *Izmeneniia v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroi mirovoi voiny*, and in a subsequent article in *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika* were denounced in an officially sponsored "discussion" of his "errors" in May, 1947. Cf., Varga, "Demokratiia novogo tipa," *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika*, No. 3, 1947; and "Diskussiia po knige E. Varga 'Izmeneniia v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroi mirovoi voiny,' 7, 13, 21 maia 1947 g., *Prilozhenie k zhurnalu Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika*, No. 11, 1947.

[4] Cf., pp. 499 ff., *infra*.

[5] "Rezoliutsiia Informatsionnogo biuro o polozhenii v Kommunisticheskoi partii Iugoslavii," *Pravda*, June 29, 1948, p. 2. The "Cominform," it should be noted, is more formally referred to in Soviet publications as the "Information Bureau of Several Communist Parties."

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cies" into an inevitable "new phase of intensified class struggle." In this "new phase," the further development of "people's democracy" must be based solely on the precepts of Marxism-Leninism and on Soviet experience in the construction of socialism. The U.S.S.R. itself has ceased to be concerned over the national and liberal sensibilities of the eastern Europeans or over popular aversion to the collectivization of agriculture. Force, applied through the doctrine of the class struggle, has become the avowed Soviet method of social change.

This hardening of Soviet attitude must, in considerable measure, reflect the failure of the previous strategy of mingled persuasion and coercion to overcome national and anti-communist resistance. However, it is quite possible that the earlier policy had, in the Soviet view, outlived its usefulness. During the first postwar years, the immediate "tasks" of the "new democracies" under the Soviet-sponsored program were: first, to reconstruct war damage; and second, to lay the "foundations" for socialist construction.[6] By June, 1948, these "tasks" had been in considerable measure fulfilled. Organized political opposition had been quelled, production approximated pre-war output, the "commanding heights" in the economies had been nationalized, and the redistribution of land among the peasants had been completed.

II

Soviet theorists have made it unmistakably clear that "people's democracy" is not, in their view, a permanent stage in political evolution, but a *transitional* type of system, the principal function of which is the construction of socialism. The "new democracies" are regarded neither as "bourgeois" democracies of the "old" or western European type, nor as socialist democracies of the type found in the U.S.S.R. They are, it is said, an entirely new and original form of society, containing elements of both capitalism and socialism.[7] The avowed goal of socialism is defined as in Marxism-Leninism—namely, as a "classless society" in which all means of production are owned by the "people," and the "exploitation of man by man" has been abol-

[6] Cf., pp. 499 ff., *infra*.

[7] Numerous examples illustrate this statement. For one, cf., A. Leontiev, "Ekonomicheskie osnovy novoi demokratii," *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, No. 4, 1947, p. 75.

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ished. The immediate objectives of the "new democracy" were, until the recent shift in Soviet policy, limited to laying the "foundations"[8]—political, economic, socio-cultural and national—on which socialism was later to be built.

Before the appearance of the Cominform Resolution, full communism[9] was not one of the avowed goals of "people's democracy," although this ultimate objective was implicit in the frequency with which references in Soviet publications to the "new democracy" were coupled with general statements on the universal applicability of Marxism-Leninism and the inevitable world victory of communism.[10] Soviet publications now openly declare communism to be the final goal of "people's democracy."[11] It is, nevertheless, significant that such statements are still comparatively rare. Apparently the U.S.S.R. does not feel that conditions are yet ripe for placing full emphasis on this objective.

III

The origins of "people's democracy" have, from the beginning, been consistently described in Soviet theory in terms of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of violent proletarian revolution. All the "new democracies" are said to have originated in the "struggle for national liberation" during the second World War. The fundamentally class nature of this struggle was enhanced, rather than obscured, it is said, by its outwardly national form, inasmuch as the war itself was essentially a "class war" against fascism, the "highest exponent of international capitalism." Thus the wartime struggle and the events which succeeded it constituted, in Soviet theory, that "political seizure of power" through violent and continuing class struggle which Marxist doctrine considers an essential preliminary to the ultimate establishment of socialism in any country.[12]

[8] Cf., pp. 499 ff., *infra*.

[9] Communism, in Soviet terminology, is the second and "highest" stage of socialism, in which men are compensated for their labor according to their needs, rather than according to the amount of labor expended (as under socialism).

[10] Cf., pp. 509 ff., *infra*.

[11] *Pravda*, June 15, 1948, p. 3; and Iu. Frantsev, "Natsionalizm—oruzhie imperialisticheskoi reaktsii," *Bolshevik*, No. 15, 1948, p. 45.

[12] The importance attached to this point in Soviet theory is well illustrated by a dogmatic attack on Varga which appeared in the August, 1947, issue of *Slaviane*. Cf., I. Medvedev, "K voprosu ob ekonomicheskikh osnovakh narodnoi demokratii," *Slaviane*, No. 8, 1947, pp.

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According to Marxism-Leninism, however, the complete destruction of the "bourgeois bureaucratic-military state machine" is also necessary for a "real people's revolution."[13] Yet, while Soviet theorists unanimously maintain that "people's democracy" is the result of successful proletarian revolution, few theorists have held that such violent destruction of the former governmental structure actually occurred in the countries of eastern Europe.[14] Moreover, Varga's view that "the old state apparatus was not demolished, as in the Soviet Union, but is being rebuilt by means of the unprecedented inclusion in it of the adherents of the new regime" seems not to have been challenged.[15] The lack of precision in Soviet writing on this subject may serve as one example of the early postwar Soviet policy of avoiding doctrinal issues which might antagonize popular feeling.

Soviet writers have, however, attempted to grapple with another major problem of doctrine raised by the phenomenon of "people's democracy." The question—one which first arose in connection with the Bolshevik revolution—is why the countries of eastern Europe, primarily agricultural in character with only a small industrial working class, were able to carry out successful proletarian revolutions without first going through the stage of "bourgeois" revolution. In attempting to answer this question, Soviet writers have invariably begun with the premise that the "new democracy" arose solely as the inevitable result of the "historic, economic forces" operating within each individual country.

At the same time, several more specific explanations have also been presented. Most frequently it is maintained that the "feudal survivals" in eastern Europe became so closely identified with the forces of "capitalist imperialism" during the "war of liberation" that the struggle for national independence and "bourgeois" revolution became inextricably merged in a strug-

33 f. Varga (cf., Varga, *op. cit.*, p. 11) had strongly affirmed his faith in the doctrine of violent and continuing revolution. However, he had also expressed the view that the Czechoslovak people had seized power peacefully and at one stroke, thereby proving themselves an exception to the general principle. This position was condemned as heretical and revisionistic.

[13] J. Stalin, *Leninism*, New York, International Publishers, 1942, p. 34.

[14] For one exception, cf., I. P. Trainin, "Demokratiia osobogo tipa," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 1, 1947. p. 7.

[15] Varga, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

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gle for proletarian revolution as well. Soviet theorists also say, in vindication of Lenin's principle that it is easier to achieve socialist revolution in a backward than in an advanced country, that the forces of reformism and "opportunism" were not so strongly developed in the eastern European countries as in the "bourgeois" countries of the West. In addition, Soviet writers hold (contrary to all evidence) that the proletariat of eastern Europe, although small, was highly organized, and was therefore able to justify Lenin's belief that it is possible for a proletarian minority to seize power.

Finally, Soviet spokesmen unanimously maintain—with a fine disregard for the "inevitable" action of the "historic, economic forces"—that the existence of a socialist U.S.S.R. *alone* made possible the rise of "people's democracy."[16] Without the inspiration, example, and protection of the Soviet Union, the "new democracies" would not have been able to survive in the face of western imperialism and internal reaction.

IV

Is "people's democracy," in the Soviet view, a form of proletarian dictatorship?

According to Marxism-Leninism, victorious proletarian revolution must be followed by the "dictatorship of the proletariat."[17] Yet Soviet spokesmen, prior to the publication of the Cominform Resolution, vigorously denied that the dictatorship of the proletariat had been established, or was to be established, in any of the "new democracies."[18] In defending this position, Soviet theory resorted to an extremely narrow definition of the term "dictatorship of the proletariat." Although both Lenin and Stalin had, in the past, insisted that proletarian dictatorship must be based on an "alliance of the proletarian and the non-proletarian toilers,"[19] postwar Soviet usage invariably defined

[16] Trainin, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[17] I. V. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, New York, International Publishers, 1932, p. 31. "The transition from capitalism to Communism will certainly bring a great variety and abundance of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be only one: *the dictatorship of the proletariat*" (sic). Cf., also p. 71 for a similar statement by Marx.

[18] Cf., I. Konstantinovsky, "New Role of the Peasantry in the East-European Countries, *New Times*, No. 19, 1947, p. 5; and Trainin, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[19] Stalin, *op. cit.*, with particular reference to the chapters entitled "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," "The Party's Three Fundamental Slogans

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the dictatorship as "single party rule," or the exclusive domination of the state by the industrial workers, sharing power with no other group.[20] In contrast, "people's democracy" was defined as "the rule of the toiling people"[21] (the industrial workers, peasants and "progressive intelligentsia") who exercised their power through a coalition government of several parties. The industrial workers themselves, moreover, were consistently described as the "workers," and almost never as the "proletariat."[22]

Attempts to reconcile this denial of proletarian dictatorship in eastern Europe with orthodox Marxist doctrine led Soviet theory, prior to June, 1948, into an equivocal position. Soviet theorists strongly asserted the essential correctness of the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship as the "basic method" of socialist construction.[23] But at the same time, they maintained that Marxism-Leninism does not bind itself to any one form of "democracy" or to any single pattern of transition to socialism.[24] Both Marx and Lenin believed, it was said, that the exact form of transition should vary with the conditions and traditions of individual countries.

From this premise, Soviet spokesmen argued that the "new democracies" were surrounded by "peculiar circumstances" which neither Marx nor Lenin could have foreseen and which rendered the method of proletarian dictatorship impracticable. However, Soviet theorists differed among themselves as to the nature of those "peculiar circumstances." One group held that the presence of internal and external "reactionary forces" threatening the security of the new regimes required that the communist parties devote their energies primarily to the defense

on the Peasant Problem," and "The Slogan of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Poor Peasantry in the Period of Preparation for the October Revolution." Cf., also J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, New York, International Publishers, 1934, pp. 22-25 especially.

[20] Trainin, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[21] According to Soviet usage, the "toilers" are those persons who earn their living by labor of some sort, either physical or mental. The term "workers" is applied only to those who earn their living by physical labor in industry. Both terms will be used in the Soviet sense throughout this paper.

[22] This was in striking contrast with the theoretical position of the workers in the U.S.S.R., where, according to Stalin, the proletariat ceased to be a "proletariat" and became a "working class" only after socialism "in the main" had been achieved and there remained no capitalist elements to exploit the workers or to be repressed by them. Cf., Stalin, *Leninism* ("On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R."), *op. cit.*

[23] Leontiev, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

[24] *Ibid.*

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of the "democratic conquests" which had already been made.[25] To an outsider, this admission of weakness seems far from consistent with the emphasis which Soviet publications concurrently placed on the example of the U.S.S.R. in overcoming the far greater dangers which had faced it during its early years, inasmuch as the U.S.S.R. had chosen to meet those dangers by the method of proletarian dictatorship—a fact which was never mentioned in Soviet writing on "people's democracy." According to the second group of Soviet theorists, the fundamental "peculiarity" in the position of the "new democracies" consisted in the presence of a socialist U.S.S.R. With perhaps even less consistency from the point of view of orthodox Marxism, those writers maintained that the "people's democracies" could, under the protection of Soviet socialism, safely afford the luxury of a more gradual transition to socialism.[26]

Although Soviet theory insisted that the "new democracies" were ruled by all the "toilers," it also maintained that the "class struggle" must continue, that only through struggle could the ultimate victory of socialism be assured. Until recently, the "internal class enemy" was said to consist of the large and medium-sized manufacturers, merchants, financiers and landowners.[27] The exigencies of the class struggle, however, were held to necessitate not only the liquidation of the "class enemy," but also the extension of working class "hegemony" over the social order as a whole and over the government of the "toilers" in particular. Only the workers, led by a "vanguard" of the most active and politically conscious workers organized in the communist parties, were thought to be capable of leading the "toilers" to socialism.

V

The Cominform Resolution of June 28, 1948, introduced an outwardly abrupt shift in the Soviet theory of "people's democracy."[28] According to the new "line," which has been applied to all the "new democracies," the progress which the eastern

[25] Trainin, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[26] Leontiev, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[27] The "external class enemy" was defined as the "intriguing Anglo-American imperialists."
[28] The Resolution is specifically stated to have been drawn up and published on the initiative of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Cf., "Rezoliutsiia Informatsionnogo biuro," *op. cit.*, p. 2.

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European countries have made toward the construction of socialism has led them into an inevitable "new phase of intensified class struggle." This can mean only that, in the Soviet view, the "people's democracies" have completed the basic work in laying the "foundations" for socialist construction and are now ready to proceed with the actual transition to socialism.[29]

According to the Cominform, Tito's principal "rightist errors" arose from his alleged preaching of the "Bukharinite doctrine" of the peaceful evolution of capitalism into socialism and his consequent denial that the class struggle must inevitably become sharper with progress toward socialism. The basic heresy of both Tito and Gomólka was described as "automatism," or the tendency to assume that the transition to socialism would occur spontaneously, without the necessity for waging a "determined class struggle."[30] Tito was accused of carrying this error to the extreme of "merging" the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the coalition government of all the toilers, thus endangering its identity as a "revolutionary instrument of the working class."[31]

In the "new phase of intensified class struggle," the working class is warned against Gomólka's "error" of regarding "people's democracy" as "a kind of golden mean between liberal-bourgeois democracy and social democracy" and forgetting its "essential character" as a form of transition to socialism.[32] In this connection, current Soviet theory advances the novel thesis that failure to conduct the class struggle with sufficient vigor may even result in the reversion of "people's democracy" to capitalism.

> People's democracy, it should not be forgotten, is an intermediate stage between the bourgeois state and the Socialist State, between capitalism and Socialism. No country can remain long in that inter-

[29] The Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party described the theoretical basis of the "new phase" as follows: "To the extent that the basic socio-political reforms established in the framework of people's democracy are carried out, the countries of people's democracy progress toward tasks directed toward the attainment of socialism, which require a further sharpening and deepening of the class struggle." Cf., "Rezoliutsiia plenuma tsentralnogo komiteta Polskoi Rabochei Partii," *Pravda*, September 9, 1948, p. 3.

[30] Gomólka was denounced by the Polish Workers' Party in September 1948 for "errors" substantially the same as those of Tito. He was replaced by Bierut as general secretary of the party.

[31] "Rezoliutsiia Informatsionnogo biuro," *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[32] "Doklad Beruta na aktive PPR," *Pravda*, September 10, 1948, p. 3.

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mediate stage without moving either forward or backward. If it does not move forward towards Socialism, its development will be back to capitalism. But socialist development is not automatic and spontaneous. Whether the country really advances towards Socialism depends on the further development of the class struggle of the proletariat and on proper direction of the country's policy under the determined guidance of the Communist Party.[33]

The "class enemy" is no longer defined in the "new phase" in the same fashion as during the preceding period, for the old "enemy" has been liquidated. The new "enemy" is primarily the more well-to-do peasant or "kulak," and, to a less extent, those "capitalist elements" which are said to have grown up in industry and trade.

In their present form, however, the communist parties of eastern Europe are considered poorly equipped to serve as leaders in the class struggle. Current Soviet theory maintains that the usefulness of a mass party membership during the earlier stage of the "new democracy" has come to an end, and that the parties must now be transformed into smaller, more highly disciplined organizations with a more carefully selected membership. The new parties must function in accordance with the principle of "democratic centralism," and must adhere closely to the model of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In a word, they must become effective organs of revolution.

In the importance now attached to a vigorous waging of class warfare, Soviet theory has, in fact, if not openly, returned to the orthodox Marxist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[34] Since June, 1948, Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly expounded the necessity of establishing a close "alliance" between the working class and the "poor and middle peasantry" in eastern

[33] O. Kuusinen, "Are you for or against the Soviet Union?" *New Times*, No. 39, 1948, p. 5.

[34] It now appears that at least one Communist official has publicly identified "people's democracy" with the dictatorship of the proletariat. After this article was written, Mátyas Rákosi, general secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party and deputy premier of Hungary, was quoted in the *New York Times* (January 23, 1949, p. 21) as follows: "A people's democracy is, according to its function, a dictatorship of the proletariat without the soviet form." The purpose of the proletarian state, Rákosi said, is the suppression of the "class enemy"—the bourgeoisie. "The presence of the Soviet Army" made it possible for the "people's democracies" to "exercise the function of a proletarian dictatorship in comparative peace and without a bloody civil war."

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Europe as "one of the basic principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat."[35] In striking contrast with previous usage, the working class of the "new democracies" is more and more frequently mentioned in Soviet publications as the "proletariat."[36] Moreover, the merging, in all the "people's democracies," of the communist and social democratic parties on the basis of the latters' unconditional acceptance of Marxism-Leninism, and the resultant entrenchment of the "unified" communist parties in power, would seem finally to have destroyed even the hollow logic of previous Soviet assertions that single party rule—and hence proletarian dictatorship—did not obtain in eastern Europe.

VI

The Soviet theory of a "new phase" in the class struggle attendant on the transition to socialism rests upon the assumption that the basic work in laying the "foundations" for socialist construction had been largely completed by the spring of 1948. What, then, was the nature of those "foundations," and what are the immediate objectives of current Soviet policy in eastern Europe?

Although Soviet policy prior to June, 1948, aimed at securing "working class hegemony" in the coalition governments of the "toilers," the *political* "foundation" considered necessary for the construction of socialism was defined as the establishment of the "rule of the toilers." In this connection, the continued presence of the outward forms of parliamentary government in most of the "new democracies" provoked considerable discussion among Soviet theorists.[37] A few Soviet writers maintained that the "rule of the toilers" could be realized only under a Soviet form of government. But the majority argued that various forms of government are possible in transitional societies such as "people's democracy."[38] "Bourgeois" forms of govern-

[35] A. Leontiev, "Vosmoi tom Sochinenii I. V. Stalina," *Bolshevik*, No. 17, 1948, p. 25.

[36] Cf., p. 498, n. 33, *supra*.

[37] The Soviet pattern of political organization through a hierarchy of "people's councils" had been adopted only in Yugoslavia and Albania.

[38] Mátyas Rákosi recently carried this position still further when he declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat can be established in eastern Europe without the Soviet form of government. This is possible, he said, because of the protection afforded by the Soviet Union. Cf., the *New York Times*, January 23, 1949, p. 21.

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ment could continue to exist in eastern Europe, because the class structure of the "new democracies" assured control by the "toilers," and also because the presence of the U.S.S.R. afforded protection for the new regimes against western "imperialist plots."[39]

Since the shift in Soviet policy, the securing of communist party "leadership" in the governments of eastern Europe has become the avowed political objective of "people's democracy." Moreover, the outward respect which Soviet spokesmen had previously accorded to the principle of parliamentary responsibility has been replaced, in the "new phase" of the class struggle, by a denial of the validity of all legal methods of political change and by an increased emphasis on direct, revolutionary action. Although the Bolsheviks in the past made extensive use of "parliamentary forms of struggle," they never, it is said, attached decisive importance to such methods, but considered them only a supplement to the "basic, extra-parliamentary revolutionary means of struggle."[40]

The *economic* "foundations" for the construction of socialism, as described in Soviet theoretical writing, fall into three categories: 1) nationalization of the "key points" in industry, 2) land reform, and 3) industrialization through state planning.

The nationalization of the "commanding heights in the economy" was designed to open the way for rapid industrialization and to assure the political predominance of the "toilers." Nationalization in the "people's democracies" was considered fundamentally different in character from nationalization in "bourgeois" countries, where, in the Soviet view, the creation of "state-monopolistic enterprises" must necessarily result in "state capitalism" and the further entrenchment of the bourgeoisie in political power.[41]

[39] Leontiev, "Ekonomicheskie osnovy novoi demokratii," *op. cit.*, p. 76.

[40] E. Burdzhalov, "O mezhdunarodnoi znachenii istoricheskogo opyta partii bolshevikov," *Bolshevik*, No. 17, 1948, p. 50.

[41] I. P. Trainin, "Demokratiia osobogo tipa," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 3, 1947, p. 1. Soviet theory has not always been consistent on this point, however. Molotov himself declared, in 1945, that such radical reforms as land reform in "bourgeois" countries weaken the position of the "reactionary-fascist forces and stimulate the rise of the democratic and socialist movement in those countries." Molotov's early position on this question seems perilously close to revisionism! Cf., "28ia godovshchina Velikoi Oktiabrskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revoliutsii. Doklad V. I. Molotova na torzhestvennom zasedanii Mos-

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During the first three postwar years, Soviet theory supported the continued private ownership of smaller factories, craft shops and retail trade as part of the policy of calculated economic concession which was considered necessary in the interests both of economic recovery and of political expediency.[42] So great was the importance attached to this policy in Soviet theory that the Yugoslav program for liquidating "all remnants of capitalism" was sharply condemned by the Cominform as a "Trotskyite, left deviation" from Marxism-Leninism.[43] Nevertheless, while continuing to denounce "adventurism" in the nationalization of private enterprise, Soviet spokesmen have, in recent months, placed increasing stress on the need to weed out "capitalist elements" in the small trade and industry of eastern Europe.

On the whole, however, the U.S.S.R. appears well satisfied with the progress of nationalization in the "people's democracies." According to the Cominform, "the question of the nationalization of industry and its development on a socialist basis has been solved successfully in the new democracies," thus marking "a serious step toward socialism."[44]

In contrast, the Soviet attitude toward agriculture has shifted abruptly since the publication of the Cominform Resolution. Expropriation of the larger landholdings and the redistribution of the land in small plots among the poorer and landless peasantry was, in the earlier Soviet theory, an important means of liquidating "feudal survivals" and laying the economic "foundations" for socialist construction. As a result of this policy, conducted under the slogan, "the land belongs to those who till it," the rural population of eastern Europe had become, by the spring of 1948, predominantly a small landowning peasantry.

This agrarian policy was directed toward two immediate objectives: increased agricultural production as a necessary basis for industrialization, and acquisition of the political support of

kovskogo Soveta 6-go noiabria 1945 g.," *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika*, No. 11, 1945, p. 10.

[42] Cf. Medvedev, *op cit.*, p. 38, for a statement of the Soviet theory of attracting small traders to the state by a policy of economic concession.

[43] The Yugoslav "error" consisted in their alleged failure to precede nationalization with adequate preparatory measures.

[44] "The Development of Agriculture in the People's Democracies," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, No. 20 (23), 1948, p. 1.

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the peasants. However, despite the emphasis which Soviet writers constantly placed on the principles of land ownership by the tillers and voluntariness in the formation of agricultural collectives, it was apparent long before the appearance of the Cominform Resolution that socialization of agriculture was the ultimate goal of agrarian reform. Varga seems to have reflected the dialectical strategy behind Soviet agrarian policy in eastern Europe when he declared that the "new democracies" had first sought, as an essential preliminary to more radical innovations, to satisfy the land hunger of the peasants.[45] Once the peasants' land hunger had been assuaged, Soviet theory relied not only on "historical necessity," but on the practical needs of the peasants to turn them toward socialism. Those practical needs were deliberately intensified by the state itself, which wielded its economic weapons in such a way as to foster the "voluntary" formation of collective farms.

Whether the policy of calculated concession in agriculture succeeded in satisfying the peasants' land hunger may be an open question. But it is significant that Soviet theory has, since June of 1948, largely rediscovered Lenin's warning that the most dangerous seeds of capitalism are contained among the peasantry. Thus the slogan, "the land belongs to those who till it," has been replaced by the slogan, "the liquidation of the kulaks as a class"; and a "bitter, relentless class war" in the countryside has been proclaimed in each of the "new democracies" (excepting Yugoslavia, of course). The liquidation of the kulaks can be accomplished, it is maintained, only, as in the U.S.S.R., by the mass collectivization—or the "sovietization," as it is sometimes called—of agriculture. The communist parties of Poland, Hungary and Rumania have formally announced that the cultivation of the land in small plots is no longer considered practicable, and that individual farming must inevitably give way to mechanized state and cooperative agriculture.[46]

As in the case of industry, however, current Soviet theory condemns the left as well as the right extreme in agricultural policy. Thus the Yugoslav party leaders were accused both of the "right deviation" of failing to push collectivization with

[45] Varga, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
[46] The *New York Times*, August 21, 1948, p. 4.

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sufficient vigor, and of the "left deviation" of undertaking collectivization without adequate preparation. Under the present Soviet program, the "new democracies" are expected to take steps for the more rapid collectivization of agriculture. But such steps must be preceded by "detailed and lengthy preparatory work" to "restrict capitalist elements in the countryside" and to "strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class."[47] Accordingly, most of the communist parties of eastern Europe have carefully coupled their statements on the need for rapid collectivization with equally strong warnings against "adventurism" and excessive haste in the socialization of agriculture.

In Soviet theory, economic planning was the method by which state-controlled industry and agriculture were to be coordinated for the purpose of rapid industrialization. Planning thus acquired the status of a third economic "foundation" for the construction of socialism.

Soviet writers were almost unanimous in maintaining that both the concept and the method of state economic planning as practiced in the "new democracies" were modeled directly on the Soviet example. Varga's view that planning of the Soviet type is possible only in a socialist state—in the U.S.S.R. —was denounced in the officially sponsored "discussion" of his "errors," and planning was held to be fully possible in "transitional economies" where not all the means of production have been nationalized.[48] Nevertheless, the concluding statement by the chairman of the "discussion" recognized some differences between Soviet planning and planning under "people's democracy":

> Insofar as the basic means of production in the countries of the new democracy are nationalized, agrarian reform is carried out and the development of agriculture is under the influence of a democratic state, to that extent they have there the prerequisites for planning. Unquestionably, planning in the countries of the new democracy is still in the initial stage of development, and in this sense it is substantially different, of course, from planning in a socialist society.[49]

The ambiguity of this statement notwithstanding, recent Soviet

[47] "Rezoliutsiia Informatsionnogo biuro," *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[48] "Diskussiia po knige E. Varga," *op. cit.*, pp. 58f.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

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theory has included no criticism of the conduct of planning in the "people's democracies," and has given no indication—beyond the general precept of conformity to Soviet experience—of the direction in which it is expected to proceed in the "new phase" of the class struggle.

Prior to the publication of the Cominform Resolution, Soviet theory included the laying of socio-cultural and national "foundations" among the tasks considered necessary for the construction of socialism.

The *socio-cultural* "foundation" was usually described as the creation of a "new moral-political atmosphere." The goal—which Marxism regards as an important objective of proletarian dictatorship—was, in fact, the remolding of man himself, mentally and spiritually, into the socialist ideal. The more immediate aims were to develop "labor discipline" through "emulation" or "patriotic competition" (a movement similar to Soviet Stakhanovism); to create a sense of "social unity" among the various groups in the population, particularly between peasants and workers; and to raise the "educational and cultural level" of the people.

Since June, 1948, the emphasis placed on these various objectives has shifted to conform with the demands of an intensified class struggle. The importance attached to "labor discipline" and the Stakhanovite movement has increased. But the goal of "social unity" has been replaced by two new objectives: the liquidation of the kulaks and other "capitalist elements," and the creation of an "alliance" between the workers and the "poor and middle peasantry." The cultural and educational aims are now described more narrowly in terms of eliminating "private property instincts" in cultural life and indoctrinating the people in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

National independence was the final "foundation" which the earlier Soviet theory considered necessary for socialist construction in the "new democracies." The importance attached to this objective represented a considerable departure from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that true national independence can be achieved only as a *result* of the prior achievement of socialism—a departure from orthodoxy which was said to have been neces-

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sary in order to protect the new regimes against the "intrigues of capitalist imperialism":

> For Marxist-Leninists, the national question is not independent of, but subordinate to the tasks and interests of the struggle of the working class for its own aims. But here, namely in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the conjunction of circumstances is such that the struggle for the goals of the proletariat cannot be successful without a struggle for the confirmation of national independence.[50]

Prior to the spring of 1948, Soviet publications constantly stressed the devotion of the U.S.S.R. to the principles of national independence and the equality of all nations, large and small. However, this emphasis on national sovereignty and the disinterested friendship of the Soviet Union was coupled with an equally strong emphasis on the "sacred brotherhood" and friendship of all the Slavic peoples, in support of which the Soviet press marshalled increasing numbers of quotations from groups and individuals in the "backward" Slavic states who protested their loyalty to Stalin as the "great teacher," and their determination to follow in the footsteps of the U.S.S.R. along the road to socialism. Thus the Soviet approach to the question of nationalism in eastern Europe was apparently based on the same kind of dialectical strategy as guided Soviet policy toward the collectivization of agriculture. While endeavoring to persuade the "new democracies" that their independence was secure, the U.S.S.R. sought to induce them, by sentiments of Slavic kinship and by the example set by loyal party members, voluntarily to accept Soviet hegemony.

The failure of this strategy is clearly manifest in the stress which Soviet spokesmen have placed, since June, 1948, on the need to eliminate "nationalist deviations" in the communist parties of the "people's democracies." Moreover, the Soviet claim to a specially favored position in eastern Europe has been fully revealed in Soviet complaints that the Yugoslav, and the former Polish, party leaders had tended to conduct their countries' relations with the U.S.S.R. in exactly the same way as with capitalist countries. Gomólka's "error" in this respect was said to have originated in his "lack of understanding of the essential idea of the mutual relationship between the countries

[50] Trainin, "Demokratiia osobogo tipa," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 1, 1947, p. 14.

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of people's democracy and the U.S.S.R., and the leading role of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in the international front of struggle against imperialism."[51] Tito was accused of the still greater heresy of consciously proceeding in his relations with the Soviet Union "from the well-known bourgeois-nationalist thesis that the capitalist states present less danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than does the U.S.S.R."[52]

In the current Soviet campaign against "nationalist mentality" in the "new democracies," the growth of nationalism is attributed to the rise of "capitalist elements" and "private property instincts." Nationalism is regarded as a further aspect of the general eastern European tendency toward opportunism, revisionism and "rapprochement with the bourgeoisie," resulting from the failure to press the class struggle with sufficient vigor. In the face of this trend, Soviet theory insists that "the principles of Bolshevism are obligatory for all countries" in the transition to socialism, and that the undisputed "leadership" of the U.S.S.R. must be fully recognized in each "people's democracy."[53]

VII

Before the Cominform Resolution was published, Soviet spokesmen vigorously insisted that each of the "new democracies" was going toward socialism in its own individual way, in accordance with its own peculiar conditions and traditions. The question of whether one country could single-handedly construct socialism without Soviet aid received no attention in Soviet publications, however, until late in 1947, when the issue was introduced in two articles appearing almost simultaneously in *Bolshevik* and *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*. The *Bolshevik* article merely quoted, without apparent disapproval, a statement in which Kardelj, general secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party, said that "the democratic forces of the toiling people, headed by the working class, contain in themselves all the necessary elements and conditions for the most far-reaching con-

[51] "Rezoliutsiia plenuma tsentralnogo komiteta Polskoi Rabochei Partii," *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[52] "Rezoliutsiia Informatsionnogo biuro," *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[53] Burdzhalov, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

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struction of socialism in our country."[54] The article in *Planovoe Khoziaistvo,* while not actually denying the possibility of unilateral socialist construction in the "new democracies," maintained at some length that the Stalinist doctrine of "the possibility of constructing socialism in a single country," as originally enunciated, applied only to the Soviet Union, and that the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. alone made the building of socialism in eastern Europe feasible:

> Under present conditions, the presence of a powerful socialist state —the Soviet Union—makes really possible and practicable the socialist transformation of society in those countries which, in former times, would not have had sufficient strength for the accomplishment of such an historic task. During the years when the U.S.S.R. was entering on the construction of socialism, when the fate of the Soviet revolution was decided, Comrade Stalin, proving the possibility of constructing socialism in our country, observed:
>
> "We are not speaking, of course, about Montenegro or even about Bulgaria, but about our own country—about the U.S.S.R."
>
> Comrade Stalin went on to say that he was speaking about a country in which imperialism had existed and developed, in which there is some basis of large industry, in which there is a proletariat and a party leading it, in which there are natural and other resources which make the construction of socialism possible.
>
> It is now clear, after the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union, that new, formerly non-existent possibilities have opened up for small peoples as well. The contemporary experience of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the other countries of the new democracy provides full evidence of this.[55]

Since June 1948, Soviet theory has categorically denied that any "people's democracy" can either construct socialism or preserve its national independence without the assistance of the U.S.S.R.[56] In contrast with their previous position, Soviet theorists now insist that national variations in the transition to socialism must be strictly subordinated to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and to "Soviet experience in the construction of socialism":

[54] V. Moshetov and V. Lesakov, "O demokraticheskikh preobrazovaniiakh v stranakh novoi demokratii," *Bolshevik,* No. 22, 1947, p. 47.

[55] Leontiev, "Ekonomicheskie osnovy novoi demokratii," *op. cit.,* p. 70.

[56] In recanting his "errors," Gomólka said: "For no one country among the people's *democracies can guarantee* its own independence and sovereignty, or develop and go forward to socialism, without the closest cooperation with the Soviet Union." Cf., "Vystuplenie Gomulka na aktive PPR," *Pravda,* September 10, 1948, p. 4.

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> It is impossible to recognize as correct the assertion that each country is going toward socialism by its own completely independent path, that there are as many paths to socialism as there are countries. To speak thus is deliberately to deny the international significance of Bolshevism. The general conformity to law in the transition from capitalism to socialism revealed by Marx and Engels and confirmed, made concrete and developed by Lenin and Stalin on the basis of the experience of the Bolshevik party and the Soviet state is obligatory for all countries.[57]

This question of "socialism in one country" has developed into one of the basic ideological issues in the current controversy between the Communist Parties of Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. Early in the dispute Tito wrote, in a formal reply to Soviet charges, that the Yugoslav communists were "developing socialism in our country in somewhat different forms" than in in the Soviet Union.[58] Later, he declared that the doctrine of the possibility of constructing socialism in a single country fully applied to Yugoslavia.[59] In contrast, the U.S.S.R. now maintains that the attitude adopted toward the Soviet Union is "the touchstone of true internationalism, the touchstone of true devotion to socialism,"[60] since "deep devotion to the cause of Socialism and Communism is inseparable from an equally profound devotion to the Soviet Union.[61]

Moreover, the abnegation of nationalism in the "people's democracies" is identified, in current Soviet theory, with exclusive devotion to the doctrine of world proletarian revolution as expounded and exemplified by the U.S.S.R. It is clear that the Soviet Union considers its self-assumed position as "leader" of the "new democracies" to be but one aspect of its general role as stimulator and protector of proletarian revolution in all countries. As in the early days of the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet spokesmen now openly proclaim that "the Soviet state is the . . . . vanguard of the progressive forces of humanity, whose mission it is to carry out the epoch-making process of

[57] Burdzhalov, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[58] Central Committee of Communist Party of Yugoslavia to Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union, April 13, 1948, in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, London and New York, 1948, p. 27.

[59] The *New York Times*, November 17, 1948, p. 10.

[60] "Doklad Beruta," *op. cit.*, p. 3. Cf., also "The Soviet Union—Standard-Bearer of a New Epoch," *New Times*, No. 26, 1948, p. 2.

[61] Kuusinen, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

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replacing bourgeois exploiting society by free socialist society.[62] At the same time, revolutionary statements made many years ago by Soviet leaders are quoted with increasing frequency in Soviet publications:

> "The party," said Comrade Stalin, "proceeds from the fact that the national and international tasks of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. are merged in the one general task of liberating the proletariat of all countries from capitalism, that the interests of constructing socialism in our country are wholly and entirely merged with the interests of the revolutionary movement of all countries in the one common interest in the victory of revolution in all countries . . . ."[63]

Soviet theory has always looked upon "people's democracy" as an important step toward the "inevitable" world victory of communism. The very existence of the "new democracies," by reducing the number of states in the "world capitalist system," was said to have materially intensified the "general crisis of world capitalism."[64] Months before the formal announcement of a "new phase" in the class struggle, one Soviet spokesman declared:

> The countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe . . . . have resolutely set foot on the path to socialism. This is an ominous reminder of the inevitability of the downfall of the rule of imperialist oppression and tyranny; it is a portent of the oncoming complete triumph of communism.[65]

Now, however, the "new democracies" are, for the first time, expected to play an active part in promoting the cause of world communism. The vigorous support of "international proletarian solidarity," as "the sharpest weapon of the workers and of all toilers . . . . in solving the tasks . . . . of constructing socialism and communism," is, in current Soviet theory, one of the prime duties of "people's democracy."[66]

VIII

The extraordinary flexibility of Soviet tactics in promoting the cause of world communism is, perhaps, the principal "les-

[62] *Ibid.*
[63] Frantsev, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
[64] "Diskussiia po knige E. Varga," *op. cit.*, pp. 21 and 43.
[65] "Invincible Banner of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle." *New Times*, No. 5, 1948, pp. 1f.
[66] Frantsev, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

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son" to be drawn from a study of the Soviet concept of "people's democracy." The preceding pages have been largely devoted to pointing out the contrasts in Soviet theory as it was set forth before and after the Cominform denunciation of the Yugoslav Communist Party in June, 1948. However, it would be a great mistake to interpret the departures from Marxism-Leninism which were manifest in the Soviet theory of "people's democracy" before that date as a real break with orthodoxy. For it is a basic precept of Leninist doctrine that the tactics of the moment must be adapted and applied to fit the requirements of immediate circumstances.

Current Soviet policy in eastern Europe is founded on the assumption that the initial period of preparation for the building of socialism has come to an end, and a new period, dedicated to the actual construction of socialism, has begun. In this new period, the older indirect methods of coercion, calculated concession and semi-legality, which were combined with a careful glossing over of the more revolutionary teachings of Marxist doctrine, are apparently no longer considered necessary for the attainment of Soviet objectives and have been replaced by the openly revolutionary methods of proletarian dictatorship. Thus the forceful imposition of Bolshevism, the collectivization of agriculture and the subordination of national independence and equality to Soviet "leadership" have become the openly avowed aims of Soviet policy toward the "new democracy."

There can be little doubt that the "sovietization" of eastern Europe represents, in Soviet theory, only a prelude to ultimate proletarian revolution in all countries. But the degree of emphasis currently accorded this objective in Soviet publications suggests that world revolution is viewed as belonging to yet another "phase" of socialist development—perhaps a hypothetical phase in which the victory of Soviet socialism in eastern Europe will have so intensified the "general crisis of capitalism" as to precipitate a new "revolutionary crisis" on a world scale.

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THE ORGANIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

By WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN

WISHES have been the fathers to many thoughts, but wishes alone have never sired an effective international organization. It is only when the desirable and the possible have been brought into some sort of relation with each other that plans for international organization have ever had any chance of succeeding. This statement is of course a truism; anything which succeeds must have been possible. Can one, however, make any statements about the limits of what is possible without waiting for the historical record to complete itself? In the field of international organization failure to undertake this task has resulted in many cruel disappointments, and unfounded optimism has given way to uninformed cynicism. It is therefore of some interest to consider some of the ways in which the stubborn facts of international life condition the range of choice within which men of good will may hope to act successfully.

One of the constants in the realm of international politics is the existence of a hierarchy of states based upon an unequal distribution of power. The order in the hierarchy changes from time to time—states ascend or descend the scale of power, and the number at the top varies—but the hierarchy, in all its inequality, remains. One of the consequences arising from its existence is that few states are able to exert their influence upon more than a local basis. From this it follows that diplomacy in the world arena becomes the business of the Great Powers.

Prior to the nineteenth century the caste system of world politics was generally recognized. The small states accepted their subordination as a matter of course; the great states exercised the prerogatives of their position openly and frankly. Indeed, there were few illusions regarding status and equality in interstate relations. It was "natural" so to accept one's position in an era of authoritarian traditions. The substance of most philosophy, whether religious, political, or social, was itself hierarchical, and the fact that the lesser states were treated

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in some respects on a level with the greater could be accepted as a matter of expediency rather than as an absolute right. Grotius and his successors taught that all states were equal before the law, but since force was resorted to more often than litigation, in the cases that counted, the question of equality seldom arose. In an era when rank and prestige were preëminent values, power, modified by expediency, was recognized as the prime instrument of international persuasion, and the supremacy of the Great Powers was unquestioned.

As the nineteenth century progressed the introduction of new values served to obscure in men's minds the inescapable hegemony of the Great Powers. The new value pattern in large part reflected that nexus of beliefs associated with the democratic ideal. Where expediency had formerly determined the extent to which the lesser states were to be brought into consultation with the larger states, so as to facilitate the policies of the latter, the democratic ideal seemed to demand that all, great and small alike, participate as a matter of right. Equality, instead of being a convenient legal fiction, became in many quarters an article of faith. Thereafter the statesman had not only to devise policies according to self-interest and expediency; he had also to implement those policies in such a way as to acknowledge the values of democracy. So long as relations between states followed the traditional channels of diplomacy his problem did not become acute. Only when diplomacy entered a new phase—specifically that of international organization—did the elements of power, expediency, and democracy have to be formally reconciled. How, if at all, has this reconciliation taken place, what has been its outward aspect, and what have been the consequences in the realm of international affairs?

Of the three great experiments in international organization the first did not attempt to grapple with the problem at all. The founders of the Quadruple Alliance of 1815 merely strove to institutionalize the fact of Great Power hegemony in Europe. Alexander, Castlereagh, and Metternich all rejected the idea of representation without responsibility; for representation, in their minds, was synonymous with responsibility, and responsibility meant power. That their effort failed (as it did in 1824) was due less to the exclusiveness of their association than to

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the fact that the Great Powers had fewer shared values than they had originally anticipated. That the failure was greeted with a chorus of gratification, particularly in England, indicated, nevertheless, that future experiments of this type could hardly ignore the ideal of democracy.

By 1919 the doctrine of self-determination, the strictures against secret diplomacy, and above all the emphasis placed by President Wilson on a democratic peace, made imperative a reconciliation between the power of the few and the presumed aspirations of the many. How that reconciliation was to be accomplished became the subject of much debate during the founding of the League of Nations. As was only natural, owing to the hierarchical order of the system, the outcome of the discussion depended ultimately upon the views of France, England, and the United States.

The French position, being the simplest and the one which received shortest shrift at Paris, may be disposed of in a few words. France had suffered two invasions in as many generations, and though she now stood among the victors she could hardly avoid the admission that her foe, though beaten, remained the strongest single state on the Continent. As a consequence France tended to look upon the proposed League of Nations as the framework for an enduring alliance against Germany rather than as a new instrument of diplomacy. Responsibility and representation were, in themselves, relatively unimportant issues in French eyes; what counted was the objective of the agreement. Provided that the members of the League would pledge themselves in advance to resist aggression, and provided that their resistance would be automatic, France was unwilling to quarrel over the structural aspects of the arrangement. Structure could become important under one circumstance only: if the League were not specifically directed against Germany.[1]

The sessions of the League of Nations Commission soon revealed that the worst of France's fears were in the process of realization. Not only did England and the United States reject her views as to the purpose of the League; they indicated quite

[1] David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, 2 vols., New York, Putnam's, 1928, vol. I, pp. 164 ff.

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clearly that Germany might actually be invited to join the association. From that moment France had, in her own estimation, only one recourse. She must win for herself a series of allies on the eastern borders of Germany, and she must make it impossible for her old enemy to gain a predominating place within the confines of the League. Under such circumstances it is hardly surprising to find Léon Bourgeois, the chairman of the French delegation, presenting himself "not as a representative of a Great Power but as a member of the future Society of Nations," who demanded that the smaller powers should have responsibility as well as representation.[2]

The English, in contrast to the French, addressed themselves with great care to the problem of responsibility and representation. The Phillimore Committee, appointed as early as 1916, had devoted much study to the Quadruple Alliance and the incipient organizations which had preceded it. The Foreign Office, in a cautious memorandum dated November, 1918, used the conclusions of the Phillimore report to suggest the form which the League might take. An interstate conference, consisting of the foreign secretaries of the Great Powers, would assemble annually; the foreign ministers of all the signatory Powers would meet every four or five years; and a conference of delegates, elected from the legislatures of the various member states, would convene concurrently. The pattern was clear. The Great Powers would govern; the small states would receive representation and status. But the sole responsibility of the latter would be that of discussion.[3]

General Smuts, in his celebrated pamphlet of December 16, 1918, dispelled all doubts as to the precise direction of official English thinking on the subject. Where the Foreign Office memorandum had been guarded and circumspect the General was blunt and to the point. If there was to be no superstate neither should there be "a mere ineffective debating society." "The new situation does not call for a new talking shop. We want an instrument of government which, however much talk is put into it at the one end, will grind out decisions at the other end."

[2] Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law*, London, 1936, p. 257.

[3] Margaret E. Burton, *The Assembly of the League of Nations*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1941, pp. 19-21. It is interesting to note how closely these old proposals have been followed in the constitution of the new Council of Europe.

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The only difficulty lay in creating an instrument that would fulfill this requirement. According to Smuts,

> The League will include a few great Powers, a large number of medium or intermediate states, and a very large number of small states. If in the councils of the league they are all to count and vote as of equal value, the few Powers may be at the mercy of the great majority of small states. It is quite certain that no Great Power will willingly run such a risk by entering a league in which all have equal voting power . . . . The league is therefore in this dilemma, that if its votes have to be unanimous, the league will be unworkable; and if they are decided by a majority, the Great Powers will not enter it; and yet if they keep out of it they wreck the whole scheme.[4]

The General's solution to the dilemma was to bring responsibility and representation under the roof of one organization, but to keep their functions apart. Responsibility would go to the Great Powers meeting in an executive council. Representation, and representation only, would go to the entire membership in an assembly empowered to debate and recommend, but not to act.

Although the Smuts proposal represented the most lucid expression of the English position it could hardly be more influential than the views of France unless it captured the imagination of the American delegation. Or, to be more precise, unless it sank into the consciousness of Woodrow Wilson; for in this instance Wilson was the American delegation.

The popular stereotype of Wilson is one of inflexibility. Stiff in dress, stiff in manner, stiff in debate and belief, how could he be otherwise than rigid and implacable in his conception of the Covenant? The record of his advocacy of the League, of his struggle with the Senate, and, at last, of his death, leaves an impression of admirable and impenetrable obstinacy. And yet the record is not wholly convincing. For when Wilson set himself to the task of drafting the Covenant he proved adamant upon only two scores, that there should be a League and that it should be "democratically" constituted. Beyond that he was open to a degree of persuasion and pressure.

The Smuts proposal therefore fell upon fertile soil.[5] Wilson

[4] Miller, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 38-9.

[5] Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 30. But see Stephen Bonsal, *Unfinished Business*, Garden City, Doubleday 1944, pp. 15-21.

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had composed one draft of the Covenant before leaving Washington. He wrote three more after his arrival in Paris. He had given no consideration to the problem of responsibility and representation in his original draft; the sole instrument of his League was to be a Body of Delegates to which all democratic countries would belong. But his ideas suffered a radical change under the impact of the Smuts pamphlet; and he admitted that a single assemblage, representative of every state, was impractical. He still clung to the Body of Delegates, for it represented in his mind the democratic ideal of which he was so much the prophet. But in his third and fourth drafts he introduced a Council of the Great Powers, and transferred to it most of the functions which he had originally assigned to the Body of Delegates. Surely this was something quite different from inflexibility. Indeed, the evidence indicates that, between his arrival in Paris and the first meeting of the League of Nations Commission, Wilson had descended from the exalted position that a common devotion to democracy would cure the world's ills, to the realization that power coupled with responsibility were more practical means to that end. For a man of soaring ideals the descent was both rapid and courageous.[6]

But could the realization that had overtaken Wilson be captured in the language of the Covenant? At first the prospects appeared good. The positions of the English and American delegations were, on this point, hardly distinguishable. Both were of the opinion that the Great Powers in the Council should operate the League; both felt that the small powers in the Assembly should simply talk about the operation. Together, surely, they could impose their ideas upon the other delegations. And with the Hurst-Miller draft—a synthesis of the English and American positions—they did exactly that. The Hurst-Miller draft was the only agenda furnished to the League of Nations Commission; the Hurst-Miller draft was the basis for the month of discussions that followed; and, after the debate had eddied and died, the Hurst-Miller draft provided a solid nucleus for the Covenant of the League.

Yet the document that emerged was hardly an exact duplicate of the original draft; and the distinction between responsibility

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 33-4.

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and representation was not clear at all. The language of the Covenant identified the Council as the executive body of the League, but now the small powers were to be represented there in a minority of only one. The possibility existed, moreover, that this minority of small powers might become a majority either by the addition of new members or by the resignation of two of the old permanent representatives. And the Assembly, though only briefly mentioned, had been elevated to a status of equality with the Council. What had taken place?

To begin with, everyone connected with the drafting of the Covenant had talked so much about the equality of states that even the most responsible policy-makers at Paris found it difficult not to pay lip-service to the principle in the constitution of the League. They then discovered that, having progressed so far, they simply could not stop; for lip-service and commitments were not easily distinguishable. In fact, representation without some kind of function seemed to be regarded as tantamount to no representation at all. Under different circumstances the United States and England might have avoided this embarrassment by the inclusion of a few innocuous phrases. But at Paris they were confronted not so much with the demands of a miscellaneous group of small states, as with those of their closest small power supporters; and these powers, in turn, were being consistently encouraged in their demands by France. The pressure was irresistible. First England and the United States granted greater representation to the small powers on the League of Nations Commission. Then they conceded small power representation on the Council. Finally they accepted the principle of equality between the Council and the Assembly. The arguments advanced by Smuts were forgotten; the metamorphosis suffered by Wilson was wasted. The Covenant of the League, as it finally emerged, hardly distinguished between representation and responsibility.[7]

Was this lack of definition really important? The point is difficult to determine; we can only speculate. It may be argued, on the one hand, that whatever the system of representation the policies of the Great Powers will determine the activities

[7] For an authoritative account of the struggle that took place in the Commission of the League of Nations, see Miller, *op. cit.* vol. I, pp. 130 ff.

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of any international organization. The small powers, according to this argument, will rarely precipitate a crisis without the support of one or more of the Great Powers; or, if they do, they will quickly find themselves to be impotent. The claim is made, on the other hand, that certain small power representatives, lacking the perspective granted to statesmen from states with worldwide interests, may, in a body such as the Assembly of the League, raise embarrassing questions and force the Great Powers into attitudes which they would not otherwise have adopted. One may perhaps assign a certain amount of truth to both contentions. No doubt the rules of power politics are operative in the realm of international organization; but they seem to operate in a more complex fashion and with lower intensity than in other spheres of interstate relations. For here the imponderables of public opinion begin to disturb the calculations of the statesman. Here, in fact, public opinion acts as a kind of leveler. The exposed small powers may follow the lead of the Great Powers docilely enough, but the irresponsible little states—removed from the center of affairs and small in vision as well as size—may do so not at all, or only at a price. For this type of small power is now in a position to appeal to the varied segments of Great Power public opinion unless its demands are met, and, whatever the validity of such a threat, the mere mention of it may induce concessions from the democratic Great Power states. Or, the less responsible little state may choose to act independently and upon its own initiative, confident that it can carry the day, again by well-timed appeals to Great Power public opinion. Within the peaceful arena of international organization, representation in a body such as the Assembly carries with it an influence out of all proportion to the physical resources involved; the powerful state, like the creditor state, may even be at a disadvantage. Unless there is an underlying awareness of the actual distribution of force a dilution of responsibility can easily result.

Such an awareness was almost totally lacking between 1920 and 1939. The United States promptly disavowed the bulk of its international obligations. England and France bickered for three years over the disposition of Germany, and then England attempted to withdraw into isolation. Germany, upon being

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re-admitted into the family of nations, showed more interest in *revanche* than in deference to a European community. To this general denial of responsibility the structure of the League made a material contribution. For responsibility had been so ambiguously distributed between the Council and the Assembly that there was a standing invitation to evade its burdens. Indeed, the temptation to do so was enormous. Was it not, after all, more democratic to discuss and decide issues in the more representative of the two bodies? Lord Cecil, who at Paris had been the determined advocate of Great Power domination, now thought as much. He discarded his old ideas upon being appointed a delegate to the League from the Union of South Africa, and called with fierce tenacity for greater reliance upon the dictates of the Assembly.[8] His enthusiasm spread; statesmen like Benes and Hambro joined with him in the crusade. Gradually the call of democratic ideals, the divisions among the Great Powers, and the structure of the League itself focussed attention almost exclusively upon the activities of the Assembly.

The Assembly responded bravely. Led by the small powers it came to exercise general supervision over all the labors of the League, even over matters that originally had been entrusted to the care of the Council. Under the spur of Mr. Hambro it gained control over League finances. And, as more and more responsible statesmen took to savoring the pleasures of Geneva, the Assembly tried its hand at lawmaking in the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, the Geneva Protocol, and the General Act for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.[9] Ultimately, as the world crisis beclouded the horizon, the Assembly served as the forum for a bitter discussion of the Manchurian 'incident' and the Abyssinian 'dispute,' and as a tardily harmonious whole in the expulsion of the Soviet Union in 1939.

But if the Assembly labored bravely it labored in vain. It had only the power to recommend. By ceaselessly recommending and ceaselessly failing to act it aroused first expectations and then cynicism or despair. It also prolonged that period of self-deception wherein the United States and England, having abdicated their authority, and France, having lost hers, trusted

[8] For Lord Cecil's views, see his autobiography, *A Great Experiment*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1941, particularly, pp. 47-219.

[9] Zimmern, *op. cit.*, pp. 469-79.

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to some occult power to order the affairs of the world. Representation on a more or less universal scale seemed to honor one facet of the democratic ideal, but at the same time the principle had sapped the vitality of those great democratic states on whom rested the responsibility for making the League of Nations operate. And yet a reversion to the exclusive association exemplified by the Quadruple Alliance of 1815 was no longer possible; by 1939 the principle of general representation had become too deeply rooted. As the new war started the problem remained that of recognizing the limitations of the principle, and placing the responsibility for action where it could be exercised, in the hands of the Great Powers.

Although the founders of the League ultimately lost sight of this problem, they had shown an initial awareness of it in their efforts to create a representative but inherently weak Assembly, and an efficient Council governed by the Great Powers. The founders of the United Nations, having become equally aware of the issue, were all determined, for a variety of reasons and in various ways, to avoid their predecessors' errors.

The Soviet Union was particularly emphatic upon the point of Great Power responsibility. Mr. Gromyko, who served as the Russian delegate to the Dumbarton Oaks conference, might have preferred the title of World Union over that of United Nations; he might even have favored decisions by a straight majority vote (subject to the veto) in the Security Council, and the establishment of an international air force; but there was never any question in his mind, or in the minds of his superiors, that the Great Powers must control the new organization.[10] Nor was there any question in these same minds that the most effective way of disposing of the dilemma of responsibility and representation was by disposing of the Assembly altogether. One may or may not believe that the Soviet Union finally entered the United Nations in order to prevent it from operating effectively. One may or may not believe, on the other hand, that the Soviet Union had not been so calculating; that between 1943 and 1945, before English weakness and American shortsightedness had become fully apparent, the Soviet Union ac-

[10] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 vols., New York, Macmillan, 1948, vol. II, pp. 1677, 1682, 1683.

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tually planned to act in limited concert with the West. But one cannot doubt that, whatever the sources of Soviet behavior, a respect for the democratic ideal was not one of them. When Mr. Gromyko and his superiors agreed to have an Assembly they tried to introduce the sixteen Soviet Republics into it, and, when this maneuver failed, they left no doubt that they accepted the body merely as a matter of form.[11]

The English attitude was, by contrast, sympathetic. Mr. Churchill had originally sought to establish a series of regional organizations over which would stand a world council composed exclusively of the Great Powers. In the face of opposition from the United States he resigned himself to having institutions similar to those which had characterized the League. But, within the framework of those forms, the Prime Minister and his advisers were as adamant in support of Great Power supremacy as Lord Cecil and General Smuts had been a quarter of a century earlier. There is a temptation, in this connection, to compare the England of 1944 with the France of 1918; there are, in fact, many similarities. But the differences are marked. The England of 1944 proved more sophisticated in her appreciation of the limitations of a system of international organization; she was also wedded to a tradition of gradual change. If a vastly weakened power position required the addition of new security guarantees, it did not require that England should scurry about wildly in search of allies. Perhaps Mr. Churchill's greatest accomplishment resulted from his ability to disguise the extent to which his country had fallen in the hierarchy of states. It was not his intention to throw off the disguise in negotiations for the establishment of a United Nations.

It was evident, nevertheless, that much of the status remaining to England depended upon the support of her Dominions. Here a bicameral United Nations could serve a most useful purpose. It could give the Dominions great latitude of expression and a certain freedom of action; and, if properly designed, it could, in moments of crisis, rally the Dominions to the support of England. So, if Mr. Churchill favored a Council where England could act, he also favored an Assembly where the Dominions could talk. A United Nations thus fashioned, with

[11] *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 1678-79.

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representation in one body and responsibility in the other, might replace to some extent the slackening bonds of Empire.[12]

The idea of a representative Assembly and a responsible Council held equal if different attractions for the United States. The State Department, which was initially responsible for formulating the American plans for the new organization, had three guiding principles: to satisfy the democratic ideal; to place the destinies of the postwar world in the hands of the three great wartime allies; and to persuade the American people to acquiesce in such a concentration of responsibility in the form of the United Nations. The first principle plainly required the creation of a representative Assembly; the second principle as certainly necessitated the establishment of a responsible Council of the Great Powers. It was not quite so clear what the third principle called for. On the one hand was the recollection of the *débacle* of 1920—the rejection by the Senate of the League of Nations. On the other hand were strong evidences of a revival of American idealism—the recurring insistence upon a recognition of democratic values on a worldwide scale. Prevention of a recurrence of the League fiasco seemed to require even stronger safeguards to American sovereignty than had been adopted in 1919. Satisfaction of the aspirations of the more articulate sections of the population seemed to call, with equal persistence, for the representation of the small as well as the great states. On the whole State Department plans favored an organization with a strong Council of the Great Powers and a weak Assembly, composed of a large number of great and small powers amiably intermixed. But throughout the planning process there seems to have lingered both uncertainty as to the demands of the American public and a strong desire to pay tribute to that democratic ideal which had so strongly influenced the thinking of Wilson. Representation, in the American drafts of the United Nations, took second place to responsibility; but the difference was not so great that the pleading of powerful advocates could not reverse their order within the organizational framework.[13]

[12] Percy E. Corbett, *Britain: Partner for Peace*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1946, pp. 66-71.

[13] Hull, *op. cit.*, vol. II, Part Eight, provides the fullest account so far of American plans for the United Nations.

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The dominating role played by the United States in working out the details of the new organization increased the possibility that such a reversal might occur. England possessed plans of her own, but at crucial points in the preliminary discussions she gave way to the American point of view. The Soviet Union seemed to have no concrete plans at all, though she proved fertile in expedients when the time came to discuss the projects of others. The Dumbarton Oaks conversations were therefore almost wholly American in inspiration, and when the results of those talks emerged they took the form substantially of the American proposals. The final draft, in Secretary Hull's words, gave the Assembly "the right, on its own initiative, to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of peace, including regulation of armaments, and to make recommendations, although action on such questions was still the function of the Council."[14] In the last analysis this was not a great deal. The Great Powers would be the efficient members of the new organization; the Assembly would be a debating society with certain specified functions, the chief purpose of which would be to make the bare fact of representation somewhat more palatable. As late as October, 1944, the American position thus coincided with that of the two other major Powers. Responsibility would lie with them; the remaining states would have to be content with appearances.

But could the intended distinction between responsibility and representation be adequately defined in words? If the powers of the Assembly were too severely limited the more important of the smaller states might refuse to join the organization. Conversely, if ambiguous wording were employed in regard to such a body the small states might claim and, in fact, arrogate far more responsibility than had been intended in the document. Not only had the powers of the League Assembly been left ambiguous; the Covenant had been exposed to so much criticism and alteration that a meaning favorable to the authority of the Assembly had come to be read into its terms. The Great Powers in 1944 and 1945 attempted to avoid this error in two ways. First, they defined the functions of the new Assembly with greater care. There were ambiguities, to be sure, but these

[14] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 1684.

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were less blatant in the Charter than in the Covenant. Secondly, they tried to avoid the concessions and modifications that had been made at Paris by adopting a new negotiating procedure. The system would consist of two steps, the first of which had already been taken. The Great Powers had met at Dumbarton Oaks, had exchanged views, and had come to an agreement upon the majority of subjects to be included in the Charter of the United Nations. In the second step they would present the document which they had drafted to the other states for ratification. Whosoever dared to suggest drastic alterations in a draft sponsored by the Soviet Union, England, the United States, and China, would be very bold indeed.

Such at least was the theory behind the procedure adopted in 1944 and 1945. The practice turned out to be somewhat different. For the procedure depended upon the active and continuing collaboration of the Great Powers, and that was not forthcoming. Suspicions regarding the Soviet Union began to crop up. There were disagreements over the voting procedure in the Security Council, over the number of Soviet Republics that should have independent representation, over the status of the Latin American countries in the United Nations, even over the question of whether Mr. Molotov should attend the San Francisco Conference where the Charter was to receive its final form.[15] As the defeat of Germany drew nearer, and postwar problems loomed larger, the task of maintaining Great Power unity before the world became increasingly difficult.

If the policies of the Soviet Union were alarming, the vagaries of the United States had an almost equally unsettling effect. In the heat and sacrifice of war the United States had resumed the responsibilities of a very great Power; but as the tension in Europe eased there appeared signs of an attempt to evade the burdens of that onerous role. In the sphere of international organization official American allegiance to Dumbarton Oaks was as unqualified as ever, but there was some question as to whether officialdom and the public-at-large were not reading some entirely new meanings into the context of the Proposals. The State Department had published the Dumbarton text; it had called in a host of unofficial domestic organizations for

[15] James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper, 1947, p. 55.

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consultation and advice; it had ground out leaflets and speeches in an effort to win public support for the Charter; it had even said some rather pretentious things about the function of the new Assembly. The response was unprecedented. Advice, criticism, and encouragement poured into the Department, and officials who had timidly awaited the accolade of public opinion discovered that publicity was hardly what the proposed organization required.[16]

The most significant aspect of this outburst of American enthusiasm was not so much its spontaneity as its relative lack of discrimination. There existed a general expectation that the United Nations would be both effective and highly democratic: effective in the sense that the wartime cooperation among the Great Powers would be of indefinite duration; democratic in the sense that all peaceloving states, regardless of strength, would share in the responsibilities as well as the benefits of the postwar settlement. Whatever the merit of these expectations, they hardly conformed to a philosophy which, in the crucial field of maintaining international peace and security assigned responsibility for action to the Great Powers in the Security Council, and representation combined with only limited power of discussion to the small powers in the General Assembly.

The vocal body of American public opinion was not the only group to miss the distinction between representation and responsibility. Influential members of the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference seem to have suffered from a similar misunderstanding. Senators, Representatives, and ex-State Governors, who customarily started their operations from shared value patterns, subsisted in an atmosphere of party maneuvers and compromises, and decisions by majority rule. The discovery that the United States could anticipate with confidence that a large number of votes in the new organization would be cast by states willing to accept American leadership led them to believe that the techniques of domestic politics could be transferred to the arena of international organization. And since the General Assembly, uninhibited by the veto, was the obvious place in which to practice those techniques there was a growing movement to enlarge that body's powers.

[16] *Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President, by the Secretary of State,* Washington, U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1945, pp. 26-7.

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To these evidences of a changing mood the State Department added a concrete act of its own. The United States, as a part of its effort to insure acceptance of the new organization and consolidate its own position in the Western Hemisphere, had called a conference of the Latin American states in Mexico City. The conference, which convened early in 1945, added further to the imposing edifice of Pan-American treaties, and agreed enthusiastically to the principle of the United Nations—on the condition that Argentina should be admitted to the organization as a member. The Soviet Union at Yalta had already indicated distaste at the thought of welcoming Argentina among the allies, but the State Department chose to ignore the warning.[17] Since the decisions at San Francisco would be made by a two-thirds majority, and since the United States would have such a majority at its command, there remained the comforting thought that the Argentine application could always be honored.

The intransigence of the Soviet Union, the state of American public opinion, the mood of the United States delegation, the State Department commitment at Chapultepec—this combination of attitudes and circumstances contrived to obscure the delicate distinction between representation and responsibility that had been drawn at Dumbarton Oaks. The San Francisco Conference went a long way towards erasing the distinction altogether. In principle the Sponsoring Powers stood by the agenda furnished by the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. In practice Great Power unity proved to be only a mask. France and China were more concerned with winning sympathy for their respective grievances than with perfecting the structure of the United Nations. England found her Commonwealth associates more eager for authority than she had anticipated. And around the neck of the United States hung the albatross of Chapultepec. Only the Soviet Union remained faithful to the spirit of Dumbarton Oaks.

The process by which the distinction between responsibility and representation got blotted out may be illustrated by the debate leading up to the admission of Argentina. The subject arose on April 30, 1945, in the executive committee of the con-

[17] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-9; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History*, New York, Harper, 1948, pp. 892-98.

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ference. Mr. Molotov first tried to have the question removed from the day's agenda. When this gambit failed he attempted to suffocate the suggestion in a welter of discussion. The second maneuver was no more successful than the first. Although Mr. Molotov assured the committee that the Soviet Union would vote against the admission of Argentina, a favorable motion, sponsored by the Latin American states and supported by the United States, quickly passed.[18] As the resolution proceeded from committee to committee the same procedure repeated itself. Mr. Molotov maneuvered and protested in the best parliamentary style; the Latin Americans, followed by the United States, replied with votes. Finally, on the afternoon of the same day, the resolution reached the plenary session; and after a final protest by Mr. Molotov the conference voted, thirty-one to four, to admit Argentina to the United Nations Conference on International Organization.[19]

The immediate consequences of this episode were twofold. On the one hand, no further trials of voting strength were essayed. Next day Mr. Molotov successfully insisted that all questions of substance in the various committees of the conference be determined by a two-thirds majority. And later, as the work on the Charter progressed, his subordinates developed the disconcerting habit of referring questions on which they might be in a minority over to the steering or executive committees where the Russian accent was accorded a more sympathetic ear.[20] The plenary session, which bore a striking resemblance to the future Assembly, returned to that orgy of speech-making peculiar to such bodies, and remained talkative but unimportant to the end. For the moment Great Power domination of the conference had been reasserted. But, on the other hand, the differences between the Great Powers had appeared in the open. Knowledge of such differences must have generated a strong temptation to play upon Great Power discords and thereby to secure modifications of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Whether the opportunity would be seized depended largely upon the forebearance of the smaller states.

[18] *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945*, "Summary Reports of the Executive Committee," April 30, 1945.
[19] *Ibid.*, "Verbatim Records of the Plenary Sessions," April 30, 1945.
[20] *Ibid.*, "Summary Reports of the Executive Committee," May 1, 1945.

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As a group the small powers assembled at San Francisco were far more mature in outlook than their counterparts of 1919. As Mr. Hambro had remarked earlier: "More and more clearly the small nations recognize that any attempt to disseminate distrust among those great nations, that any appeal to national prejudices, to old jealousies and fears between the big countries, is a menace to every small state."[21] Nevertheless, there were marked variations in outlook. The small European states had twice suffered the consequences of Great Power dissensions; they were prepared to make large sacrifices in order to avoid another such ordeal. The Latin American states felt somewhat more secure. Confident in the support and protection of the United States, untouched by the ravages of war, wooed because of their natural resources, they had a tendency to propose measures the results of which they could not foresee. Then there was the special case of Australia. Australia had made a substantial contribution to the Allied war effort and had served as the first line of defense in the Far East. But despite these services she had exercised little or no influence in the councils of the Great Powers. The attitude of her principal spokesman at San Francisco was largely a reaction to this sense of exclusion. Australia was going to be heard from in every committee of the conference, even if what she had to propose at times lacked sense.

Although the small powers revealed a variety of opinions they also revealed a tendency to combine in a policy directed towards breaking down the distinction between responsibility and representation established at Dumbarton Oaks. The technique used was to extract as many concessions as possible from the Anglo-American bloc without driving the Soviet Union out of the conference. The arena in which the main battles were fought was the committee charged with defining the duties of the General Assembly. Step by step the small powers attempted to overcome the limitations which had been placed upon that institution. They challenged the right of the Security Council to pass on the acceptability of new members. They argued their own right to select independently the non-permanent members of the Security Council. They asserted that the Assembly alone should elect the Secretary General of the organization; and they

[21] William T. R. Fox, *The Super-Powers*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1944, p. 142.

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attempted to reserve to the Assembly the right of determining its own voting procedures. In each instance they lost their fight. The General Assembly, despite two months of debate, emerged from the conference in much the same form as it had been presented to the delegates. There was only one significant change. Article Eleven of the Charter had been broadened to permit a discussion by the Assembly of any topic at any time; and, provided that the subject was not on the agenda of the Security Council, the Assembly could recommend the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, deemed likely to impair the general welfare.[22]

Although the substantive changes made in the Charter at San Francisco did not loom large, the spirit in which they had been effected was of some significance. In the face of Great Power discords there had been, in effect, a revival of the old tendency to resort to ineffectual displays of voting strength, and to the passage of pious resolutions. Already by 1945 representation had become confused with responsibility. Despite the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and the procedure used to have those proposals adopted, the reconciliation of the democratic ideal with the inequalities of power seemed no closer than in 1919.

The years between 1945 and 1949 have seen the difficulties of the problem increase. The division between the Soviet Union and the United States has widened, and the influence of the Security Council has decreased correspondingly. At the same time, under the auspices of the United States, more and more issues of the postwar period have fallen into the hands of the General Assembly. According to one theory the observer might feel encouraged by this trend towards the more "representative" body, as Lord Cecil was encouraged by a similar movement in the League of Nations. According to another theory the same observer might find materials for doubt and disappointment.

In the political field the General Assembly has divided its work into three major categories. It has dealt with the issues of the day; it has provided a platform for the discussion of great international problems; and it has moved to arrogate to itself

[22] For the debates over the powers of the General Assembly see, *Documents of the United Nations Conference, op. cit.*, "Summary Reports of Committee II/1."

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the powers of the Security Council. No particular success has marked any of its endeavors.

In the field of disarmament the exact nature of the Assembly's accomplishment must remain problematical. Discussions regarding conventional weapons have turned on the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union; which means that the subject itself has hardly undergone critical study. The Atomic Energy Commission remains alive, if barely active, but whether this portends agreement, or merely reflects an acknowledgement of the existence of a problem, remains to be seen. The difficulties of Greece and Korea stand in approximately the same status of unresolved complexity as when the General Assembly embarked upon its various investigations and recommendations. Only in Palestine has there been a marked change. Here, the existence of the General Assembly has enabled the United States to pursue a policy which otherwise it might not have presumed to undertake. The operation of American influence through the comparative anonymity of a United Nations commission has no doubt had a soothing effect on American public opinion. But whether the anonymity of that influence has retarded the maturity of American opinion, whether the General Assembly did not usurp the function of the Security Council, and whether the emerging solution in Palestine bears any relation to the recommendations of the General Assembly, are once again considerations which must be weighed against the title to success which the United Nations now claims in this matter.

Whether the accomplishments of the General Assembly on the propaganda front can be weighed at all is perhaps a hypothetical question. What Senator Vandenberg, in his homely phrase, referred to as the town meeting of the world has become a market for the exchange and evaluation of insults, and the worth of this peculiar currency has depreciated with extraordinary rapidity. Discussion and debate, "the healthful and ventilating functions of a free deliberative body," of which Mr. Stettinius spoke so glowingly in 1945, have turned into irresponsible charges and countercharges whose chief contribution has been to obscure issues and arouse passions.[23]

[23] For the interesting comment by Mr. Stettinius, see *Charter of the United Nations, op. cit.*, p. 14.

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Even the idea that the General Assembly might assume the functions of the Security Council has encountered obstacles. Secretary of State Marshall's original proposal of an Interim Committee of the General Assembly seems to have been intended to replace the Security Council in everything but name; but the vigorous attack, and eventually the boycott, to which the proposal was subjected by the Soviet Union and her satellites, has reduced it to more manageable proportions. The realization that the Security Council cannot be profitably circumvented now has the effect of placing the Committee in the position of a busy if ineffective study group. Despite this *contretemps,* subjects of unalterable controversy between East and West, as in the case of Greece, continue to be removed from the agenda of the Security Council and given over to the General Assembly. What this maneuver accomplishes, except to inflate temporarily the prestige of the General Assembly and demonstrate the voting strength of the West, remains, under present circumstances, a matter of conjecture.

If the failures of the General Assembly are disappointing they are hardly surprising. The Assembly was neither designed nor empowered to perform the functions pressed upon it as a result of the division between East and West. But if there is no cause for surprise, there is reason for alarm. For the General Assembly can, by its very existence, arouse expectations the relation of which to the facts of international relations is, at best, tenuous. The cycle of hope and disillusionment caused by its efforts, and inability, to act may well generate the deeper responses of despair, withdrawal, or aggressive self-righteousness. Nor do these reactions constitute the only danger. The General Assembly stands as an invitation to the Great Powers (and particularly the democratic ones) to avoid the responsibility which must ultimately be theirs, and fosters the illusion among the small powers that they have responsibilities which, in the final analysis, they cannot exercise. There is much useful work that the General Assembly can accomplish, even in the great political controversies of the era. It can discuss, suggest, and at times moderate. More important, it can stand as a symbol, however imperfect, of the kind of international relations after which the Western world is striving; for the conscience of

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the West has long demanded that something other than crude displays of coercive capacity control the course of diplomacy. But its members cannot long continue to confuse representation with power and expect the United Nations to survive.

In this most imperfect world, responsibility, if it is to be accepted by anyone, must be accepted by those with the capacity for effective action. Such capacity now lies, and will continue for some time to lie, in the hands of the Great Powers. The democratic ideal nevertheless seems to require that states other than the Great Powers be represented in the arena of decision. Neither the hard fact of Great Power responsibility nor the still forceful aspiration of the democratic ideal can be slighted. Nor, at the present moment, can the one be effectively merged with the other. The structural division proposed by General Smuts at Paris in 1919, and revived at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, still represents the logical escape from the dilemma of responsibility and representation. That the division has twice proved illusory in the face of events does not detract from its basic effectiveness. For a mechanical solution which delegates responsibility to a Council of the Great Powers, and leaves the symbolic function of representation to an Assembly composed largely of small powers, can operate efficiently so long as the dilemma itself is clearly understood.

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REVIEW ARTICLES

PROBLEMS OF COLONIALISM

By RUPERT EMERSON

Kumar Goshal, *People in Colonies,* New York, Sheridan House, 1948, pp. 329. $3.50.
H. Duncan Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeships,* Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1948, pp. xvi, 429. $5.00.
J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice,* Cambridge, University Press, 1948, pp. xiii, 568. $7.00.

IT is not the least of the sins of the current East-West conflict that its hypnotic influence has seduced our attention away from a number of other problems some of which are at least as likely to determine the future of mankind as that conflict itself. Among these problems one which stands out as of indisputably central importance is the future development of the many millions of peoples who remain in a colonial status or have recently emerged from it into a precarious independence. To these peoples there must be assimilated others—notably the Chinese—who, although they have never come under explicit colonial rule, are in the same general position of emerging suddenly from an ancient world into the complex modernities which are essentially the creation of Western Europe and its descendants overseas. From another aspect these are all peoples who in modern times have been the object of the policies and activities of more dynamic states and peoples and who are now vigorously asserting the right to become masters of their own destiny. At the least they demand the right to be let alone to shape their own societies according to their own conceptions of the good life, with such non-imperialistic aid as they may be able to secure; and, beyond this, they seek to play an active role in the shaping of the world at large on equal terms with the peoples to whom they have been subject and inferior. The internal cohesion, structure, and advancement of these peoples, the attitudes which they come to develop, the power which they

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may achieve, and the goals toward which they direct this power, are matters which may well prove to be the most crucial issues of future decades and even centuries.

The three books currently under review all deal with one or another phase of this problem, but the terrain to be covered is so vast and the means of approach to it so varied that, except in the most general terms, there is scarcely any area of overlap between them. Indeed, the focus of interest of each of them differs so sharply from the others that it requires some stretch of the imagination to recognize that they are fundamentally engaged in debating the same problem.

The aspect emphasized by Kumar Goshal is the glaring contrast between the technological advance and consequent wealth of a small fraction of the world as compared with the miserable poverty of most of the rest of it: "Of the two billion human beings on earth, one and a half billion are poor, incredibly poor," he contends in his opening pages. "Ponder this carefully: In the Twentieth century three-fourths of the world's population are as destitute as their ancestors were a thousand years ago . . . These are the people living in colonies and semi-colonies." In part his book is an old-style and slashing attack on imperialism as aggressive and rapacious, benefiting its instigators but not its victims. Here he recapitulates, with no neglect of its seamier aspects, the familiar story of imperialist expansion in the nineteenth century and earlier, which he usefully brings up to date with an account of the rise of nationalism among the subject peoples, the imperialist drive of Japan, and the confused tangle of new and old in the immediate postwar years. In his emphasis on the need for an all-out attack on poverty, as an essential supplement to a speedy movement toward political independence, and in his plea for concerted world action through the United Nations "to remove the artificial restrictions surrounding modern technology and resources and to release the potentialities for a rich and abundant life for all mankind," he projects his analysis constructively into the future. It is not unreasonable to assume that the type of thinking represented by Mr. Goshal is symptomatic of the restive intelligentsia of the colonial and quasi-colonial world.

H. Duncan Hall has primarily turned his attention to the

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international cures for the ills of colonialism, concentrating on the establishment and development of the mandates system with some comment on its latter transformation into trusteeship under the United Nations. Since he has focussed his interest principally on the arrangements and manipulations of the powers in relation to the mandates, on such self-denying restrictions as they imposed upon themselves, and on the machinery through which the League carried out its supervisory role, he does not deal more than incidentally with the effects of the mandates system upon the peoples for whom, at least nominally, it was devised. The bitter poverty which fills the center of Mr. Goshal's stage is only dimly visible in the wings of the stage as set by Mr. Duncan Hall, and there is little feeling that the international machinery has a vital impact on the lives of many peoples of varying color and creed. In an introductory chapter on the somewhat novel concept of the international frontier and in occasional comments on other topics, such as the arrangements for the Conventional Basin of the Congo and their relation to mandates and trusteeships, Mr. Duncan Hall goes beyond the narrow confines of a re-interpretation of the mandates system, but on the whole his book makes no significant contribution to a comprehension of the fundamental issues which are at stake in the realm of colonialism.

The third approach, adopted by J. S. Furnivall, is the one which cuts deepest into the underlying and continuing problem since, at least by implication, it raises the broad question of the nature of the impact of modern Western society on the less developed peoples of the world. More immediately, Mr. Furnivall seeks to explore the question as to whether or not what are commonly considered the best and most enlightened policies of colonial governments and administrators really make sense in terms of producing viable societies which will in due course be able to stand on their own feet. It is his general and well-supported conclusion that on the whole they do not, and that colonial regimes tend to leave behind them peoples less able than before to achieve effective self-government and to move in a coherent communal fashion toward the attainment of the good life.

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Setting off from case studies of pre-war Burma and the Netherlands Indies, he is concerned primarily with the actual or threatened disintegration of the traditional and old-established native communities under the corrosive influence of externally imposed political and economic ideas. In the Western world these forces and ideas have grown slowly over long periods of time within societies which have developed counterbalancing elements of internal cohesion. In colonial areas they have been introduced hastily and in a distorted form under the aegis of governments inevitably representing interests other than those of the people they rule. In consequence the same ideas and forces which in a different setting have served as a spur to progress have, under colonial conditions, served less to bring stable advancement than to atomize, to demoralize, and to reduce social bonds to the lowest common denominator of the cash nexus. It is Mr. Furnivall's contention that real native welfare cannot be achieved through a multiplication of welfare activities and services by colonial governments since such activities and services are conceived and imposed from outside and are not a response to some felt need of the people whom they are supposed to benefit. On the political side he has grave doubts that the increase of native participation in Western controlled and directed colonial administrations has any necessary bearing on advancement toward self-government inasmuch as these administrations are directed toward goals other than those of the colonial peoples themselves and have no organic relation to the native societies above which they have been erected. Similarly, he puts it forward that economic progress "profits the native as an individual only so far as he participates in the larger surplus, and it enhances his welfare only so far as it contributes, directly or indirectly, to the enrichment of his social life." The basic moral of his story is that true well-being can be achieved only in the context of a close-knit communal life, and that the West, even when it has honestly sought to promote welfare, has in fact served to undermine and destroy the pre-existing communities which gave life its savor and its meaning. That Mr. Furnivall has, from his long experience as a colonial administrator and his studies elsewhere, produced the answers to the questions which he raises is more dubious,

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but there can be no doubt that he has asked some at least of the most fundamental questions.

The challenge implicit in such a view as his is obviously a very real one. It is particularly relevant for the United States at a time when the implementation of President Truman's fourth point is beginning to get under way and when the success of E.R.P. is increasingly seen to be intimately linked with the possibilities of colonial development. More broadly, in the context of the East-West conflict, the United States must have a major concern with the problem of winning to its side the one and a half billion people of whom Mr. Goshal writes, and it is eminently plausible to think that the appeal and feasibility of a dictatorial Communism is likely to be greater than that of liberal democracy among peoples which have been dissolved into disgruntled fragments. The danger that in promoting economic progress we are at the same time destroying the older social foundations of life with no workable substitute for them is not one that can be casually ignored.

To this danger the type of approach represented by Mr. Goshal pays little attention. It does not appear to be an adequate answer to say, as Mr. Goshal does, that the "colonial people in general fared better before they were conquered by the imperialist powers" (which is at all events a dubiously accurate proposition), and that therefore there must now be a planned change in colonial economies calling for gigantic loans and the importation of vast quantities of modern farming equipment, machinery, machine tools, etc. Fully conceding that the raising of standards of living through some bold new program is a central and legitimate "must" for the world's agenda and that its successful implementation would be a boon for the advanced as well as the less developed peoples, there remains Mr. Furnivall's question as to what kind of society would emerge as a result. There is always the need to be reminded, as Mr. Goshal vividly reminds us, that the sins of the imperialist world are large and grave; but, not improbably, the more significant task is to explore how these sins can be undone without producing equally disturbing and almost wholly unforeseen consequences. It may well be that the knowledge of mankind about itself is far too inadequate to work out the unknowns

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in this monumental equation and that it is wisest to let the human and social resultants of a great process of planned (or unplanned) development run their own course on the essentially untested assumption that the benefits will outweigh the evils; but it should at least be explicit that there are profoundly important question marks scrawled across the blueprints.

The international solution as represented by the existing trusteeships is certainly unacceptable as constituting anything more significant than a most tentative beginning. The man of good will cannot reject or repudiate the mandates-trusteeship system because it does represent some degree of concession, however grudging, to the notion of an international conscience which has claims superior to those of particular imperial powers. Furthermore, particularly in its UN-trusteeship form as contrasted with the mandates, the system has vast potentialities for improvement and extension. It may be noted that under the terms of Chapter XII of the Charter it would be possible to convert all colonies into trusteeships, substantially at the pleasure of their present owners, and then to regroup them into a few sensible large-scale territories under actual international administration. Like the general United Nations structure itself, trusteeship can be developed to embrace the most desirable and far-reaching ends *if* the powers concerned want to make use of the potentialities which they have written into the Charter; but there is no sign visible on the horizon to indicate that that "if" is likely to be translated into substantive reality.

As it actually operates, trusteeship is limited to a few scattered territories in Africa and the Pacific which have in common only the accident that prior to World War I they constituted the empire which Germany, as a late comer in the imperial sweepstakes, had been able to scrape together. Even in the most expansive days of the League's mandates system it was, as Mr. Duncan Hall comments, "indeed a strange assortment of territories that the backwash of successful war against Germany and Turkey and the principle of 'no annexations' flung finally together under the new system." By now the ex-Turkish territories have all graduated from the system into independence, and the former German colony of Southwest Africa has been jealously guarded from the benefits of United Nations supervi-

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sion. In some quite real respects trusteeship is now almost more of an impediment than a gateway to progress, not only because it gives to the uninitiated a satisfying sense that the colonial problem is really well on the way to solution, but also because certain arbitrary chunks of land and slices of people have been separated off from neighboring territory with which they could be united to the lasting benefit of all concerned. From this latter state of affairs arises, among other things, the dilemma of the administering powers who must maintain the sacrosanct distinctness of their international charges, and yet are aware that for purposes of efficient management and speedier advancement some at least of these charges must be dealt with as integral parts of adjoining colonies.

The gravest shortcoming of the mandates-trusteeship system is, however, that the type of administration is of precisely the same order as that in other colonies, with the added element of international supervision and a few internationally approved safeguarding formulas. As far as colonies in general are concerned, it can hardly be contended that the loose provisions and application of the Charter's Chapter XI have produced any real change in the situation. To what extent, if at all, life has been made more tolerable for the inhabitants of trusteeships than it is for ordinary colonial peoples under the rule of the same imperial powers is a question to which there appears to be no answer. Nor, approaching it from another angle, is there any concrete evidence that higher standards set by the system have significantly served as a model to spur the powers on to more admirable efforts elsewhere. The less than fervid enthusiasm for the system of Mr. Duncan Hall is chilled to the freezing point in Mr. Goshal's judgment that behind the "brilliant rhetoric" of the League's mandate article "there lurked astonishingly fallacious theories and false statements," and that when the mandatories took over jurisdiction "even the slim promises made in Article 22 were not honored." (Incidentally, his opinion of the trusteeship system is that it is more of the same.) Certainly there is no reason to assume that the same powers which, in Mr. Furnivall's opinion, are failing to produce a brave new world in their own colonies are markedly more successful at the job in their role as mandatories or trustees, or

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are able, as they sit in judgment on themselves in the Trusteeship Council or General Assembly, to achieve the fundamental insights which they lack as colonial administrators.

In trusteeships, in colonies, or in areas just emerging into substantive independence, there is a common core of problems which center about the issue as to how the transition can be made from ancient ways and patterns into the modern world of mass production and atomic energy. The advanced Western world has surely made enough of a botch in its own efforts in this direction, and yet it inevitably has a very considerable responsibility to assist the others to bridge the vast gap which divides them from the modernity the West has created. It is intolerable that the barest subsistence should be the lot of most of mankind, and no one could contend that the type of stability we want in the world is attainable when peoples live on as different levels as they now do. Poverty living side by side with wealth breeds envy, revolt, and war. But what are the turmoils which will be occasioned by a rise in living standards and the revolutions in the patterns and concepts of life which must accompany such a rise? Mr. Furnivall has painted some of them in the disintegration of the native societies of Southeast Asia and Africa. There are bound to be others in the rise of new classes, in the dynamic pressure of increasing population and changing balance of power, in the appearance of new and ardent nationalisms, and in the mere multiplication of semiliterate masses ready to be swayed by the propagandist and the demagogue. The balance of order and disorder, of stability and instability, promises to be a precarious one at the best.

It is, perhaps, the only answer to assume, if somewhat blindly, that putting an end to superstition and poverty, to oppression and exploitation, is in itself a sufficient good to warrant running the risks that inevitably accompany it. From the inevitable turmoil, one can only hope, will come a new stability and sanity, perhaps even a new and humanly unwonted wisdom. In the interval both Mr. Furnivall and Mr. Goshal lay stress on the necessity for freeing peoples to work out their own destiny in their own terms as against the continued superimposition of the good life as somebody else sees it. If Mr. Furnivall insists that "those who, even as the instruments of social justice, destroy

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a civilization, thereby assume responsibilities which they can discharge only by building a new and more highly organized civilization in its place," he is also insistent that advancement in any meaningful sense can come only to those who want it and seek it for themselves. The discharge of a responsibility to build a better replacement for what has been destroyed requires the full and free participation of those who are to inhabit the new civilization, and its shaping will tax the highest abilities of the United Nations. It is the greatest task on which East and West could collaborate, but there is tragically little reason to dream that they will.

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THE FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE

By WILLMOORE KENDALL

Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949, pp. xiii, 240. $3.00.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE can be read variously as: 1) a general introduction to intelligence work which, say, the director of almost any section of Central Intelligence might give a new recruit to read on his first day at the office; 2) a memorandum from an Old Hand at intelligence work who has thought it all over—like the bird in *Peter and the Wolf,* from a safe distance—and has a thing or two to tell those of his colleagues who have stayed on in Washington; and 3) an attempt by that same Old Hand to make sense—*inter alia* for himself—out of a greatly expanded United States government activity in which, as all who know it can testify, sense does not leap to the eye. Because the book is in part each of these three things, it is not perfectly satisfactory as any one of them. But it is evidently not offered as a learned treatise on any or all of them: indeed, the gap in the existing literature in the field is so great that one can hardly be surprised at Mr. Kent's failure to define his task with precision. The great merit of his book is that it provides a body of descriptive material which will enable serious public discussion to begin on the relation of intelligence to policy in a democratic system. Since it is American policy on which the future of the free world seems to depend, it is high time for the public debate to commence.

Moreover, Mr. Kent's book is one from which anyone interested in the relation, past, present, and future, between United States foreign policy and social research, can learn much—now from its manifest content; now, perhaps more often from what it takes for granted, what it says between the lines, and what it might have said but did not. Therefore, let us take a look at the book in each of its three capacities.

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I

The beginner at an intelligence agency can get from *Strategic Intelligence* an initiation into the terminology of the profession he is entering—a picture of the intelligence map in Washington (what organizations are performing intelligence functions, how, theoretically, they mesh together, etc.)—and a provisional grasp of some of the controversial issues because of which the lines on that map lie where they lie rather than somewhere else. He can learn that the task of foreign intelligence is that of "describing, observing, and reporting upon, and speculating as to the future of . . . phenomena in foreign lands" (p. 104), which seems as good a working definition as he is likely to find of the task actually being performed by certain agencies. He can, perhaps best of all, derive from the book the elements of an emergent "ethics" of the intelligence profession—a sense of why it is important that the intelligence function should be well performed, a realization that there are some compromises (with, say, administrative convenience, or entrenched ignorance) that he and his colleagues must, in the long run, refuse to make, and an insight into certain differences between government research and academic research that make the ethics of the latter not strictly applicable to the former.

Mr. Kent may, to be sure, awaken in the beginner some expectations that are doomed to disappointment, as, for example, when he assures him that "an intelligence organization is a strange and wonderful collection of devoted specialists molded into a vigorous production unit" (p. 74); but it was two Old Hands at newspaper work who wrote *The Front Page,* and there is no doubt something to be said for inculcating in beginners an enthusiasm that only the more romantic of their seniors are able to maintain. Speaking as a man who has often told beginners badly what Mr. Kent tells them well, the present writer welcomes *Strategic Intelligence* in this one of its three capacities, and hopes that the intelligence fraternity will make good use of it. It will save the P-8's precious time, and will contribute generously to the professional development of their junior colleagues.

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II

Mr. Kent has looked at the intelligence set-up in Washington and found it, on balance, good. Thus, *Strategic Intelligence* is not the book of a reformer who takes pen in hand to expose and remedy a bad situation. On the contrary: it insists that the decision-maker who regularly substitutes his own judgment for that of the "intelligence arm" is, *tout court,* "turning his back on the two instruments by which western man has, since Aristotle, steadily enlarged his horizon of knowledge—the instruments of reason and scientific method" (p. 206). It would be quite unfair, on the other hand, to suggest that Mr. Kent puts himself forward as a defender of the *status quo* in intelligence planning and organization. He shows himself, at a number of points in his argument, genuinely aware that the existing arrangements reflect, shall we say, something less than the best thinking of which the nation is capable. But he has not worked out in his own mind what an ideal set of intelligence arrangements—the ones he would set up if all the resistances were removed—would be like, and thus has no standard against which to measure the magnitude of the shortcomings he exposes. In any case, his book is not characterized by a persistent willingness to follow through on adverse criticism, to proceed from recognition of a basic defect to such questions as: How grave is this? May not our defects be so grave that in so far as it is possible to court national disaster by mismanaging the intelligence function, we are doing *just that* in the United States?

Let us examine some of the emphases that might have led him to ask such questions:

1. Mr. Kent believes that intelligence *cannot* do its job unless it knows the mind of the recipients of its reports, and gets from them the kind of "guidance" that any professional man needs from his client (pp. 180-182).[1] He can hardly avoid the conclusion that where such guidance is not forthcoming the intelligence job is, in effect, not being done. Is it forthcoming, then, in those areas of national policy that are of deepest concern to us? "The uninitiated," Mr. Kent replies, "will be surprised to

[1] Curiously, however, he reproduces with evident approval a passage of Walter Lippmann's which urges the reverse of this (p. 200). Mr. Kent's views on *Kämpfende Wissenschaft* (*ibid.*) vary sharply from chapter to chapter.

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hear that the element of guidance . . . becomes rarer and rarer as the job of intelligence mounts in augustness" (p. 182). Does it not then follow that, as regards the great decisions about foreign policy, it is highly probable that (we use his language) our undertakings will fail and our statesmen plan in ignorance? Evidently, but Mr. Kent does not make the inference.

2. One of the things that an intelligence agency must do is to scrutinize, and try to make sense of, "what goes on abroad" (p. 152). As is well known, United States intelligence agencies make use for this purpose both of "overt" techniques—that is, "unromantic open-and-above-board observation and research" (p. 4)—and "covert" or "clandestine" techniques of fact-gathering. Two choices which any intelligence agency must make, therefore, are those relating to, first, the allocation of resources between these two types of "collection," and secondly, the degree of autonomy which the clandestine operation shall, out of tender regard for considerations of "security," be permitted to enjoy. Indeed, the whole matter of clandestine operations is now so surrounded by security restrictions as to make even the statement that they are surrounded by security restrictions a matter of doubtful legality; and the literature of the subject is not extensive.

All the more interest therefore attaches to Mr. Kent's statement—and he is pretty clearly looking right at Washington when he makes it—that the clandestine force, "if it allows the mechanisms of security to cut it off from some of the most significant lines of guidance," ends up destroying "its own reason for existence" by "collecting the wrong information and not collecting the right" (p. 167). And the interest becomes intense when this statement is placed beside the further statement to the effect that: "This kind of mis-collection would be far less likely to occur *if the operation were not free to steer its own course behind the fog of its own security regulations*" (p. 168).[2] This tallies precisely with one of the present writer's major criticisms of our present intelligence arrangements: they enormously exaggerate the importance of covert collection, and yet permit it to yield shockingly small dividends.[3] Now: either

[2] The italics are mine.

[3] If *you* were director of an intelligence agency in France, and wished to know "what goes on" in the United States, which would you do first: take out an airmail subscription

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the agency needs the extra information it can obtain through clandestine operations after it has exhausted the potentialities of its overt collection, or it does not. If it does not, it can do without its clandestine operation altogether; if it does, it must be in a position to lay down—and enforce—directives to the men responsible for obtaining it. And if the Washington intelligence agencies are not in this position, then Mr. Kent is telling us something that needs to be said to a much wider audience than that which is likely to read his book, and something whose implications need to be pointed up much more sharply than he has pointed them up. The whole question of covert collection is, in the present writer's view, one that urgently requires investigation by a Congressional committee prepared to speak the language of legislative supremacy, and to insist that no democracy can afford to make a simple and—in the short and middle term at least—irrevocable act of faith in the men called upon to perform this highly explosive function.

3. "*Without professional experts,*" says Mr. Kent, "there is no intelligence . . . . They are the social and natural scientists and the military experts who have a finger-tip feel for the ways of research and analysis, who are masters (or dedicated novitiates) . . . of their particular bracket of learning, and to whom the discovery of new facts or new relationships is a career" (p. 107).[4] Again and again, indeed, he shows his awareness that the quality of an intelligence agency's personnel is the major determinant of the quality of its performance; and if in the passage just cited he sidesteps the question, whether the intelligence function is today in the hands of men like those he has described ("if they do not in actual departmental practice measure up to the specifications of this paragraph, . . . *they should*"), it is not difficult to collect his views as to the present trend in this regard: "Two forces of disintegration are now working in concert on the most valuable people. They are being nudged from within [by civil service regulations] and beckoned from without. Their loss is a catastrophe to federal intelligence

to the *New York Times*, or send four ex-Deuxième-Bureau men to dispense largesse in Washington? And now that you have answered that question in the manner that the present writer expected, how sure are you that you would send the four men at all?

[4] The italics are mine.

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work" (p. 147).[5] But the warning is buried in a technical discussion in the middle of the book, and has no impact upon its general argument.

4. Mr. Kent has other minor quarrels with present intelligence policy: he would like a civilian director for Central Intelligence (p. 100); he feels that CIA's powers of investigation *vis-à-vis* departmental intelligence are inadequate (p. 101); he believes that Washington would be well-advised to rethink the relation between research people in the home office on the one hand, and "field staff," including here overt as well as covert collection, on the other (p. 165); and so on.

The present writer believes that if all of Mr. Kent's reproofs were acted upon, and all his proposals adopted, the result would be an improvement in United States intelligence operations. But this improvement would, like the infant mentioned in Marx's famous footnote, be very small.

III

The most instructive passages in *Strategic Intelligence* are, in the present writer's opinion, those in which Mr. Kent reveals what we may call the general theory of the intelligence function to which his thinking has brought him—plus those in which he records, but on his theory does not identify as such, recognizably pathological aspects of existing intelligence arrangements. They are instructive because Mr. Kent's state of mind on most of the problems to which such a theory must address itself reflects to a remarkable degree that of official Washington as the present writer came to know it in the course of his own tour of duty as an intelligence official. And, so far as he knows, this is the first time that that state of mind has, so to speak, ventured beyond the steel curtain on 26th Street to subject itself to criticism. When approached from this point of view, *Strategic Intelligence* becomes a book that every social scientist should lay in his heart and ponder. Let us notice some of the characteristics of this state of mind:

[5] And he says elsewhere that if we are looking for "the encouraging element in departmental intelligence," *i.e.*, the departments that have "realized the importance of the task," shown "a decent respect for full and accurate knowledge," and "employed the right kind of professional people," it is to Labor, Commerce, and Agriculture (thus, one infers, not to State and Defense) that we must go (p. 115).

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1. It is a state of mind which is—dangerously, in this writer's view—*dominated by an essentially wartime conception of the intelligence function.* Most of the men who occupy the key positions learned the intelligence business during the war. They seem to have acquired a trained incapacity to put aside, more than momentarily, the intellectual habits appropriate to the conduct of hostilities (or preparation for the conduct of hostilities) against an actual or potential enemy, and to give to the distinctively peacetime functions of a governmental intelligence agency the importance they deserve. This is not to imply that research into the constituents of power should lapse in time of peace, or that "strategic intelligence" as this state of mind conceives it should be performed with any less loving care than in the past; and it is certainly not to imply that the possessors of this state of mind are in any sense reluctant to place the intelligence agencies at the service of the quest for (or, as Mr. Kent likes to put it, the *strategy of*) peace. The point is, rather, that the very use of the term "strategic" as opposed to, say, "foreign policy," to denote the entire task of intelligence is itself profoundly significant, and that the big job—the carving out of United States destiny in the world as a whole, as contrasted to the conduct of United States policy toward a congeries of nation-states—tends to slip through their fingers.

One illustration of this to which one might point is the ease with which Mr. Kent moves from a definition of the role of intelligence which presupposes that the objectives of foreign policy are *given* (p. 154), as, with respect to the large issues, they are in time of war, and one that runs in terms of "the objective and impartial exploration" of competing alternatives, which is evidently the appropriate definition in peacetime (p. 201). Another illustration is his willingness to acquiesce in a definition of that role which regards the knowledge "upon which we base our high-level national policy toward the other states of the world" as separable into two parts, namely, that about other states and that about something called "our own domestic scene." Such a definition puts the first part in the hands of a distinct group of officials whose "research" must stop short at the three-mile limit even when the thread they are following runs right across it, and yet which tells itself it is using the

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scientific method. (This ends you up with intelligence reports that *never, never* take cognizance of United States policies alternative to the one actually in effect, such problems being "domestic" matters.)

It is this wartime conception of the intelligence function which leads to a "regional breakdown" of the intelligence function, and deems knowledge of the outside world as additive—in the sense that if six regional division chiefs are gathered together in the name of the world situation there also is wisdom about the latter. It is a state of mind characterized by a compulsive preoccupation with *prediction,* with the elimination of "surprise" from foreign affairs. The shadow of Pearl Harbor is projected into the mists of Bogotá, and intelligence looks shamefaced over its failure to tell Secretary Marshall the day and hour at which a revolution will break out in Colombia. The course of events is conceived not as something you try to influence but as a tape all printed up inside a machine; and the job of intelligence is to tell the planners how it reads. With this conception of intelligence one does not, and, on the record at least, cannot distinguish between what we may call absolute prediction and contingent prediction.[6] The latter is what the government needs, especially in peacetime.

2. It is a state of mind dominated by an essentially bureaucratic conception of United States government, and of the intelligence problem. On examining Mr. Kent's discussion of the relation between the "producers" and "consumers" of intelligence (pp. 180-206), one recognizes at once that he is concerned not with the relation between his intelligence experts and the elected officials who, as we hope, are still making the actual decisions about our foreign policy, but with the relation between his intelligence experts and what it is now fashionable to call the "policy planners." The issue here is fundamental: if you conceive the intelligence function in this manner, you are excluding from its purview what this writer would call its most crucial aspect—*i.e.*, that which concerns the communication to

[6] An example of absolute prediction would be: "General DeGaulle will come to power this day six months"; or "Japan will attack Pearl Harbor on *x*-day at *y*-hour." The contingent prediction would read: "The following factors, which can be influenced in such and such a fashion by action from the outside, will determine whether, and if so, when, General DeGaulle will come to power."

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the *politically* responsible laymen of the knowledge which, to use Mr. Lippmann's happy phrase, determines the "pictures" they have in their heads of the world to which their decisions relate. The role of the intelligence agencies becomes, on this showing, that of mere research assistants to the George Kennans.

Mr. Kent might reply to this criticism, as the present writer has heard many of his former colleagues reply: This is how it in fact works, and it would be "unrealistic" to discuss the intelligence function in any other terms. No doubt; but if so, we do not tell ourselves that ours is a book about the "knowledge upon which our nation's foreign relations, in war and peace, must rest" (p. vii). For the state of mind for which *that* book calls is one which explicitly recognizes how small a part of that knowledge can or should be provided by a government operation (*i.e.*, how large a part of it is and should be provided by professional scholarship under non-governmental auspices, and how large a part of it is, whether it should be or not, provided—however badly—by journalists), and how important it is to relate our thinking about that small part to our thinking about the rest.

3. It is a state of mind characterized by a crassly empirical conception of the research process in the social sciences. This, in view of the profound commitment of our intelligence agencies to what we have called the "regional breakdown" of their problem, is not surprising. For, if it is regional units you are building, and it is social scientists specialized to specific countries and areas you wish to staff them with, what you end up with is an extremely high percentage of historians, who with the best will in the world communicate to the operation the characteristic vices (and virtues) of their kind of research. The performance of the intelligence function accordingly becomes a matter of somehow keeping one's head above water in a tidal wave of documents, whose factual content must be "processed"—*i.e.*, in Mr. Kent's language, "analyzed," "evaluated," and exploited as raw material for "hypotheses." The emphasis, as we have already noticed, is on prediction, which against this background is necessarily understood as a matter

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of projecting discernible empirical trends into an indefinite future.

Here also the issue is fundamental: an intelligence operation built upon a conception of the research process in the social sciences that assigns due weight to "theory" as it is understood in economics and sociology and, increasingly one hopes, in politics, would of course be a wholly different affair. It would recruit a considerable percentage of its personnel precisely for its theoretical training and accomplishments; it would free them from the tidal wave of documents; it would enable them to work under conditions calculated to encourage *thought;* it would, above all, give them continuous and instantaneous access (e.g., by international telephone) to the data that really matter, namely the raw data of the developing situation in the outside world. (The documents, having come from abroad, *are as a matter of course* out of date.) This, clearly, is not the place to discuss the comparative merits of the two conflicting conceptions of social research, and it is not intended to suggest that the intelligence function should be delivered over entirely to that implied in the foregoing sentences. The point is, rather, that current planning and organization in the intelligence field ignores one of the two altogether. (It is, from this point of view, highly significant that Mr. Kent, for all his numerous references to the social sciences and social scientists, never employs in that connection the words *theory* and *theorist.*)

4. It is a state of mind characterized by an uncritical optimism regarding the supply of the skills upon which the effective performance of the intelligence function depends. Mr. Kent, quite rightly in this reviewer's opinion, looks primarily to the social sciences for these skills. Like most scholars who served with OSS during the war, however, he tends to envisage the solution of the intelligence personnel problem in terms of attracting back to Washington the social science scholars who, in the course of the shake-up after the war, lost heart and turned their faces homeward—i.e., in terms of a return to a Golden Age situated, like Spain's, in the past. Or, to put the same thing another way, he tends to assume that "out there"—in the universities, in the research institutes, or, one supposes, temporarily unemployed—the men you need exist and await their call. One

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finds in him, and in the intelligence fraternity in Washington, none of the anxieties that would cause most responsible scholars in the fields other than History (for which we leave Mr. Kent, as a professional historian, entirely free to speak) to say to him: There could be no more dangerous error. The supply of skills you have in mind is hopelessly inadequate and, failing drastic national action—for example, a new Manhattan Project, but this time in the social sciences—to increase it, will remain hopelessly inadequate throughout the predictable future. It is inadequate in two senses: We are, and are likely to remain, unable to release any significant number of men to government intelligence without wrecking the teaching programs upon which the future supply of such men must depend; and we have grave misgivings—the economists perhaps less than the rest of us, but the economists also—about the ability of our sciences to supply the sort of knowledge which, in Mr. Kent's phrase, "our highly placed civilians and military men must have."

It is, in fine, not a state of mind which is likely to produce the book all of us have been waiting for someone to write since, twenty-seven years ago, Mr. Lippmann's *Public Opinion* first directed our attention to those pictures in decision-makers' heads—and to the possibility of our deliberately influencing their accuracy. Nor is it a state of mind likely to produce even a small part of the book that would deal with the government's own "high-level foreign positive intelligence." But the publication of *Strategic Intelligence* may well make more possible the writing of these two other critically needed works.

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RESEARCH NOTES

DEMOCRATIC PSYCHOLOGY AND A DEMOCRATIC WORLD ORDER

By THOMAS I. COOK

IF the passing of the European age is not to mean the passing of the democratic way of life, democrats must be better equipped than they now are to carry on the struggle for the minds and hearts of men who dwell beyond the confines of the Western, democratic world. Indeed, if democracy is to maintain itself against the forces which threaten it from within, democrats must reexamine the bases of their belief. The struggles to make the world safe for democracy and to make democracy safe in its traditional Western homelands are indeed so intertwined that the task is as urgent on the one front as it is on the other.

This research note states in schematic form some propositions regarding the psychological premises upon which traditional democratic theory was based and the nineteenth century struggle for democracy prosecuted. It then examines the ways in which the newer psychological assumptions regarding the nonrational bases of political behavior have influenced the doctrinal beliefs supporting the various democratic and authoritarian forms of modern political order. It concludes by attempting a definition of the task of the political philosopher in redefining the concepts and values of democracy to take account of the new insights in psychology. Completion of this task should give new meaning and new vigor to the effort to develop a democratic way of life in a democratic world order.

The generic psychology out of which Western democracy grew was Christian. It rested on two fundamental ideas. The first was, and is, that man is a spiritual animal with a moral purpose, and not simply a subject of a functioning universe with purposes alien to humanity or without purpose at all. The second assumption is that man, while moral, is finite, and therefore imperfect and marked by both original sin and potential

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goodness. Therefore he needs both government and liberty; because of his fundamental nature he can never be a pure creature of the secular political order.

The Reformation, without rejecting these assumptions, added a third: the competence of men to be judges alike of their spiritual ends and of the means thereto. They could dispense with the expert in theology—every man his own theologian.

The more specific and immediate psychological premises, which became the basic credo of nineteenth century struggles for democracy, derived from the Newtonian world, from John Locke and the philosophers of the Enlightenment. They may all be summed up under the rubric of reason.

Reason meant:

1. that the universe is rational;
2. that man has rational power to understand it;
3. that man is subject himself to rational natural law;
4. that, subject to such rational law, he is himself a rational being;
5. that, if he behaves otherwise, it is because he has been hampered by authority acting on environment, including himself, from using and expressing his reason;
6. that, therefore, he must be freed and made equal, not subjected to arbitrary power and enforced hierarchy;
7. that the power of public authority must be reduced to a minimum, and even then made subject to his—that is, to collective control;
8. that, thus enabled to be self-directing within a minimum of order needed for predictability, he will rationally pursue his own interests, using fully his energies;
9. that, himself rational, he will choose to live according to the Golden Rule, not merely through benevolence, but through an enlightened evaluation of his own long-term self-interest;
10. that, at once rationally understanding and necessarily subject to rational law, he will progressively overcome the consequences of past arbitrariness and environmental inequality, will triumph over external nature, and will achieve perfection in his own reason, and in harmony with his fellows.

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From this psychology philosophy derived:

1. guarantees of personal freedoms and protections against arbitrary law enforcement under the Rule of Law;
2. the concepts of majority rule and of representative and responsible government;
3. the conviction that, given free discussion and the absence of suppression in the form of withholding of information, truth, itself attainable, will win out in the competition of the market place.

What new, or different, psychological assumptions do, or may, we hold today? They may be summed up under the rubric nonrationality, on the eighteenth century concept of Reason, which is yet their partial progenitor.

1. Man is a complex of genes, of biological dominants and recessives, of limited but highly varied potentialities.
2. All men, like all living organisms, do have a small number of limited basic needs which must be satisfied for their, and their race's, survival.
3. They possess, amid all the diversity of their structures, and as fundamental thereto, the desires to fulfill those needs.
4. Those desires, common to, yet working through, their specific structures, give them varied power of adaptation to the situations within which they are compelled to seek satisfaction.
5. Particular environments select among, condition, and determine the direction, level, amount of expression of, and repression of, the varied potentialities.
6. For human beings the environment is largely cultural, and even the physical environment is culturally affective. Institutions are of its essence, and, while certain of these are universal in their presence, they are particular in their form.
7. The culture, especially the institution of the family in early years, imposes a pattern of values which, in relation to relevant potentialities, leads in the individual to a set of moral imperatives. These constitute his image of an ideal self.

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8. Similarly, certain of his impulses—his search to express potentialities—are repressed but not eliminated. These lead to lasting and normally increasing conflict with the institutional environment as well as, within the person, with his self-image. These conflicts, through forgetting, are not conscious, but subconscious.
9. They may, however, be removed or reconciled within the self, and with society, by a special conditioning bringing them to the level of consciousness.
10. Since the individual expresses himself through the conditioning environment, changes in that environment can change him by redirection, by giving greater stimulus to potentialities undeveloped and new direction to those developed.
11. The individual is a product of, and continuously functions within, a complex and dynamic total situation.
12. Careful observation, and especially properly directed statistical measurement, will enable us: (a) to know for masses, general or particular, the specific situational status presently prevailing; (b) its trend, if no unpredictables impinge on it; and (c) the probable changes if new elements of conditioning are appropriately introduced.

From this general climate of contemporary or recent psychology may be derived:

1. the judgment that it is possible and desirable to shape a society satisfying and evoking the maximum of diverse potentialities in each individual and in the total population, consistently with dynamic balance within the self and dynamic harmony in the society;
2. the conviction that (a) there is no final and objective truth; (b) that man is not rational, to be persuaded by argument; but (c) that he is more or less adjusted and maladjusted, and reacts and judges accordingly;
3. the inference that, while all are conditioned, those situationally in positions of power and authority may, by using the relevant techniques, condition others to behave and respond as they, the conditioners, choose.

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The psychological assumptions of modern forms of political order derive from: (a) choices from and emphases on the preceding points; (b) acceptance or rejection of various elements in the rationalist doctrine; and (c) attitude towards the generic Western and Christian concept of man.

The Fascist-Nazi totalitarian doctrine:

1. insists that men in complex societies, when left alone to pursue supposedly rational self-interest, but actually to be affected by the chance conditioning of their social-environmental position, end in chaos;
2. argues that there is no known or knowable universal truth; and that debate is therefore irrelevant and wasteful;
3. selects particular trends in the specific society as goods for it, as bases of practicable conditioning to create and preserve order;
4. endeavors to use these to condition its membership, through the judgment of leaders, and their capacity to condition.

Communist teaching:

1. accepts the end of a rational order attainable by man, with freedom and with perfectibility as its corollaries;
2. insists that historically men have been conditioned by a dominant economic pattern of production relations and resultant class systems at once inevitable and necessarily frustrating;
3. argues that it is now possible, and necessary lest chaos supervene, to use specific organizational techniques to shape the environment, and to condition people preparatory to the ideal and universal order;
4. claims that there are persons who have transcended prior conditioning in such a way as to perceive the end and know the means. These must gain and hold power, use it to condition men for the correct end, or to eliminate them if they oppose it and desire to condition men otherwise, most especially to a rejection of environmentalist determinism.

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Modern democratic government:

1. accepts the indefinitely large range and diversity of human potentialities;
2. realizes that a complex and pluralistic industrial civilization evokes, and gives more effective satisfaction to, a wider range than simpler societies, yet also creates more diverse frustrations and maladjustments;
3. believes that the application of scientific knowledge to environmental planning and to human conditioning may continuously remove frustrations and widen the range of potentialities open to realization;
4. sees the process as dynamic and continuous, with some frustrations as the necessary price of realization—a doctrine of risk-taking as inescapable part of personality fulfilment.

Moreover, the theory of democratic government, while acknowledging the reality of conditioning and accepting the findings of science as to behavior, recognizes also that on merely logical grounds the possession of reason—however limited in its development by experience, and however incapable one may be of working without it—has to be assumed. Otherwise the very discoveries of modern psychology themselves become meaningless.

Once given such an assumption, we then return to the concept of a higher or natural law, a universalist ethic. Doctrines of environmentalism and of conditioning then become statements of man's finitude and imperfection, and we are enabled to reconcile, and continuously utilize, scientific discoveries about man, and to accept them as means to contain and continuously overcome his frustrations, or original sin, together with the other basic elements of the Christian tradition. Nevertheless, envisaging the process as continuous, we aim in an open world at continuous avoidance of the disaster of social breakdown, use the concept of rational good as an ideal type, by definition impossible, and do not envision a meta-social solution.

We may then argue:

1. that the ordinary citizen in a democracy, severely limited as he is by particular and immediate experience,

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is capable of a limited predictive judgment as to whether government, and other organization and leadership, have on balance satisfied him, and whether an alternative promises better; and that, provided he is not at the moment of choice excessively maladjusted and frustrated, he can, on the basis of his experience and reason, make fair judgments as to the practicability of that alternative.

2. that the scientists, natural and social, wider by function in ranges of experience, and rational in their realm by a conditioned interest in disinterestedness, can provide the knowledge as to how to move from present maladjustments within and between groups; but that, themselves particular in their sphere, yet in common accepting an open universe which must be kept open for their own fulfilment, they will not impose a closed pattern.
3. that statesmen will act as brokers, not simply between groups, but between experts and lay citizens; and that they will use, in the form of propaganda, conditioning techniques in order to preserve and direct the greater society, but subject always to the judgment of the electorate as to their performance, in a situation where others may similarly function, and in opposition to them.

The implications of these statements become clearer when contrasted with the totalitarian point of view, which holds:

1. that the individual and groups, conditioned, and conditionable, must be fitted to a pattern immediately and once and for all, overcoming maladjustments and creating one closed society;
2. that the scientists must provide the techniques to do this and must accept the finality of the principles chosen for them as bases;
3. that the statesman makes judgment, uses the knowledge of conditioning provided for him to create unity and eliminate maladjustment, and with it the necessity for

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judgment. Those not adjustable, not responsive to conditioning, must be eliminated.

The democrat's answer to this position is that knowledge is never final, that stability is not to be achieved by permanent adjustment—which in a dynamic industrial society is even a short-run impossibility—and that the logic of the system is permanent liquidation.

Only through the generic method of democracy is it possible to reconcile man's uncertainty and his awareness of limitation with his curiosity, and his gaining of some degree of knowledge, to be used and applied in the preservation of a dynamic society. Only through democracy can men's desire for leadership, and creation of leaders, be reconciled with their desire to participate. Only in a democratic society can the desire for personal recognition as a basis of status be reconciled with, and acknowledged to have interdependence with, the demand to express individual divergence. Only in democracy are limited security and predictability to be reconciled with freedom to search, and to be particular.

Yet, if these things are so, why should dissatisfactions with democracy arise, why are some recent dictatorships properly to be viewed as the suicide of democracy, why should democratic thinkers be impressively aware of the latent threat of such suicide in their own régimes?

My own view, by no means original, is that the problem arose precisely out of that rationalism which, creative of democracy, yet in its own dogma, and in its conjunction with events which it at once rationalized and made possible, ignored or undermined the very basis of society in ignoring the limitations and needs of man the social and environmental animal.

Although rationalism attacked and led to the removal of those arbitrary restraints which had come to mean the double frustration of (a) hindrance to release and use of energies, and (b) an order denying the very purpose of law and order—that is, predictability—it still required that energies be not dissipated and wasted, or persons frustrated.

But, in its very concepts of reason, of individualism, of liberty, it did not simply undermine the emotional and traditional bases of a still dominantly landed order; it provided no positive

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grounds for community, for social bonds in the new industrial order of which it was midwife, save enlightened rational individualism, something which the conservatives properly saw as in itself alone no basis at all. Moreover, the later development of rationalism in certain doctrines of laissez-faire, and its reconciliation with evolution in the form of individualist social Darwinism denied the desirability and the possibility of community. Yet the traditional order, in its pure form, was increasingly irrelevant to a situation which, growing out of a timeless and history-less rationalism, made time, and change in time, of the essence of life.

Inequality, impersonal relationships, the growth of the city, the massing of labor, trade cycle insecurity, class conflict,—all these phrases are generically indicative of the development which left the individual with little sense of belonging, of status, of participation, of leadership, of effective power to predict, or to choose between meaningful alternatives. Interdependence within an ever-growing society increased, but its grounds became always more unintelligible, unknowable, uncontrollable. More diverse needs, more variant personality types, could indeed find outlet and satisfaction, but always with great insecurity. Voluntary associations grew in number, contained discontent and limited lostness; but they also competed in a power struggle, itself limitedly contained. Moreover, the more profound emotional ties of traditional institutions, of church and family, were progressively weakened.

Now, in the main, the countries which have embraced totalitarianism, in one form or another, were characterized by: (1) a strong traditional rural-agrarian economy, and a powerful and intransigent ruling class as apex thereto; (2) a late coming of industrialism; (3) no effective development, over a period, of democracy *pari passu* with industrialization. Russia apart, the irrelevance of that tradition to new industry, and, including Russia, its relative incompetence to develop it, go far to explain dictatorship envisaged as an attempt artificially to create, where breakdown of all organic society threatened, or to make possible, where new technology was manifestly incompatible with old tradition, a social pattern which could not itself grow. In particular, the original Fascist dictatorships were precisely designed to overcome the atomizing of a belated second Enlight-

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enment; and Mussolini as critic of the formal dogma of democracy, as seen from an Italian point of view, was precisely right, however inadequate and disastrous his solution.

In the countries which have operated successfully under democratic auspices, various of the following occurred:

1. The acceptance of the formal teachings of rationalist individualism was modified by continuity and adaptability of aristocratic tradition, by coöption and education of those successful in competition into the ranks and arts of statesmen.
2. Democratic institutions were introduced early, and developed *pari passu* with industrialization.
3. The release of energies made possible under rationalist teaching did not, though creating grave and progressive inequality, lead to total disruption of society or conflict within it, or to a complete sense of lack of function in the individual. Success in preserving minimal social bonds was due to the persistence of predictability and to increasing returns, whether through a frontier and untapped resources or through primacy in industrialization, the facts of empire, and the aforementioned civilizing and limitation of rulers.
4. Democracy was able to move from a concept of rigid to one of adaptable rights, especially in the sphere of property; and, whether under the aegis of moral conscience or the impact of practical results of interdependence, in a society of growing inequality, was able to introduce enough restraints and controls to prevent disruption and to promise a politics of positive welfare, social function, and human dignity.
5. Against this background, labor itself was able, though far from easily, and willing, though sometimes hesitantly, to organize for transformation within what was still a society, and to gain power and position therein, with an accompanying sense of dignity and significance for its members, and even, despite its own restrictions, for those potentially members.

Nevertheless, these developments were palliatives, though they preserved uneasily a minimum consensus which allowed authority, democratically designed, to prevent disruption and

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the breakdown of underlying general will, however great the tensions between groups, and the sense of aloneness and lack of total social position of the individual. For the masses, however, there was little sense of belonging within the factory, and, as labor organization grew, it too often adopted the inequalities and the distance between leaders and rank and file characteristic of those with whom it bargained and fought.

Meanwhile, the new technology of the laboratory, resting on a rarefied, imaginative, but to the ordinary man almost meaningless and unintelligible view of a universe indefinitely vast and fundamentally unstable, destroyed the solid security of natural uses of natural materials, and the dependable dominance of the few foundation raw materials of earlier industrialism. In the process it disrupted yet more grievously stability of employment, of habitation and of settled towns and cities, and of the never too stable relations between peoples. Already the symbols of finance and accounting, once a pragmatically rational release, had become meaningless masters with which men could barely cope.

No longer, then, was it possible for men to use freedom effectively to satisfy diverse needs by choosing between intelligible alternatives with predictable risks under a rule of comprehensible law. The year 1929 and the Second World War, as well as the insecurities of the present atomic age, indicated clearly, even within democracy, the inadequacies of institutions to give men fulfilment, to prevent those degrees of maladjustment and frustration which in turn prevent balanced judgment and warrant the fear of democratic suicide unless they be eliminated.

Such elimination necessitates a new planning for, and with, freedom; a new organization of relationships between expert, statesman, people; a new planning of environment utilization; a new conditioning thereby, and by direct methods, of people. It requires a new system of order which, in creating greater predictability, and narrowing the range of choices open to men in the realm of means so as to relate that range to their capacities, effectively releases their energies, and so gives them an opportunity to feel themselves as parts of society and to enjoy with some security the final goods given a new and effective basis through modern technology.

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But I have previously argued that a new psychological basis for democratic organization, consonant with known individual psychological needs, and calculated to eliminate the threat of irrational abandonment of democracy itself, a natural and not absurd consequence of excessive frustrations, of differences between potentiality and performance, is present.

Recognition of its presence, the will, understanding, to utilize it, and to build a relevant and stable democratic order are not uniformly present. Why? Partly, I suggest, because the very insecurities noted have led many to a too facile acceptance of positivism, of ideas of measurement and conditioning, and of men as instruments, or, in Kantian terms, means only, with neglect of, and from supposed need of opposition to, that *philosophia perennis* which has pre-Christian roots. Partly, I think, because the very insights of eighteenth century rationalism, become democratic dogma, have prevented reexamination of psychological and sociological possibilities, and are clung to unadventurously as the one secure basis for avoidance of totalitarianism.

I end, therefore, with two general assertions:

1. that it is necessary to abandon certain prevalent oppositions, between individualism and collectivism, between freedom and planning, between authority and liberty;
2. that it is necessary through reexamination of ancient concepts and their relationships, in the light of psychological and sociological knowledge, to restate certain problems and reconcile certain supposed antitheses, notably:
   a. free will and determinism;
   b. monism and pluralism;
   c. idealism and instrumentalism;
   d. in the light of such philosophic enquiries, the political-social oppositions earlier noted.

Modern psychology, I urge, necessitates such activity. Modern sociological insights assure that it will be profitable and useful as a theoretical basis for a relevant and effectively functioning democratic order. Its provision is, I respectfully urge, the political theorist's obligation and justification.

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